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JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to UTAH 
CODE ANN. §§ 78-2-2(3)0) and 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Issue: Did the trial court err when it denied Appellant's motion to strike 
Appellee's amended memorandum in support of motion for summary judgment? 
Standard of Review: Whether a trial court has erred in interpreting a rule in 
the Utah Code of Judicial Administration is a question of law reviewed under a correction 
of error standard, with no deference accorded to the trial court's determination. N.A.R., 
Inc. v. Fan, 2000 UT App 62, 1 5, 997 P.2d 343, 344. 
Issue Preserved: Appellant preserved the issue in the trial court by filing a 
motion to strike Appellee's amended memorandum in support of motion for summary 
judgment. (R. 1207-12; R. 1512-20.) The trial court provided no written or verbal 
rationale for its denial of the motion to strike. (R. 1532-34.) 
2. Issue: Did the trial court err when it denied Appellant's motion to strike fact 
exhibits contained in Appellee's amended memorandum in support of motion for summary 
judgment? 
Standard of Review: Whether a trial court has erred in admitting out-of-court 
statements under the Utah Rules of Evidence "depends on "whether the trial court's 
analysis involved a factual or legal determination or some combination thereof.'" State v. 
1 
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Parker, 2000 UT 51,113, 4P.3d778, 781. The trial court provided no written or verbal 
rationale for its denial of the motion to strike. (R. 1532-34.) The trial court's decision 
to admit the evidence over Gene Francisconi's objection to its lack of authentication, lack 
of foundation, lack of personal knowledge, conclusory assertions and hearsay should be 
reviewed for abuse of discretion. Klinger v. Kightly, 889 P.2d 1372, 1376 (Utah App. 
1995). ^ 
Issue Preserved: Appellant preserved the issue in the trial court by filing a 
motion to strike the exhibits. (R. 1170-72; R. 1173-1206; R. 1521-31.) P 
3. Issue: Did the trial court err when it determined there was no genuine issue 
as to any material fact regarding Appellant's employment contract claims? 
Standard of Review: Whether a trial court has erred in concluding as a matter of law 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact concerning summary judgment is a 
question of law reviewed under a correction of error standard, with no deference accorded 
to the trial court's determination. Robinson v. TripcoInvestment, Inc., 2000 UT App 200, 
if 9, 398 Utah Adv. Rep. 26. 
Issue Preserved: Appellant preserved the issue in the trial court by filing a 
memorandum in opposition to Appellee's motion for summary judgment on the 
employment contract claims. (R. 1239-44.) The rationale for the trial court's grant of the 
motion for summary judgment is the issue presented for review. (R. 1536-37.) 
2 
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4. Issue: Did the trial court err when it determined there was no genuine issue 
as to any material fact regarding Appellant's intentional infliction of emotional distress 
claim? 
Standard of Review: Whether a trial court has erred in concluding as a matter 
of law that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact concerning summary judgment 
is a question of law reviewed under a correction of error standard, with no deference 
accorded to the trial court's determination. Id. 
Issue Preserved: Appellant preserved the issue in the trial court by filing a 
memorandum in opposition to Appellee's motion for summary judgment on the intentional 
infliction of emotional distress claim. (R. 1245-47.) The rationale for the trial court's 
grant of the motion for summary judgment is the issue presented for review. (R. 1538.) 
5. Issue: Did the trial court err when it determined there was no genuine issue 
as to any material fact regarding Appellant's defamation claim? 
Standard of Review: Whether a trial court has erred in concluding as a matter 
of law that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact concerning summary judgment 
is a question of law reviewed under a correction of error standard, with no deference 
accorded to the trial court's determination. Robinson, supra. 
Issue Preserved: Appellant preserved the issue in the trial court by filing a 
memorandum in opposition to Appellee's motion for summary judgment on the defamation 
3 
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claim. (R. 1244.) The rationale for the trial court's grant of the motion for summary 
judgment is the issue presented for review. (R. 1537-38.) 
6. Issue: Did the trial court err when it determined there was no genuine issue 
as to any material fact regarding Appellant's fraud claim? 
Standard of Review: Whether a trial court has erred in concluding as a matter 
of law that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact concerning summary judgment 
is a question of law reviewed under a correction of error standard, with no deference 
accorded to the trial court's determination. Robinson, supra. *#> 
Issue Preserved: Appellant preserved the issue in the trial court by filing a 
memorandum in opposition to Appellee's motion for summary judgment on the fraud 
claim. (R. 1247-48.) The rationale for the trial court's grant of the motion for summary 
judgment is the issue presented for review. (R. 1538-39.) 
7. Issue: Did the trial court err when it denied Appellant's motion to amend his 
complaint to include a claim of retaliation? 
This issue is withdrawn on appeal due to Mr. Francisconi's determination that the 
claim of retaliation is included in the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is a wrongful termination action and tort action arising out of the way in which 
the termination was carried out. Appellant Eugene Francisconi ("Mr. Francisconi") was 
4 
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terminated by Appellee Union Pacific Railroad Co. ("UP") on April 26, 1996. On that 
day, UP officials had accused Mr. Francisconi of irregularities in connection with certain 
reimbursements for expenses. Two implied agreements providing for employment other 
than at-will arise out of a meeting on that day, and two implied agreements were in place 
before that. UP breached its employment contracts with Mr. Francisconi when it 
terminated him for alleged expense account irregularities. In addition to claims for breach 
of an employment contract, Mr. Francisconi has brought claims for intentional infliction 
of emotional distress, defamation and fraud arising out of the termination. 
B. Course of Proceedings Below. 
After entry of an order denying Mr. Francisconi's motion to strike a majority of the 
exhibits submitted in support of UP's motion for summary judgment (R. 1532), and 
denying Mr. Francisconi1 s motion to strike UPfs amended memorandum in support of its 
motion for summary judgment (id.), the trial court granted UP's motion for summary 
judgment (R. 1536-40). 
C. Statement of Facts. 
1. Mr. Francisconi worked on the railroad for more than 25 years before he was 
terminated. He began his career with the railroad directly out of high school. He started 
as a laborer and worked his way up to a managerial position in six years. He received 
regular merit awards and recognition for superior achievement. He was evaluated annually, 
and always received the highest rating available to his managerial class. (R. 1216.) 
5 
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2. In his position as safety manager based in Salt Lake City from 1990 through 
his termination in 1996, Mr. Francisconi was required to spend approximately 50 percent 
of his time traveling throughout the company's "western region," which included nine 
western states from Cheyenne, Wyoming to the West Coast, and to conferences 
nationwide. (R. 1252-53.) He was responsible for maintenance operations, which 
included locomotive and car safety. The majority of his work-related time was "spent 
traveling to the various locations in the region but [once there] my duties would entail 
safety inspections, safety meetings, safety training." (R. 1252.) %-.-
3. The company's operations in Pocatello, Idaho, were a part of the western 
region, and therefore a part of Mr. Francisconi's geographical area of responsibility. 
During the relevant period (1994-96), Pocatello had the largest terminal in Mr. 
Francisconi's area of responsibility, and employed about 1,200 personnel. (R. 1217.) 
4. By 1996, Mr. Francisconi had extensive experience with the company's 
expense reimbursement policies, and the expense reports in question constitute a fraction 
of the total number of expense reports submitted during the audit period of 1994 through 
1996. (R. 1217.) Prior to April 26, 1996, Mr. Francisconi had never had an expense 
report rejected or otherwise questioned in any way. (Id.) 
5. From 1976, UP caused a Personal Expense Manual and periodic updates 
thereto to be delivered to Mr. Francisconi at his workplace. He thereafter read and 
6 
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retained the expense policy, and was familiar with its contents, including the "in lieu of 
lodging section. (R. 1217-18.) 
6. In 1987, after he became separated (and later divorced) from his then-wife, 
Mr. Francisconi had an intimate relationship with Barbara Tower, another employee of the 
company. At the same time, however, Mr. Francisconi was abruptly transferred to 
corporate headquarters in Omaha, Nebraska, to work for Arthur Shoener, a UP executive, 
as a safety representative. (R. 1270.) ^ 
7. In 1988, while in Omaha, Mr. Shoener told Mr. Francisconi on several 
occasions that he too had had an intimate relationship with Ms. Tower. (R. 1218.) The 
Omaha position was temporary, and Mr. Francisconi was reassigned back to Salt Lake 
City nine months later, after Ms. Tower had left Salt Lake City and employment by UP. 
(R. 1270-71.) 
8. Ms. Tower confirmed that she had an intimate relationship with Mr. Shoener 
for several years in the 1980s (R. 1358-59) as well as 1993 through 1997. (R. 1362-63.) 
9. Mr. Shoener last spoke to Mr. Francisconi about Ms. Tower in 1995 or 
1996, while they were both in Pocatello on business. (R. 1271; R. 1218.) 
10. Mr. Shoener, Vice President of Operations for UP, made the decision on 
behalf of UP to terminate Mr. Francisconi. (R. 1352.) 
11. In 1994, UP caused a pamphlet entitled "Union Pacific General Rules for 
Administering Discipline Effectively" ("UPGRADE Policy") (Appx. J) to be delivered to 
7 
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Mr. Francisconi at his workplace. Mr. Francisconi read and retained the original 
pamphlet that was delivered to him. At no time after receiving the pamphlet did Mr. 
Francisconi receive any training or communication from any source that even implied the 
UPGRADE Policy does not apply to managers. (R. 1218.) 
12. No company employee ever reported to Mr. Francisconi in his position as 
a safety manager. (R. 1218.) ^
 ?r 
13. Thomas Campbell, an Assistant Vice President of the company and Mr. 
Shoener's assistant (R. 1219), instructed Gary Johnson, Mr. Francisconi's supervisor (R. 
1215), to direct Mr. Francisconi to attend a meeting in Omaha on April 26, 1996. (R. 
1324.) Mr. Johnson refused to disclose the purpose of the meeting. (R. 1254, 1256.) 
14. On April 26, 1996, Mr. Francisconi attended a meeting at the Red Lion 
Hotel in Omaha, Nebraska. Once at the meeting, Mr. Francisconi was confronted by six 
UP officers and agents, including several auditors, direct supervisors and a railroad 
policeman, Gary Lottman. (R. 1254.) The meeting lasted four hours. (R. 1257.) 
15. During this time, Mr. Francisconi was shown copies of his expense 
statements and accused of violating the "in lieu of policy by, among other things, 
purchasing improper items and claiming purchase of items as gifts for others when he or 
his wife personally benefitted from the items. He was also accused of being a thief, a liar, 
committing fraud, and abusing his position. (R. 1218.) 
8 
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16. At the meeting, Mr. Francisconi was told that the company was considering 
having him criminally prosecuted, and that the residences of his father and other relatives 
could be searched for stolen items. (R. 1219.) 
17. Toward the end of the meeting, Mr. Lottman said to Mr. Francisconi: "What 
do you think you need to do to keep your job?" (R. 1264.) Mr. Francisconi responded: 
"Well, you tell me what I need to do. I'm willing to make restitution if you think I've 
done something wrong. Tell me what you want me to do. And at that point in time, I 
would have made restitution of any amount they said I needed to keep my job even though 
I felt I was not at fault and even though I felt that I followed the ["in lieu of ] policy." 
(Id.) Mr. Lottman replied: "Well, the first thing you can do to save your job is to fill out 
a statement." (Id.) Mr. Lottman admits he suggested to Mr. Francisconi that he provide 
a statement. (R. 1344.) Mr. Lottman then dictated to Mr. Francisconi the contents of the 
statement, and Mr. Francisconi wrote it out and signed it. (R. 1264.) 
18. Mr. Francisconi disavows the contents of the statement he signed. (R. 1215.) 
He was not informed about the reason for the meeting in Omaha on April 26, 1996. He 
walked into the hotel conference room set aside for the meeting, and was thereafter 
interrogated, non-stop, for the next four hours by six persons, including Mr. Lottman. 
Mr. Francisconi felt the meeting "was very grueling. Gary Lottman sat straight across 
from me. Stared at me the entire time. Very intimidating meeting." (R. 1257.) During 
9 
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the meeting, Mr. Lottman accused Mr. Francisconi of being a liar and a thief, and 
threatened him with criminal prosecution. (R. 1264; R. 1346.) 
19. Mr. Francisconi signed the statement because it was his "understanding that 
by giving them this statement I was saving my job." (R. 1263.) In doing so, he was 
relying on the statements made to him by other employees who had been audited, such as 
James Gallamore, and who Mr. Francisconi thought had much more serious expense 
account irregularities. They had told him prior to the meeting that they had been permitted 
to keep their jobs after signing statements and making restitution. (R. 1263; R. 1216.) 
20. Only after Mr. Francisconi had signed the statement was he then informed 
that doing so would not save his job as he had been promised. Neil Vargason, who was 
the senior UP official present, told Mr. Francisconi that he faced dismissal, and offered 
him two choices: invoke Level 5 UPGRADE or sign a resignation that UP officials had 
brought with them to the meeting. Mr. Francisconi refused to resign, and accepted UP's 
offer to place him in Level 5 UPGRADE. (R. 1265.) 
21. At the time of the meeting, Mr. Francisconi understood Level 5 UPGRADE 
to mean that he would have the right to a hearing on the merits of his dismissal, and the 
right to have committee review any adverse decision resulting from the hearing.(R. 1219.) 
22. Mr. Vargason admits that he may have mentioned Level 5 UPGRADE to Mr. 
Francisconi at the meeting. (R. 1366.) Mr. Lottman admits that Level 5 UPGRADE was 
mentioned. (R. 1345.) 
10 
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23. Mr. Francisconi is not the only manager who believes that he qualifies for 
the UPGRADE Policy. Alan Hill, who replaced Mr. Francisconi, testified that it is his 
understanding that all company employees, including managers, qualify for UPGRADE. 
(R. 1369-70.) He has never been told UPGRADE does not apply to him. (R. 1370.) 
Robert Rupp, who was an assistant manager in Pocatello, also testified that he understood 
all levels of UPGRADE to apply to all employees. (R. 1336-37.) 
24. After the meeting on April 26, 1996, Mr. Francisconi was not allowed to 
return to company headquarters, where he had left his briefcase, without a continuous 
escort. Upon his return to Salt Lake City that same evening, he was met by two railroad 
policeman the moment he exited the airplane. He was told he must immediately relinquish 
his company vehicle and the keys to his office. Without transportation, he made it home 
only after obtaining a ride from a co-worker who had been on the same flight. The railroad 
policemen further told Mr. Francisconi he was no longer authorized to enter company 
property. He was told that he would be contacted by law enforcement. (R. 1219.) 
25. Soon after arriving home and through May 17th, Mr. Francisconi 
experienced extreme anxiety resulting from his dismissal. He broke out in hives for several 
days and could not sleep. (R. 1219.) 
26. Between April 30 and May 17, Thomas Campbell telephoned Mr. 
Francisconi at his home on three separate occasions. (R. 1267; R. 1374.) During each 
of these conversations, Mr. Campbell demanded that Mr. Francisconi sign a resignation 
11 
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and release of liability agreement. He was told that he had until May 17,1996, to sign and 
return the release. Among other provisions, the release would have required Mr. 
Francisconi to waive any right to sue UP for wrongful termination. (R. 1219-20.) 
27. If Mr. Francisconi did not sign the release, Mr. Campbell threatened, he 
would have no insurance from April 30, 1996, not receive COBRA medical coverage, be 
prosecuted for criminal fraud, receive no accrued vacation pay, receive no pay for the 
month of May, and would not be recommended to any prospective employer. (R. 1266-67.) 
28. Mr. Campbell knew before the April 26th meeting that Mr. Francisconi's 
wife, SharFrancisconi, suffered from medical problems. (R. 1373.) Mr. Francisconi also 
told Mr. Campbell during their conversations in May that his wife had had gall bladder 
surgery on May 3,1996, and would again be undergoing nonelective surgery in June 1996 
to remove a growth on her spine that was causing paralysis. (R. 1220.) 
29. At his wife's urging, Mr. Francisconi refused to sign any resignation 
document, and notified Mr. Campbell of this fact on May 17th. (R. 1267.) Mr. 
Francisconi informed Mr. Campbell he would be pursuing legal action to remedy his 
wrongful termination. (R. 1220.) ^
 f 
30. The health care benefits department of UP was directed by Rene Lillard, the 
human resources director of the railroad operations department, which was headed by Mr. 
Shoener, not to offer COBRA coverage to Mr. Francisconi. (R. 1355.) UP did not 
initially offer COBRA coverage to Mr. Francisconi. (Id.) 
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31. Shar Francisconi was previously scheduled to undergo nonelective surgery 
on June 5,1996. On June 3rd, Mr. Francisconi and his wife were contacted by the hospital 
and informed that the surgery was canceled due to no insurance coverage through UP. The 
surgery was rescheduled for July 8th. (R. 1220.) 
32. On June 20, 1996, Mr. Francisconi received a COBRA Election Form from 
UP. The next day, Mr. Francisconi returned the paperwork to UP electing COBRA 
coverage for his wife. (R. 1220.) 
33. On July 3, 1996, Mr. Francisconi and his wife received notice from the 
hospital that the July 8th surgery would be canceled if coverage was not arranged by the 
close of business that day. Shar Francisconi telephoned Larry L. Reiff, UP's benefits 
administrator, to determine why COBRA was still not available. Mr. Reiff was not in his 
office, and Shar Francisconi left a voice mail message. Mr. Reiff did not return her call. 
Later that day, Shar Francisconi faxed Mr. Reiff a letter demanding that coverage be 
provided. Mr. Francisconi and Shar Francisconi were informed later that day that COBRA 
coverage was now in place and the surgery would go forward. (R. 1220.) 
34. Ms. Tower testified that she was told by Tom Haig, an employee of UP, that 
Mr. Francisconi was terminated because he "was cheating on his expense accounts." (R. 
1360.) yt;' -*••• " • • ^-.•,-::.-%^-.. 
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expense reports were first submitted. (R. 1571, at 3 n.3.) But when Mr. Francisconi 
refused to resign, Mr. Johnson reversed himself and suddenly decided the stays were not 
for a business purpose. {Id.) 
46. During the stays in Pocatello, Mr. Francisconi worked full days conducting 
training and other related activities, including on weekends. (R. 1268-69; R. 1214; R. 
1335.) 
47. UP alleged in the trial court that Mr. Francisconi was required to describe 
in the expense reports each recipient of an "in lieu of lodging expense. (R. 1025.) The 
"in lieu of policy does not require an employee to identify the ultimate recipient. (R. 
1300.) A typical standard form used by Mr. Francisconi to seek reimbursement of 
expenses, a copy of which is attached as Appendix I hereto, contains no directive to 
include such information. (R. 1339-41.) 
\. [• 48. UP further alleged in the trial court that Mr. Francisconi had given items 
later reimbursed as "in lieu o f expenses directly to third parties, such as relatives. (R. 
1382.) But the "in lieu o f policy does not prohibit the host from giving an "in lieu o f 
item to a third person. (R. 1300.) ? ,
 : 
49. UP alleged in the trial court that certain items could not be given to the host 
and then reimbursed. (R. 1392-93.) The "in lieu of policy places no limitation on the 
type of item that may be given to a host. (R. 1300.) 
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50. UP prepared reports describing the alleged misconduct of the employees who 
were audited, many of which reports are contained in Appendix E. Summarizing the 
reports of two of the three employees other than Mr. Francisconi who were terminated as 
a result of the audit: 
J.L. Frazier, Senior Director, Maintenance Operations. Reported fictitious 
personal mileage that he claimed at $5,000; inappropriate meals and 
entertainment charges totaling $3,200; altered and fabricated receipts. 
Substantial evidence that he intended to defraud the company. (R. 1571, 
Appx. E, at 3-4.) For instance, responding to a derailment in Laramie, 
Wyoming, Mr. Frazier flew there on the corporate jet, but claimed personal 
mileage traveling there. Changed a $40 receipt to $250 in connection with 
entertainment of people involved in cleanup. Collected ticket stubs at 
restaurants and used those as support for fictitious items. Obtained claim 
checks that were in sequential order and used them periodically to obtain 
reimbursement for fictitious items. Restitution: $15,500. (Id.) 
G.L. Benham, Systems Consultant. On 20 occasions, reimbursed for unused 
flight coupon but flew on the corporate jet. Reported 46 credit card 
purchases in Mexico City, Mexico, even though amounts billed by American 
Express disclosed the exchange rate used by Mr. Benham was less than the 
rate used by American Express. Claimed between $30 and $45 for one-way 
taxi fare from the Railroad's marketing and sales office to the Mexico City 
airport although the current one-way fare is approximately $15. Submitted 
duplicate requests for reimbursement on four occasions ($317). Expensed 
a three-day trip to Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, but was in Omaha the whole 
time. Restitution: $11,928. (7d.,at4.) 
51. Other employees were permitted to keep their jobs despite their serious 
violations of the expense policy. For instance, within Mr. Shoener's line of authority: 
J.D. Gallamore, Senior Director, Maintenance Operations. Reimbursed 
$1,984 for airline tickets. Paid for the tickets with his corporate credit card 
and then was reimbursed twice, when he sought reimbursement for the 
charge to his credit card and when he returned the coupon for 
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reimbursement. Reported an airline ticket ($534) that was charged directly 
to the company, even though the ticket coupon had been stamped "non-
reimbursable" by the travel agent. Reimbursed $9,100 for 13 trips to St. 
Louis (his home town), where he expensed weekend, holiday and vacation 
days. The purpose of the business trips was not adequately explained. 
Purchased 160 Omaha Steaks gift certificates with a value of $9,500. The 
Company was told that the steaks and gift certificates were purchased for the 
Company's Spot Awards Program; however, the steaks were distributed just 
prior to the year-end holiday season and were issued to Mr. Gallamore's 
cousin, his neighbor, unidentified persons, senior-level managers, and other 
inappropriate persons. Reimbursed $6,540 for payments to Thomas 
Campbell for staying at his house in lieu of commercial lodging. For part 
of that time, Mr. Gallamore paid Mr. Campbell $55 per day. Reimbursed 
on 43 occasions ($1,666) for entertainment of locally-based employees. 
These 43 instances represented 37 percent of the workdays Mr. Gallamore 
spent in the Omaha office during the 11-month period in question. Unable 
to account for much of the expense report exceptions. Restitution: $5,202. 
(Id., at 4-5.) "He [Mr. Gallamore] was suspended by Mr. Shoener and Mr. 
Shoener told him to go home and don't come back to the office for a week 
and think about why you want to stay employed with UP, and that was the 
reprimand. Mr. Gallamore sacrificed his merit pay for 1997. He did not 
receive a merit pay increase for 1997, and his bonus for the 1996 
performance year, which would have been approximately $10,000, was not 
given to him." (Zrf.,at5.) 
52. In a Minute Entry dated January 27, 2000 (Appx. A), the trial court denied 
Mr. Francisconi's motion to strike UP's amended memorandum in support of motion for 
summary judgment and denied a request to strike eight exhibits offered in support of that 
memorandum. (R. 1532-34.) 
53. On March 7, 2000, the Hon. Stephen Henriod heard oral argument on UP's 
motion for summary judgment (R. 1535.) On March 21, 2000, the trial court entered a 
Memorandum Decision, granting summary judgment in favor of UP on Mr. Francisconi's 
20 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
five claims for relief. (R. 1536-40, Appx. C hereto.) On April 11, 2000, the trial court 
entered judgment against Mr. Francisconi. (R. 1550-53, Appx. B.) On May 8, 2000, Mr. 
Francisconi filed a Notice of Appeal from the entry of judgment in favor of UP. (R. 1561-
62, Appx. D.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court over-stepped its authority in granting summary judgment in favor of 
UP by acting as the fact finder rather than the gatekeeper who ensures that a genuine issue 
of material fact exists. By requiring Mr. Francisconi to "persuade" it of the merits of his 
claims, the trial court superimposed an improper standard on its determination of the 
motion for summary judgment, and committed reversible error. 
Sufficient evidence was submitted to the trial court to raise a genuine issue of 
material fact as to the existence of one or more implied-in-fact employment contracts with 
terms other than at-will. Specifically, the "in lieu of policy created an agreement that 
Mr. Francisconi would not be terminated for using the policy in an appropriate manner. 
Mr. Francisconi's use of the "in lieu of" policy is highly disputed. Further, the 
UPGRADE Policy that was delivered to Mr. Francisconi created an implied agreement that 
he would not be terminated without the right to invoke Level 5 grievance procedures. 
Irrespective of whether UP allowed managers to grieve dismissal, a reasonable person in 
Mr. Francisconi's position would have believed that UP communicated through its conduct 
and words its agreement to follow certain procedures before dismissal. 
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UP also agreed to a relationship that was other than at-will when it promised, at the 
meeting in Omaha, to allow Mr. Francisconi to keep his job if he would sign the statement 
concerning the alleged audit irregularities. Mr. Francisconi's testimony, as well as the 
admissions of Gary Lottman and Neil Vargason of UP, raise a genuine issue as to whether 
UP agreed to not terminate Mr. Francisconi for his alleged abuse of the expense policy in 
exchange for the statement and continued employment. Finally, the meeting also resulted 
in a promise by UP that Mr. Francisconi could invoke Level 5 UPGRADE as an 
alternative to signing a resignation document that was provided. *, 
With respect to the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the trial 
court substituted its judgment for that of the jury. It improperly resolved highly disputed 
facts, and disregarded other facts, which together created a genuine factual dispute. 
Similarly, Mr. Francisconi offered sufficient facts to raise a genuine issue as to whether 
UP defamed him when it described him as a liar, a thief, and told third persons he was 
terminated because he had been "cheating on his expense accounts." Finally, the fraud 
claim was improperly determined by the trial court, even though sufficient facts were 
offered to raise a genuine issue as to whether UP defrauded Mr. Francisconi when it 
promised him it would not terminate him for the alleged audit irregularities if he would 
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THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER DENYING GENE 
FRANCISCONTS MOTION TO STRIKE UNION 
PACIFIC'S AMENDED MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD 
BE REVERSED 
In its minute entry dated January 27, 2000 (Appx. A), the trial court provided no 
grounds for its decision to deny Mr. Francisconi's motion to strike UP's amended 
memorandum in support of motion for summary judgment. (R. 1532-34.) The basis for 
the motion was UP's failure to submit a conforming memorandum in support of its motion 
for summary judgment within the period ordered for the filing of dispositive motions. 
Rule 4-501(1)(A) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration requires every motion 
("except uncontested or ex-parte matters") to be accompanied by a memorandum of points 
and authorities as well as any materials relied upon in support of the motion. The rule also 
provides that a memorandum supporting a motion "shall not exceed ten pages in length 
exclusive of the 'statement of material facts' as provided in paragraph (2), except as 
waived by order of the court on ex-parte application." For a motion to be effective, a 
party must (1) submit a memorandum of points and authorities, (2) submit an ex-parte 
application for waiver of the ten-page limitation, and (3) obtain an order from the trial 
court granting such waiver. Id. 
On September 28, 1999, the trial court entered an amended scheduling order, 
establishing October 29, 1999, as the discovery cutoff date, and November 30, 1999, as 
the dispositive motion cutoff date. (R. 660-01.) On November 17, 1999, UP filed a 
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motion to enlarge the dispositive motion cutoff date. (R. 803-06) The trial court denied 
the motion to enlarge. (R. 818.) 
On the last day ordered for the filing of dispositive motions, UP filed a motion for 
summary judgment. (R. 819-21.) Its memorandum in support of motion for summary 
judgment was 31 pages in length exclusive of the statement of material facts. (R. 822-52.) 
UP also filed an ex-parte application for leave to file an over-length memorandum. (R. 
979-82.) On November 30,1999, the day it was filed, the trial court denied UP's ex-parte 
application. (R. 977-78.) 
When the trial court denied the application for waiver of the defect in UP's non-
conforming memorandum in support of motion for summary judgment, the memorandum 
was thereby voided. Consequently, within the period ordered for the filing of dispositive 
motions, UP had submitted only a motion without a supporting memorandum of points and 
authorities. In the absence of a memorandum of points and authorities, the motion for 
summary judgment was also defective. See R. 4-501(a)(A) Utah Code of Judicial Admin. 
It may fairly be said that a party that submits an over length memorandum on the 
dispositive motion cutoff date does so subject to the risk that the trial court may deny the 
ex-parte application, and consequently that the memorandum may be thereby voided. 
What is more, because the denial of UP's ex-parte application was entered on the same day 
the application was filed, if UP had acted with the deliberateness that the situation 
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demanded, it could have submitted a timely amended memorandum complying with the 
page limitations set forth in Rule 4-501 (1)(A). 
UP obviously interpreted the trial court's denial of its ex-parte application as a 
voiding of its original memorandum. On December 17,1999, UP purported to file a paper 
it entitled "Amended Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment." (R. 
1023-1163.) Because this "amended memorandum" was filed well after the date ordered 
for the filing of dispositive motions, it should have been disregarded by the trial court as 
untimely. 
The trial court abused its discretion when it refused to strike the amended 
memorandum. (R. 1532-1534.) Ruling without comment, the trial court gave no grounds 
for its disregard of its own scheduling order. (Id.) The ruling therefore has no 
presumption of correctness. Ron Shepherd Insur., Inc. v. Shields, 882 P.2d 650, 654 n. 
7 (Utah 1994). But whatever the basis for the ruling, it was improper. UP never 
requested a change in the scheduling order. Mr. Francisconi had the right to rely upon the 
order as a rule of procedure adopted in this action. Scheduling orders "should not be 
lightly disregarded." Arnold v. Curtis, 846 P.2d 1307, 1310 (Utah 1993). 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER DENYING GENE 
FRANCISCONTS MOTION TO STRIKE FACT 
EXHIBITS OFFERED IN SUPPORT OF UNION 
PACIFIC'S AMENDED MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
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OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD 
BE REVERSED 
With no rationale provided by the trial court for its decision denying Mr. 
Francisconi's motion to strike eight of the fact exhibits attached to UP's amended 
memorandum in support of motion for summary judgment, the basis for the ruling is 
unknown. As noted above, the ruling therefore has no presumption of correctness. Ron 
Shepherd Insur., 882 P.2d at 654 n. 7. In view of the page limitations attending the 
preparation of this brief, it is impossible to repeat in detail all of the grounds for striking 
the exhibits that were raised in the trial court. Consequently, the supporting and reply 
memoranda submitted in the trial court in connection with the motion to strike the exhibits 
are attached as Appendices F and G hereto. The following is a brief summary of the 
grounds for striking each exhibit. 
"Application for Employment". This document was never authenticated. The 
proponent of writings or other documentary evidence must first authenticate the evidence 
by "showing that it is what the proponent claims it to be." State v. Jacques, 924 P.2d 
898, 900-01 (Utah App. 1996). C/., Utah R. Evid. 901(a). In his deposition, Mr. 
Francisconi testified he had no recollection of the document, which is dated August 10, 
1970. (R. 1198.) UP offered no other evidence showing personal knowledge that the 
"Application for Employment" is what UP claim it to be, namely, Mr. Francisconi's 
employment application. Further, the document that was attached to UP's motion for 
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summary judgment was not the same three page document offered at Mr. Francisconi's 
deposition. (R. 1177-78.) 
The "Application for Employment" is also hearsay. "Hearsay is v a statement, other 
than one made by the declarant while testifying at trial or hearing, offered in evidence to 
prove the truth of the matter asserted.'" Klinger, 889 P.2d at 1376 (quoting Utah R. Evid. 
801(c)). Recognizing this, UP, in its response to the motion to strike, offered the affidavit 
of Michael Bernard to qualify the document as a business record under Utah Rule of 
Evidence 803(6). 
For evidence to be admissible as a business record, a proper foundation must 
be laid to establish the necessary indicia of reliability. That foundation 
should generally include the following: (1) the record must be made in the 
regular course of the business or entity which keeps the records; (2) the 
record must have been made at the time of, or in close proximity to, the 
occurrence of the act, condition or event recorded; (3) the evidence must 
support a conclusion that after recordation the document was kept under 
circumstances that would preserve its integrity; and (4) the sources of the 
information from which the entry was made and the circumstances of the 
preparation of the document were such as to indicate its trustworthiness. 
[Trolley Square Ass's v. Nielson, 886 P.2d 61, 66 (Utah App. 1994) (quoting 
State v. Bertul 664 P.2d 1181, 1184 (Utah 1983)).] 
"The foundation must be laid using sthe testimony of the custodian [of business records] 
or other qualified witness.' Klinger, 889 P.2d at 1377 (quoting Utah R. Evid. 803(6)). A 
"qualified witness" has personal knowledge of the authenticity of the document. Id. 
Mr. Bernard is the Director of Auditing of UP (R. 1470), and in 1996 held the 
position of Manager - Auditing (R. 14712). In his affidavit, Mr. Bernard offered the 
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following facts to establish himself as a "qualified witness," and to otherwise lay the 
foundation required under Rule 803(6): 
Attached hereto as Exhibit 2 is a copy of the Application for Employment of 
Eugene Austin Francisconi dated August 10, 1970. Contained within the 
Application for Employment is a statement of the Terms and Conditions of 
Employment. The Application for Employment, including the Terms and 
Conditions of Employment is part of the company's official records and is &t; 
maintained in the normal course of business within Mr. Francisconi's 
personnel file. [R. 1471-72.] v?; 
Thus, Mr. Bernard, the Director of Auditing, does not establish any basis for his 
alleged personal knowledge of the personnel record keeping practices of UP in 1970, 
when the document was purportedly made, or at any other time. Indeed, he fails to allege, 
to say nothing of establish, that the "Application for Employment" was prepared by a 
person with knowledge or transmitted to a custodian of the record by a person with 
knowledge; fails to identify the record keeping practices of the company pursuant to which 
the record was supposedly maintained over the past 30 years as part of a regularly 
conducted business activity, fails to identify the location of the alleged personnel file, and 
so forth. As such, in addition to lack of authentication, the "Application for Employment" 
was inadmissible hearsay. 
Affidavit of John Ivester with attached "In Lieu of Lodging Schedule." Mr. Ivester 
allegedly performed the actual audit of Mr. Francisconi's expense statements, and UP 
offered his affidavit with attached schedule to establish that Mr. Francisconi had abused 
the expense policy. (R. 1058-64.) Approximately one-third of UP's statement of facts in 
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support of its motion for summary judgment were derived from Mr. Ivester's affidavit with 
attached schedule. (R. 1024-27, at 115-7, 9-15,25-27, and 29.) He alleged, among other 
things, that Mr. Francisconi had attempted "to conceal the nature of the purchased 
merchandise," and referred to expense statements, receipts, unnamed "store personnel," 
unidentified "information to the auditor," unattached American Express statements, and 
the like as the basis for the information contained in the schedule, and for his conclusions. 
(R. 1058-64.) 
But Mr. Ivester never established that the information he relied upon was subject 
to a hearsay exception. The expense statements, receipts and "store personnel" were all 
hearsay. Indeed, all of the information he relies upon is hearsay. He has no personal 
knowledge to support any allegation in his affidavit or the attached schedule. 
UP made no attempt to qualify Mr. Ivester as a records custodian or qualified 
witness, and no foundation was laid to qualify the expense statements and receipts as 
business records. Even if he had established this foundation, Mr. Ivester's summary and 
conclusions drawn therefrom were still inadmissible because they were not prepared as part 
of a regularly conducted business activity. Trolley, 886 P.2d at 67 (ruling summaries of 
monthly statements were inadmissible because they were prepared in anticipation of 
litigation, and not in the regular course of business) (quoting Shurtleffv. Jay Tuft & Co., 
622 P.2d 1168, 1174 (Utah 1980)). 
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"Interview Summary" prepared bv Janice Arthur. UP alleged that Ms. Arthur 
"took detailed notes of the interview" in Omaha, and "then prepared a written summary 
of the questions asked and given by Mr. Francisconi." (R. 1026.) But in her deposition, 
Ms. Arthur stated she prepared a report of the interview that was "a paraphrase based 
upon my memory and the notes that I had, yes." (R. 1192.) These notes were hearsay. 
The notes that she relied upon, she further stated, included the notes of "Mike Bernard and 
Jim Hale" as well as her own. (R. 1191.) These notes were also hearsay. The "Interview 
Summary," therefore was based on hearsay. UP never separated that portion of the 
"Interview Summary" that was supposedly the product of Ms. Arthur's own recall of 
alleged admissions from that portion that was a product of the notes of Messrs. Bernard 
and Hale. Further, the "Interview Summary" only refers to an identified "I"as the source 
of the questions that were allegedly asked of Mr. Francisconi. These statements 
attributable to "I" were hearsay. UP also asserted in its statement of facts that Mr. 
Francisconi made certain admissions, none of which are actually contained in Ms. Arthur's 
"Interview Summary." As such, the alleged admissions lack sufficient credibility, and are 
hearsay (notes of Bernard, Hale or Arthur) within hearsay (Arthur's paraphrase of notes 
or recollection). * 
"Summary" of alleged findings of corporate audit staff. In paragraph 32 of its 
statement of facts, UP alleged that its corporate audit staff "prepared a summary of its 
findings," and purported to attach a copy of that summary to its motion for summary 
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judgment. (R. 1028.) In its response to the motion to strike, UP attempted to authenticate 
the summary through the affidavit of Michael Bernard, and attempted to overcome the fact 
that the summary was based entirely on hearsay by asserting: "Shortly after the 
Francisconi interview, I prepared an Executive Summary of the expense report 
irregularities disclosed by the audit." (R. 1471.) Clearly, the "Summary" is inadmissible 
hearsay, and/or hearsay ("summary") within hearsay ("irregularities disclosed by the 
audit"). 
Letter from Larry L. Reiff dated June 7. 1996. In support of the proposition that 
it offered timely COBRA coverage to Mr. Francisconi, UP attached a purported letter 
from Larry L. Reiff dated June 7, 1996. (R. 1028; R. 1137.) Mr. Reiff was never 
deposed in this action, and UP did not file an affidavit from him to authenticate the letter. 
It is also inadmissible hearsay. 
Letter from Larry L. Reiff to Dennis Seals. In further support of the proposition 
that it offered timely COBRA coverage, UP attached a purported letter from Mr. Reiff to 
Dennis Seals of United Health Care of Utah. (R. 1029; R. 1139.) This document also 
lacks authentication of any kind and is hearsay. 
Letter from Rene Orosco to Kevin L. Newton, and letter from P.P. Matter to 
Kevin L. Newton. In support of the proposition that the UPGRAPE Policy "has never 
been applied to management employees," UP offered a letter from Rene Orosco to Kevin 
L. Newton dated September 6, 1994, and a letter from P.P. Matter to Kevin L. Newton 
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dated June 29, 1994. (R. 1029; R. 1162-63.) Neither of these three individuals was ever 
deposed in this action, and they provided no affidavits. The letters lack authentication and 
are hearsay. i 
In view of the clear inadequacy of the foregoing exhibits, the trial court abused its 
discretion when it summarily and without comment admitted this evidence and, 
presumably, relied upon the exhibits to grant summary judgment in favor of UP. The 
remaining evidence4 was insufficient for UP to satisfy its ultimate burden of persuasion of 
showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING THAT THERE IS NO 
GENUINE ISSUE AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACT 
CONCERNING SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE 
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT CLAIMS SHOULD BE 
REVERSED 
The Utah Supreme Court has summarized the standard for reviewing a trial court's 
grant of a motion for summary judgment as follows: s • , 
Summary judgment allows the parties to pierce the pleadings to 
determine whether a material issue of fact exists that must be resolved by the 
fact finder. In accordance with this rule, the party moving for summary 
judgment must establish a right to judgment based on the applicable law as 
applied to an undisputed material issue of fact. A party opposing the motion 
is required only to show that there is a material issue of fact. Moreover, as 
4
 After striking the seven exhibits in question, the following exhibits remain: B 
(deposition of Eugene Francisconi), D (Personal Expense Manual), F (Statement), G 
(deposition of J. Neil Vargason), I (deposition of Arthur Shoener), J (proposed Separation 
Agreement), K (deposition of Richard E. Messner), and N (UPGRADE Policy). 
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to questions concerning material issues of fact, affidavits and depositions 
submitted in support of and in opposition to a motion for summary judgment 
may be used only to determine whether a material issue of fact exists, not to 
determine whether one party's case is less persuasive than another's or is not 
likely to succeed in a trial on the merits. Accordingly, because this is an 
appeal from a summary judgment, we review the factual submissions to the 
trial court in a light most favorable to finding a material issue of fact. A 
genuine issue of fact exists where, on the basis of the facts in the record, 
reasonable minds could differ on any material issue. [Ron Shepherd Insur., 
882 P.2d at 654-55 (internal citations and quotations omitted).] 
In its Memorandum Decision, the trial court purported to resolve factual disputes 
that should have precluded summary judgment, and improperly placed the burden on Mr. 
Francisconi to prove his case when he is only required to point to facts establishing the 
existence of a genuine issue of material fact. With respect to the employment contract 
claims, the trial court stated: 
Mr. Francisconi fails to make a persuasive case that either of these policies 
[the "in lieu o f policy or the UPGRADE Policy] changed the nature of his 
employment. Mr. Francisconi fails to marshal any arguments or show any 
specific provisions in either of the above-referred to policies to indicate that 
the nature of his employment changed in any way. Mr. Francisconi was an 
at-will employee at the time he was terminated. [R. 1536-37, emphasis 
added.] 
The at-will presumption is just that-a presumption. Ryan v. Dan's Food Stores, 
Inc., 972 P.2d 395, 400 (Utah 1998). An employee may overcome the presumption by, 
among others, showing that an implied-in-fact contract of employment existed that 
"prohibited an employer from terminating an employee without cause or without satisfying 
other agreed-upon conditions." Id. Evidence of an employer's intention to modify the at-
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will relationship to create an implied-in-fact contract of employment may include employee 
handbooks, company manuals, bulletins, oral statements, and the employer's course of 
conduct. Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 818 P.2d 997, 1002 (Utah 1991). The 
existence of an implied-in-fact employment contract is a question of fact for the jury. 
Ryan, 972 P.2d at 401.5 , 
A. A Genuine Issue of Material Fact Exists as to Whether the "In Lieu Of" Policy 
Shows an Implied-In-Fact Employment Contract 
By 1996, approximately 50 percent of Mr. Francisconi's work-time as a safety 
manager was taken up traveling from one location to another throughout a nine state area 
of responsibility. (R. 1252-53.) The job of safety manager could not be performed 
without extensive travel. (Id.) UP published the expense policy to Mr. Francisconi. To 
induce him to perform his job as safety manager, UP agreed that it would not make Mr. 
Francisconi's use of the "in lieu of policy a basis for termination so long as the use was 
proper.6 To suggest otherwise would be to say that UP and Mr. Francisconi impliedly 
5
 As the Utah Supreme Court noted in Sanderson v. First Sec. Leasing Co., 844 
P.2d 303 (Utah 1992), "at-will employment is a bundle of different privileges, any or all 
of which an employer can surrender through" an oral statement or other forms of 
evidence. Id. at 307. "An employer can, for example, agree to use a certain procedure 
for firing employees or promise not to fire employees for a certain reason, thereby 
modifying the employee's at-will status." Id. 
6
 No Utah court has been asked to determine an implied-in-fact employment contract 
in this context. However, Metcalfv. Intermountain Gas Co., 778 P.2d 744, 745 (Idaho 
1989) is persuasive authority. In that case, under an employer's policy, an employee could 
accrue sick leave at a rate of one day per month. While on full-time status, an employee 
incurred some illness which required her to take sick leave. Although her illness did not 
34 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
agreed that he could be terminated for using the "in lieu of policy even if the use is 
proper. Mr. Francisconi did not agree to such a term, and UP could not attract qualified 
employees if it had required them to self-finance travel. 
UP claims it terminated Mr. Francisconi solely for alleged violations of the "in lieu 
of policy. (R. 1377.) Thus, in the event Mr. Francisconi's use of the "in lieu of policy 
was proper-and it was-UP breached its contract with Mr. Francisconi. 
The question for the jury is whether Mr. Francisconi's use of the "in lieu o f policy 
was proper. The trial court determined that Mr. Francisconi had violated the "in lieu of 
policy,7 even though he had presented evidence disputing the two main issues UP had 
exhaust all of her accrued sick leave, the employee was absent for an extended period. 
Later, the employee's manager reduced her status to part-time at least in part because of 
her sick leave history. The employee sued for breach of employment contract. The 
employer defended by asserting there was no written limitation on its rights to reduce the 
employee's working hours. The trial court agreed with the employer, finding that the sick 
leave policy did not "reach that level of specificity required to constitute an offer for 
contract." The Idaho Supreme Court reversed, holding that a material issue of fact existed 
regarding whether, "by providing for accumulated sick leave benefits, the employer 
impliedly agreed with the employee that the employment relationship would not be 
terminated or the employee penalized for using the sick leave benefits which the employee 
had accrued." Id. at 747. The Idaho Supreme Court applies the same principals as the 
Utah Supreme Court to determine the existence of implied-in-fact terms of employment. 
7
 For instance, the trial court stated: "Mr. Francisconi did in fact misuse the v in lieu 
of policy to the tune of approximately $2,500, using the policy to distribute gifts to 
members of his family, not the person he stayed with on his business visits to Pocatello." 
(R. 1538.) The trial court apparently had so concluded before oral argument on the motion 
for summary judgment. Soon after Mr. Francisconi's counsel began to speak in opposition 
to UP's allegations, the trial court cut counsel off. "That is not going to fly very far, Mr. 
Burns," the trial court stated. "I mean if that's his explanation then he violated the policy, 
as far as I'm concerned. That's a really lame (inaudible) to the allegation that he didn't 
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raised in connection with the policy. Mr. Francisconi disputed the allegation that he failed 
to give items to the host that were later reimbursed under the "in lieu o f policy (R. 1215), 
and he showed he worked during each day he was in Pocatello in connection with the 
disputed overnight stays (R. 1268-69; R. 1214; R. 1335). Each of those overnight stays 
was also approved in writing by Gary Johnson, Mr. Francisconi's supervisor. (R. 1325; 
R. 1214.) 
The "in lieu of policy did not prevent a host from using an "in lieu of" expenditure 
to benefit someone else, and it did not require a detailed description on the expense report 
of each meal, merchandise or other expenditure given to a host in lieu of commercial 
lodging. (R. 1300.) Indeed, as Mr. Francisconi noted in his deposition, the "in lieu o f 
policy expressly permitted an employee to give "cash" to a host. {Id.) The particular use 
to which a host put the cash would, of course, be unknown. It therefore follows that a 
host, such as Alfred Francisconi, could receive and then give an "in lieu o f expenditure 
to a third person in the same way that he could accept cash and put it to any use, including 
purchasing merchandise to give to a third person. 
The only admissible evidence UP offered to prove that Mr. Francisconi did not give 
the items to the host was the statement it coerced and defrauded from him at the meeting, 
and Janice Arthur's notes of Mr. Francisconi's alleged admissions. He disavows the 
use the policy properly." (Appx. H, at 16-17.) Counsel was not permitted to defend Mr. 
Francisconi's actions. 
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contents of that statement and swore in his affidavit that the admissions were fabricated. 
It is for the jury to weigh his credibility in this regard. 
B. A Genuine Issue of Material Fact Exists as to Whether the UPGRADE Policy 
Shows an Implied-In-Fact Employment Contract 
The trial court asserted that Mr. Francisconi "fails to marshal any argument or show 
any specific provision in . . . [the UPGRADE Policy] to indicate that the nature of his 
employment changed in any way." (R. 1537.) However, Mr. Francisconi presented 
substantial evidence that the pamphlet entitled UPGRADE Policy that UP published to him 
provided certain procedures for dismissing him, thereby modifying his at-will status. See 
Sanderson, 844 P.2d at 307. 
The UPGRADE Policy states: "A formal hearing is required for Level 5 cases/' 
(R. 1148.) A Level 5 case concerns permanent dismissal. (R. 1151.) Further, by way 
of example only, the Overview section of the UPGRADE Policy states: "Discipline cases 
for level 5 violations will be reviewed for consistent policy application by an Executive 
Committee consisting of Representatives from human Resources, Labor Relations, and the 
Employing Department." (R. 1145.) Similarly, "The UPGRADE Coordinator will be 
consulted before an Employee is charged with a Level 5 offense, other than for Rule 1.5 
(Rule "6")." (Id.) It is undisputed that UP did not follow the Level 5 procedures before 
it terminated Mr. Francisconi. 
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UP alleged in the trial court that the UPGRADE Policy was available to union 
employees but not managers such as Mr. Francisconi. (R. 1032.) In support of this 
proposition, UP referred not to the language of the UPGRADE Policy, but rather to two 
obscure letters (id.) which Mr. Francisconi never saw, and which he moved to strike as 
hearsay. It also offered the testimony of Arthur Shoener, who terminated Mr. Francisconi. 
But Mr. Shoener admitted that he is unaware of any writing ever sent to employees stating 
that the UPGRADE Policy is not available to managers, and could not point to a provision 
in the Policy itself that says that. (R. 1350-51.) In short, UP presented no evidence that 
Mr. Francisconi was ever told the UPGRADE Policy allegedly was not available to him. 
UP's focus on its alleged official policy that Level 5 UPGRADE is not available to 
managers was always a red herring. The relevant evidence here is what did UP 
communicate to Mr. Francisconi through its words and conduct that would have led a 
reasonable person to believe that an offer to modify an at-will status had been made. 
In addition to the specific language recited above, the first sentence of page one of 
the UPGRADE Policy informed Mr. Francisconi that its procedures applied "across the 
entire railroad system." (R. 1143.) The last sentence of that same page concluded: the 
"UPGRADE Policy will achieve its goals and will be a benefit for all employees and the 
company." Mr. Francisconi never received training on the UPGRADE Policy or was 
otherwise told by anyone that it did not apply to persons in his position. (R. 1218.) There 
was no reason for him to receive the pamphlet if it applied only to non-managers since he 
38 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
had not supervised employees since 1976. (Id.) As such, he had only the plain language 
of the UPGRADE Policy itself to guide him on its application, and in this regard he 
reasonably interpreted the language of the policy to mean what it said, namely, that it 
applied "across the entire railroad system" and to "all employees," including managers. 
Mr. Francisconi retained and still possesses the original pamphlet he received in 1994. 
(Id.) ' - : - • " ' 
Mr. Francisconi was not alone in his belief that the UPGRADE Policy applied to 
"all employees." Alan Hill, Mr. Francisconi's replacement as safety manager, testified 
that the UPGRADE Policy applied to him (R. 1369-70), and Robert Rupp, formerly an 
assistant manager, testified the UPGRADE Policy applies to all employees. (R. 1336-37.) 
Also, it is undisputed that UPGRADE was first raised by Neil Vargason, the senior person 
in the room at the Omaha meeting (R. 1366), and that Gary Lottman also mentioned the 
UPGRADE Policy at the meeting (R. 1345). These facts created a genuine issue of 
material fact. 
C. A Genuine Issue of Material Fact Exists as to Whether Union Pacific's Promise 
that Gene Francisconi Could Keep His Job in Exchange for Signing the 
Statement Shows an Implied-In-Fact Employment Contract 
The trial court did not discuss or even mention this claim in its Memorandum 
Decision. (R. 1536-40.) 
Towards the end of the Omaha meeting, Mr. Francisconi asked UP's agents what 
he could do to keep his job and avoid being dismissed as a result of the company's audit 
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of the expense statements. (R. 1264.) Gary Lottman, in the presence of Neil Vargason, 
offered to allow Mr. Francisconi to keep his job in exchange for writing and signing a 
statement that Mr. Lottman would dictate to Mr. Francisconi. (R. 1264; R. 1344.) Mr. 
Lottman admits he suggested Mr. Francisconi provide a statement. (R. 1344.) 
Mr. Francisconi accepted this offer to modify his at-will status by writing out the 
statement that Mr. Lottman dictated to him because it was Mr. Francisconi's 
"understanding that by giving this statement I was saving my job." (R. 1264.) The 
contract provision prohibited UP from dismissing Mr. Francisconi as a result of the audit. 
By immediately dismissing Mr. Francisconi on that very basis the moment after he had 
provided the statement, UP breached the oral agreement. Sanderson is on point and should 
have precluded summary judgment on these facts.8 Mr. Francisconi's testimony coupled 
with the admissions of Messrs. Vargason and Lottman created a genuine disputed fact. 
D. A Genuine Issue of Material Fact Exists as to Whether Union Pacific's Promise 
That Gene Francisconi Could Choose Level 5 UPGRADE Shows an Implied-In-
Fact Employment Contract 
8
 In Sanderson, the plaintiff, who was suffering from a serious illness of unknown 
origin, was told by his employer to "take all the time . . . needed, do what needed to [be] 
done. When [he] was ready to come back the job would be there." Id. 972 P.2d at 305. 
When the plaintiff returned to work, he was informed that his supervisor was disappointed 
in him and was told that he must accept a demotion or be terminated. The plaintiff chose 
termination. The employee handbook explicitly provided that employment was at-will. 
Following his termination, the plaintiff sued, alleging that his employer breached its oral 
assurances that the job "would be there" when the plaintiff was ready to return to work. 
The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the employer. 
A jury could find that the employee had an implied-in-fact contract with the employer, the 
Court held. Id. at 307. 
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Here again the trial court did not discuss or even mention the claim. After Mr. 
Francisconi had signed the statement and Neil Vargason and the others returned to the 
conference room after conferring outside, Mr. Vargason told Mr. Francisconi that he faced 
dismissal, and offered him two choices: invoke Level 5 UPGRADE or sign a resignation 
and release of liability agreement that UP had brought to the meeting. (R. 1265.) Mr. 
Vargason admits he may have mentioned UPGRADE to Mr. Francisconi at this juncture. 
(R. 1366.) Mr. Lottman admits that Level 5 UPGRADE was mentioned as well. (R. 
1345.) At the time, Mr. Francisconi understood Level 5 UPGRADE to mean that he 
would have the right to a hearing on the merits of his dismissal, and the right to have a 
committee review any adverse decision resulting from the hearing. (R. 1219.) Mr. 
Francisconi refused to resign, and immediately accepted UP's offer of Level 5 
UPGRADE. 
By subsequently dismissing Mr. Francisconi without affording the Level 5 
procedures, UP breached its oral agreement. Sanderson is on point here as well. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING THAT THERE IS NO 
GENUINE ISSUE AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACT 
CONCERNING SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE 
INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL 
DISTRESS CLAIM SHOULD BE REVERSED 
On this claim the trial court asserted: 
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The allegations that Mr. Francisconi makes do not rise to the standard 
required. Union Pacific had a right to terminate under the circumstances, 
and the other allegations such as cutting off medical coverage and vacation 
pay simply did not occur. In addition, credible evidence adduced on the part 
of the defendant indicates that the allegations are not true. [R. 1538.] 
The "standard required" to support a claim of infliction of emotional distress is 
conduct which is "voutrageous and intolerable'" such that it offends against "vthe 
generally accepted standards of decency and morality.'" Retherford v. AT&T 
Communications ofMt. States, 844 P.2d 949, 978 n. 19 (Utah 1992) {quoting Samms v. 
Eccles, 358 P.2d 344, 347 (Utah 1961)). What that means is fact sensitive and a question 
for the jury.9 In Retherford, for instance, the trial court's grant of summary judgment to 
the defendant was reversed due to conduct consisting of "shadowing [Retherfordfs] 
movements, intimidat[ing] her with threatening looks and remarks, and manipulating] 
circumstances at her work in ways that made her job markedly more stressful..." Id. at 
969-970. UP's conduct pales by comparison. 
UP's conduct, which the trial court apparently chose to disregarded because it found 
that UP had a "right to terminate," may be summarized as follows: 
During the April 26th meeting UP claimed that Mr. Francisconi was 
a liar and a thief and threatened him with criminal prosecution (R. 1264; R. 
9
 "Juries are uniquely qualified to judge whether conductv falls above or below the 
standard of reasonable conduct deemed to have been set by the community.'" Trujillo v. 
Utah Dept. ofTransp., 1999 UT App 227, 142, 986 P.2d 752, 764 (quoting Darrington 
v. Wade, 812 P.2d 452, 459 n. 4 (Utah App. 1991) (citations omitted)). Thus, "The court 
[should intervene] only when it can say that the actor's conduct clearly meets the standard 
or clearly falls below it." Darrington, supra (citing case). 
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1219; R. 1346); it made threats to search the house of his father (R. 1219); 
it subjected him to over 4 hours of interrogation and accusation without prior 
warning and with no representation or opportunity to refute its accusations 
(R. 1257; R. 1215); and it forced him to sign a statement in order to save 
his job and then demanded that he resign or face criminal prosecution (R. 
1264-65). 
After the meeting, Mr. Francisconi was not allowed to return to 
company headquarters, where he had left his briefcase, without a continuous 
escort. Upon his return to Salt Lake City that same evening, he was met by 
two railroad policeman the moment he exited the airplane. He was told he 
must immediately relinquish his company vehicle and the keys to his office. 
Now without transportation, he was fortunately able to obtain a ride home 
from a co-worker who had been on the same flight. The railroad policeman 
further told him he was no longer authorized to enter company property. He 
was told that be would be contacted by law enforcement. (R. 1219.) Soon 
after arriving home and through May 17th, Mr. Francisconi experienced 
extreme anxiety resulting from his dismissal. He broke out in hives for 
several days and could not sleep. (Id.) 
A few days after the April 26th meeting, Thomas Campbell, an 
Assistant Vice President and Arthur Shoener's personal assistant, sent Mr. 
Francisconi a resignation and release of liability agreement. (R. 1220-21.) 
For the next three weeks, and through May 17th, Mr. Campbell made at 
least three phone calls to Mr. Francisconi's home, attempting to coerce him 
into signing the agreement. (Id.) Mr. Campbell knew that Mr. 
Francisconi's wife had had gall bladder surgery in early May, and that she 
was scheduled to undergo non-elective surgery in June 1996. (R. 1237; R. 
1373.) He told Mr. Francisconi that if he did not sign the agreement, his 
health insurance would be canceled retroactively to April 30th and COBRA 
medical coverage would not be offered, thus leaving him unable to pay for 
his wife's surgery. (R. 1266-67.) Mr. Campbell also threatened Mr. 
Francisconi with criminal prosecution, and told him that if he did not sign 
the agreement then the company would deny accrued vacation, he would 
receive no salary for the month of May, and any prospective employer 
would receive a negative report about him. (Id.) 
On May 17th, Mr. Francisconi informed Mr. Campbell that he would 
not resign. (R. 1267.) UP thereafter acted to punish him. His wife's 
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surgery had been scheduled for June 5, 1996, but had to be canceled two 
days before that due to no insurance coverage. (R. 1220.) The surgery was 
rescheduled for July 8th. Rene Lillard, a subordinate of Mr. Shoener's, 
instructed the UP benefits department to not offer COBRA coverage to Mr. 
Francisconi. (R. 1355.) 
Mr. Francisconi had once dated Barbara Tower (R. 1270), who was 
before, during and after the termination, the mistress of Arthur Shoener (R. 
1358-59; R. 1362-63). Mr. Shoener knew that Mr. Francisconi had once ^ 
been intimate with Ms. Tower. (R. 1218.) Mr. Shoener made the decision 
on behalf of UP to terminate Mr. Francisconi. (R. 1352.) 
Of the 200 audited employees, only three in addition to Mr. 
Francisconi were terminated or forced to resign as a result of the audit. 
Most of those with audit irregularities were allowed to keep their jobs. 
Indeed, of those employees within Arthur Shoener's line of authority (car 
maintenance operations), only J.L. Frazier and Mr. Francisconi were 
terminated as a result of the audit. (R. 1571, Appx. E, at 3.) Mr. Frazier 
was, according to the Director of Auditing, Michael Barnard, the most 
"egregious" violator of the expense policy of all 200 employees who were 
audited. (Id.) By contrast, Mr. Shoener allowed James Gallamore to keep 
his job even though, without question, his restitution amount of $5,000, 
forfeiture of merit pay and a $10,000 bonus resulted from far worse 
misconduct than that alleged against Mr. Francisconi. (Id., 4-5.) 
Mr. Francisconi was singled out from all other audited employees. 
He was, for instance, the only employee against whom UP pursued a 
criminal case in connection with the audit. (Id., at 2.) A UP auditor was 
unaware of any instance in which the company has ever made a criminal 
referral as a result of an audit. (Id.) The arbitrary restitution amount chosen 
by UP was easily the lowest amount paid by the four employees who were 
allegedly terminated as a result of the audit, and was even less than other 
employees who kept their jobs but paid restitution. (Id., at 3.) 
A reasonable person could consider the foregoing objective conduct on the part of 
UP, most of which UP does not dispute, outrageous. UP was motivated by the malice of 
its number two official, Mr. Shoener, who seized upon the opportunity to punish Mr. 
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Francisconi, a mere safety manager, for having a prior relationship with Ms. Tower. Mr. 
Francisconi experienced subjective severe emotional anguish, including physical 
manifestations. Accordingly, under the standard set forth in Retherford, a genuine issue 
of material fact existed making summary judgment improper.10 The trial court had no 
basis to say that UP's conduct clearly meets the standard or clearly falls below it. See 
Darrington, 812 P.2d at 459 n. 4. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING THAT THERE IS NO 
GENUINE ISSUE AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACT 
CONCERNING SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE 
DEFAMATION CLAIM WAS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS 
AND SHOULD BE REVERSED 
On this claim the trial court asserted: "Mr. Francisconi fails to show specific facts 
admissible in court that there was any damage, or that the communication was not 
privileged." (R. 1538.) 
"A statement charging another with criminal conduct is slanderous or libelous per 
se." Auto West, Inc. v. Baggs, 678 P.2d 286, 290 (Utah 1984) (citing cases). "Slander 
per se does not require a showing of special damage because damages and malice are 
0
 The trial court disregarded evidence disputing its conclusion that "allegations such 
as cutting off medical coverage and vacation pay simply did not occur." (R. 1538.) Cobra 
coverage was not initially offered to Mr. Francisconi (R. 1355), and his wife's June 5, 
1996, surgery was canceled due to the cancellation of his health insurance by UP (R. 
1220). Indeed, but for the last minute intervention of Mr. Francisconi and his wife, the 
re-scheduled surgery date of July 8th would have been canceled as well due to no COBRA 
coverage. (Id.) 
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implied." Allred v. Cook, 590 P.2d 318, 321 (Utah 1979). Thus, to the extent the 
statements attributable to UP concerned criminal conduct, the trial court erred when it 
incorrectly assumed Mr. Francisconi had to prove damages in response to the motion for 
summary judgement. 
At the meeting in Omaha, UP, through its agents, said that Mr. Francisconi was a 
liar and a thief and threatened him with criminal prosecution. (R. 1264; R. 1219; R. 
1346). Further, Barbara Tower testified that Tom Haig, an employee of UP, told her that 
Mr. Francisconi was terminated because he was "cheating on his expense accounts." (R. 
1360-61.) It was defamatory for UP to allege that Mr. Francisconi was a liar and a thief,11 
both statements impugning his reputation. UP obviously viewed the allegations against 
Mr. Francisconi has criminal in nature, since it pursued a criminal case against him. (R. 
1571, Appx. E, at 2.) The statement Mr. Hague made to Ms. Tower implied theft as well. 
See 50 Am. Jur.2d, Libel and Slander, § 169 at 456-57 (implication of crime is 
defamatory). See also, Combes v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 228 P.2d 272, 274 (Utah 
1951) (holding that statements concerning employee's discharge for dishonesty and loss 
of money amounted to slander per se). 
11
 The elements of theft: "A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises 
unauthorized control over the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof." 
U.C.A. § 76-6-404 (1973). Theft by deception: "A person commits theft if he obtains or 
exercises control over property of another by deception and with a purpose to deprive him 
thereof." U.C.A. § 76-6-405 (1973). 
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In addition to erring as a matter of law that damages had to be proven, the trial court 
improperly found that the statements were privileged. A defamatory statement is 
qualifiedly privileged "in certain situations in which a defendant seeks to vindicate or 
further an interest v regarded as being sufficiently important to justify some latitude for 
making mistakes....'" Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 58 (Utah 1991) (quoting 
Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts). A qualified privilege does not protect a 
defamatory statement when the defendant acted with malice or the statement is excessively 
published. Id. 
"The issue of malice is ordinarily a factual issue." Id. at 59. {citing Lind v. Lynch, 
665 P.2d 1276, 1279 (Utah 1983). Common law malice denotes ^personal hostility or 
ill will.'" Id. {quoting Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556, 559 n. 1 (Utah 1988)). The evidence 
of malice recited above raised a genuine issue of material fact that UP acted with hostility 
or ill will toward Mr. Francisconi. Additionally, UP nowhere presented evidence that 
there was no malice. See Lind, supra (summary judgment on slander claim improper 
because defendant made no effort to respond to allegations of malice). Rather, it relied 
upon the legal argument that the facts Mr. Francisconi presented could not satisfy the 
standard to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
Summary judgment was also improper because UP excessively published the 
defamatory statement to Mr. Hague and/or to Ms. Tower. A statement loses its qualified 
privilege when it is published to more persons than the scope of the privilege requires to 
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effectuate its purpose. DeBry v. Godbe, 1999 UT 111, 1 21, 992 P.2d 979 (citing 
Brehany, supra). It did not further UP's purported interest in the audit to publish to Mr. 
Hague, an employee of UP with no known connection to the audit, that Mr. Francisconi 
had "cheated on his expense accounts." (R. 1360-61.) Similarly, Ms. Tower, who was 
no longer employed by UP when the defamatory statement was repeated to her, had no 
connection to the audit. 
The trial court also found that truth was a defense in this case. 
First, truth is a defense to a defamation claim and it is obvious that Mr. 
Francisconi did in fact misuse the "in lieu of policy" to the tune of 
approximately $2,500, using the policy to distribute gifts to members of his 
family not the person he stayed with on his business visits to Pocatello. [R. 
1537-38, emphasis added.] 
Here again the trial court improperly weighed the evidence, and disregarded the 
existence of facts which raise a genuine issue as to whether Mr. Francisconi violated the 
"in lieu o f policy. Mr. Francisconi has disputed each and every allegation of abuse. 
Moreover, the trial court applied the wrong standard in concluding that UP had a "right 
to terminate."12 The existence of disputed facts concerning the elements of theft should 
have precluded summary judgment in this regard as well. 
POINTVI 
12
 "If a crime is imputed to the plaintiff, the defense of truth requires that the 
defendant vmust fasten on plaintiff all the elements of the crime, both in act and in 
intent.'" Auto West, 678 P.2d at 290 (citing cases) (finding that issue of intent was a 
factual issue for the trier of fact). The defendant must prove the alleged criminal conduct 
by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. (citing cases). 
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THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING THAT THERE IS NO 
GENUINE ISSUE AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACT 
CONCERNING SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE 
FRAUD CLAIM SHOULD BE REVERSED 
On this claim the trial court asserted: 
Mr. Francisconi fails to allege specific admissible facts showing that 
representations made by Union Pacific were false, that they were regarding a 
presently existing material fact, and that he acted upon the representations. Mr. 
Francisconi had nothing beyond his self-serving testimony to support his 
argument on this issue. [R. 1539.] 
Mr. Francisconi was confronted at the Omaha meeting with the purported results of 
the expense audit and he asked what he could do to avoid being terminated at that time. 
(R. 1274.) He did not request an assurance of future employment or release from future 
acts in violation of expense policies. The conduct arising out of the audit and the potential 
for termination were presently existing at the Omaha meeting. Indeed, UP terminated Mr. 
Francisconi solely because of the audit. (R. 1377.) Mr. Francisconi asked what he could 
do to keep his job on that day, and UP promised that he could keep his job if he signed a 
statement on that day. (R. 1274, R. 1341.) 
A jury could find, by clear and convincing evidence, that UP made a 
misrepresentation to Mr. Francisconi, designed to induce him to sign the statement, and 
that it was UP's intention when it made the misrepresentation to terminate him as soon as 
he signed it. It could further find that Mr. Francisconi relied upon the misrepresentation 
and was induced to act to his detriment. 
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CONCLUSION 
Gene Francisconi respectfully requests the following relief: 
1. That the trial court's order denying Mr. Francisconi's motion to strike UP's 
amended memorandum in support of summary judgment be reversed, and the amended 
memorandum stricken, and the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of 
UP be reversed due to the lack of a memorandum of points and authorities, and the trial 
court's entry of judgment in favor of UP be vacated, and this action be remanded for a jury 
trial on all claims set forth in the Amended Complaint. 
2. That the trial court's order denying Mr. Francisconi's motion to strike 
exhibits contained in UP's amended memorandum in support of motion for summary 
judgment be reversed, and the exhibits, or any of them, be stricken, and the trial court's 
order granting summary judgment in favor of UP be reversed due to the lack of evidentiary 
support, and the trial court's entry of judgment in favor of UP be vacated, and this action 
be remanded for a jury trial on all claims set forth in the Amended Complaint. 
3. That the trial court's order granting UP's motion for summary judgment on 
Mr. Francisconi's breach of employment contract claims, or any of them, intentional 
infliction of emotional distress claim, defamation claim and fraud claim be reversed, and 
the trial court's entry of judgment in favor of UP on the claims be vacated, and this action 
be remanded for a jury trial on these claims. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 5th day of January, 2001. 
PARSONS, DAVIS, KINGHORN & PETERS 
DAVID J. BURNS 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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I hereby certify that on the 5th day of January 2001, I served the foregoing 
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Case No: 9609.04423 CV 
Judge: STEPHEN L. HENRIOD 
Date: January 27, 2 0 00 
Clerk: mate!lew 
HEARING .....,;.. 
Plaintiff's motion to strike defendant's amended memorandum in 
support of motion for summary judgment is denied.. 'Plaintiff's 
motion to strike fact exhibits contained in defendant's amended 
memorandum is also denied. 
A 40 minute hearing is set on defendant's motion for summary 
judgment. 
DEFT'.S MOTION SUMMARY JUDG is scheduled. 
Date: 03/07/2.0.00 .. ,•.-.-. 
Time: 09: 00 .a.m. 
Location:: -Fourth Floor - W4 7 
THIRD .DISTRICT COURT 
450 SOUTH STATE STREET 
. SLC, UT 84111-1860 
Before Judge.: STEPHEN L. HENRI OD 
Dated this ^ y 7 day of- jf/)!.h \) &An.-\, 2 0 &6 
v a 
STEPHEN'L. HENRI OD 
District Court Judge 
PRO* 1 
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ATTORNEY PLA 
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.9 EXCHANGE PLACE 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 841110000 
Mail JON E WADDOUPS 
ATTORNEY DEF 
60 East South Temple 
P.O. BOX 45120/1800 Eagle 
Gate 
SLC UT 84145 
Dated this /^/day of - ^ / ^ ^ 
Deputy Cbtbft Clerk 
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L i. 
Jon E. Waddoups (#5815) 
Alexander Dushku (#7712) 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
Attorneys for Defendant 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
P.O. Box 45120 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120 
Telephone: (801) 328-3600 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 




UNION PACIFIC RAIL ROAD CO., 
a Utah Corporation, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 960904423 
Judge Stephen L. Henriod 
This action came up for oral argument on Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment on March 7, 2000. Plaintiff Eugene Francisconi was represented by Daniel Darger 
and David J. Burns. Defendant Union Pacific Railroad Company was represented by Jon E. 
Waddoups and Alexander Dushku. The Court heard oral argument, accepted submissions, and 
took the matter under advisement. The Court issued its Memorandum Decision on March 21, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2000. Having rendered its decision based on the law and the facts of the case, the Court now 
enters its judgment granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
NOW, THEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that 
Defendant Union Pacific Railroad Company's Motion for Summary Judgment against Plaintiff 
Eugene Francisconi is GRANTED. Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint including all claims 
against Defendant is DISMISSED with prejudice. Defendant is hereby awarded its reasonable 
court costs to be established by Defendant's memorandum of costs. 
Executed this l/[ day of jflafch, 2000. 
BY THE COURT 
4hwztMdJ^£± 
Stephen L. Henriod 
District Court Judge \ 
*/*. V 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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185 S. State Street, #700 
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BcfMLdfiiBt. 
Defendant's Motion for summary Judgment was argued to the 
Court on March 7, 2000, Both parties were represented,, tixe Court 
heard oral argument, accepted submissions, and took the matter 
under advisement. The Court now rules as follows. 
The standard far Summary Judgment is set forth in the case of 
Trelosroen v. Tralooraan, 699 P.2d 747-748 (Utah 1985). That 
standard is that to successfully oppose a properly supported Motion 
for Summary "Judgment, the party must present through sworn averment 
specific admissible facts establishing a dispute of fact material 
to the Motion. The defendant presented a properly supported Motion 
for Summary Judgment. The individual causes of action are 
addressed below. 
1. The plaintiff started work for Union Pacific as an at-
will employee. He alleges that the nature of his employment 
changed and express and implied agreements came into existence as 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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FRANCISCONI V. UPRC PAGE 2 ,\ KEKORANDUK DECISION 
a result of the "in lieu of policy" and the ,rU?RSRADE Policy e^  Mr, 
Francisconi fails to make a persuasive case that either of these 
policies changed the nature of his employment, Mr. Francisconi 
fails to marshal any arguments or show any specific provisions in 
either 'of the above-referred to policies to indicate that the 
nature of hie employment changed in any way, Mr. Franciscan! was 
an at-will employee at the time he vas terminated, 
2. Plaintiff alleges that his termination was in violation 
of public policy. In order to create an issue for the jury on this 
cause of action he needs to identify a clear and substantial public 
policy and show that the employer required him to violate said 
public policy and that the alleged violation vas a factor in his 
termination. Again, Mr. Francisconi fails to present through sworn 
averment any specific admissible facts establishing that there'was 
a clear and substantial public policy, that the employer required 
him to violate"" It", or""that' the alleged "violation vas a factor in 
his termination•" 
3. Plaintiff alleges defamation, claiming that a Onion 
Pacific employee in Los Angeles communicated to a Union Pacific 
employee in Seattle that Mr. Francisconi vas terminated for 
violating the "in lieu of policy" and taicing advantage personally 
of that policy. First, truth is a defense to a defamation claim and 
it is obvious that Mr. Francisconi did in fact misuse the "in lieu 
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FHANCISCOHI V. U5SC PAGE 3 MEMORANDUM DSCISIOH 
of policy" to the tune of approximately $2,500, using the policy to 
distribute gifts to members of hie family
 f not the person he stayed 
with on his business visits to Pocatallo. The statements wars true 
and plaintiff's'nurden is to show that the defendant published the 
statements and that they were false, defamatory and not subject to 
privilege, and that they were published vith the requisite degree 
of fault, and the publication resulted in damage• Mr. Francisconi 
fails to show specific facts admissible in court that there was any 
damage, or that the communication was not privileged. 
•4. Mr. Francisconi's fourth cause of action for infliction 
of emotional distress requires that hB show (1) that Union Pacific 
intentionally engaged in some conduct toward the plaintiff 
considered outrageous and intolerable; offending generally accepted 
standards of decency and morality; (2) that there was a purpose to 
inflict emotional """'distress; and (3) "  that"" it resulted. The 
allegations that Mr. Francisconi makes do not rise to the standard 
required. Union Pacific ; had a right to terminate under the 
circumstances, and the other allegations such as cutting off 
medical coverage and vacation pay simply did not occur. In 
addition, credible evidence adduced on the part of the defendant 
indicates that the allegations are not true. 
5. Mr. Francisconi6s fifth claim of relief is for fraud. 
Fraud requires a higher standard, that of clear and convincing 
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evidence. To survive, a fraud claim must require a representation 
"made concerning a presently existing material fact which was false 
and which the repreaenter Joiew to be false, made recklessly, 
lowing there was insufficient Jcncr&rledge upon which to base such a 
representation for the purpose of inducing the other party to act, 
and that the other party did act reasonably, and in ignorance of 
its falsity did rely upon it and was thereby induced to act to that 
partyss injury and damage. Mr. Francisconi fails to allege 
specific admissible facts shoving that representations made by 
Dnion Pacific were false, that they ware regarding a presently 
existing material fact, and that he acted upon the representations, 
Mr, Francisconi has nothing beyond his self-serving testimony to 
support his argument on this issue. 
For the above reasons, Summary Judgment is granted in favor of 
Union Pacific. Onion Pacific is to prepare a Judgment consistent 
with this Memorandum Decision. 
/)t 
Bated this sf-1 day of March, 2000. 
/iV 
STEPHEN L. HEHRIOD 
'•• . DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
.c foregoing Memorandum Decision , to the following, this <£*y day of 
March., 2000: 
Daniel Darger 
David J. Bums 
A-tomsys for Plaintiff 
9 Exchange Place, Suite 100 0 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Jon E. Waddoups 
JLLejcander Dushku 
Attorneys for Defendant 
60 E. South Temple, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City/Utah 84145-0120 
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j I Attorney at Law 
|| 1000 Boston Building 
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UNION PACIFIC RAIL ROAD CO. a Utah 
Corporation, 
Defendant. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
• 
Case No. 950904423 
Judge Stephen L. Henriod 
Plaintiff Eugene A. Francisconi, by and through undersigned counsel, hereby 
gives notice of his appeal of the Judgment entered by the Hon. Stephen L Henriod, 
Judge, Third District Court, on April 11, 2000. This appeal is taken to the Utah Supreme 
Court. 
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DATED this J>~ ' day of May, 2000. 
PARSONS. DAVJES, KINGKORN a PETERS 
!! . / / -. * z2 
H \ / S ^n • -
DAVID J. BURNS 
|| Attornevs for Plaintiff 
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I ! CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
[ I hereby certify that true and correct copies of the foregoing NOTICE OF 
|j APPEAL were served by maiiing copies thereof, by first-ciass United States mail, 
r - i - f^ 
postage prepaid, this _ j y _ day of May, 2000, to the following: 
Jon E. Waddoups 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
60 East South Temple, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
Daniel Darger 
A f f r i r n o \ / o + I n u / 
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1000 Boston Building : 
9 Exchanae Place 
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STEPHEN L. HENRIOD 
PARTIES 
Plaintiff - EUGENE FRANCISCONI 
Represented by: DANIEL DARGER 
Represented by: DAVID J BURNS 
Defendant - UNION PACIFIC RAIL ROAD CO 
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Filed: Memorandum in reply to defendant's memorandum opposed to 
motion to amend and in support of motion to intervene margeneg 
Filed: Affidavit of Sharlene Francisconi margeneg 
Filed: Memorandum in Reply to Defendant's Memo Opposed to 
Motion to Amend and in Support of Motion to Intervene deborahw 
Filed: Notice to Submit for Decision deborahw 
MOTION TO INTERVENE scheduled on February 23, 1998 at 09:00 AM 
in Fourth Floor - W47 with Judge HENRIOD. amysb 
Filed: Minute Entry - Taken Under Advisement Ruling -
Plaintiff's motions are denied. ATD to prepare the order. 
Judge: shenriod amysb 
Filed order: Order Denying Motion to Amend and Motion to 
Intervene amysb 
Judge shenriod 
Signed March 12, 1998 
Filed: Certificate of service hilaryy 
Filed: Notice of dposition hilaryy 
Filed return: Subpeona duces tecum on return hilaryy 
Party Served: LOUISE BOWN--
Service Type: Personal 
Service Date: May 14, 1998 
Filed: Certificate of service hilaryy 
Filed: Appearance of co-counsel - David Burns (plft) hilaryy 
Filed: Appearance of co-counsel hilaryy 
Filed: Request For Trial Setting amyls 
Filed: Notice of change of address lynettg 
Filed: Request For Trial Setting amyls 
Filed: Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion For Order 
Designation Place Of Depositions and Motion To Compel Discoveryamyls 
Filed: Plaintiff's Motion for Order Designating Place Of 
Depositions And Motion To Compel Discovery amyls 
Filed: Certificate of Service amyls 
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CASE NUMBER 960904423 {Civil} 
10-13-98 Filed: Certificate of Service amyls 
10-15-98 Filed: Memo in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Order 
Designating Place of Depositions and Motion to Compel Discoveryamyls 
10-2S-D5 Filed; Reply Memo in Support of Plaintiff's Mo Lion for Order 
Designating Place Of Depositions And Motion to Compel Discoveryamyls 
10-2 6-98 Filed: Notice to Submit for Decision on Plaintiffs Motion for 
Order Designating Place of Depositions and Motion to Comple 
Discovery amyls 
10-26-98 LAW & MOTION scheduled on November 17, 1998 at 09:15 AM in 
Fourth Floor - W47 with Judge HENRIOD. paulab 
10-2 8-98 Filed order: Minute Entry paulab 
Judge shenriod 
Signed October 28, 1998 
11-03-98 Filed: Notice of law -n- motion on return unable to mail to 
David Burns hilaryy 
11-12-98 Filed: Deposition Subpoena matellew 
11-12-98 Filed: Deposition Subpoena matellew 
11-12-98 Filed: Notice of Deposition of Rene Lillard matellew 
11-12-98 Filed: Notice of Deposition of John Ivester matellew 
11-30-98 Filed order: Scheduling order matellew 
Judge shenriod 
Signed November 30, 1998 
12-14-98 Filed order: Order (pltfs motion for order designating place 
of depositions and motion to compel discovery is 
granted) matellew 
Judge shenriod 
Signed December 14, 1998 
12-22-98 Filed: Certificate of Service juliak 
01-19-99 Filed: Certificate of Service juliak 
02-13-99 Filed: Certificate of service susansf 
02-13-99 Filed: Pltfs amended designation of trial witnesses susansf 
02-13-99 Filed: Certificate of service of discovery susansf 
02-16-99 Filed: defendants witness list lynettg 
03-05-99 Filed: Pltfs motion to compel information of enforcement of the 
in-lieu of policy and the depositions of Arthur Shoener and 
Thomas Campbell susansf 
03-05-99 Filed: Memorandum in support of pltfs motion to compel 
information on the application of the in-lieu of policy and the 
depositions of ARthur Shoener and Thomas Campbell susansf 
03-18-99 Filed: Memo In Opposition To Plaintiff's Motion To Compel 
Information On The Application Of the In-Lieu Of Policy And The 
Deposition Of Arthur Shoener And Thomas Campbell brandif 
03-23-99 Filed: Notice of Depositions brandif 
03-25-99 Filed: Certificate of service susansf 
03-29-99 Filed: Reply memo in support of pla's motion to compel 
information on the application of the in-lieu of policy and the 
depositions of Arthur Shoener and Thomas Campbell brandif 
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03-29-99 Filed order : S t i p u l a t i o n for pro tec t ive order and p ro tec t ive 
brandif 
P r in t ed : 05/30/00 11:12:35 
AL 






Signed March 29, 1999 
99 Filed: Notice of Rule 30b6 deposition 
99 Filed order: Stipulation, motion and order (discovery cut-off 
extended to 6/30/99 & dispositive motions to be filed by 
7/30/99) 
Judge shenriod 
Signed April 21, 1999 
99 Filed: Notice of deposition of Frank Kurek 
99 Filed return: subpoena duces tecum 
Party Served: Frank Kurek 
Notice of deposition 
Notice of continuation of 30b6 deposition 
Notice of deposition (barbara Tower) 
Request for hearing to set trial date 
99 Filed: Amended notice of deposition of barbara J. Tower 
99 TELEPHONE SCHED CONF scheduled on August 09, 1999 at 09:45 AM 
in Fourth Floor - W47 with Judge HENRIOD. 
99 Filed: amended notice of rule 30b6 deposition 
notice of depositions 
notice of deposition of John janzen 
second amended noticeof 309b)(6) deposition 
Pltfs supplemental memorandum in support of motion to 
compel the depositions of Arthur shoener and Thomas Campbell 
99 TELEPHONE SCHED CONF rescheduled on August 27, 1999 at 08:45 AM 
Reason: Conflict in Judge Schedule. matellew 
99 Filed: certificate of service brandif 
99 Filed: Notice of continuance of deposition (John Janzen) susansf 
99 Filed: notice to submit for decision (oral agrument requested) 
re .-motion to compel brandif 











































Fourth Floor - W47 with Judge HENRIOD. 
99 Filed: supplemental memo in opposition to pla' s motion to 
compel information on the application of the inlieu of policy 
and the depositions of arthur shoener and thomas campbell 
09-27-99 Filed: notice of depositions 
09-28-99 Filed order: Order (re: 9/3/99 hearing-motion to compel) 
Judge shenriod 
Signed September 28, 1999 
09-28-99 Filed order: Scheduling order 
Judge shenriod 
Signed September 28, 1999 
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10-12-99 Filed: certificate of service brandif 
10-12-99 Filed: certificate of service brandif 
11-02-99 Filed: Motion and memo in support of motion to compel responses 
to discovery brandif 
11-09-99 Filed: pla?s memo in support of motion for protective order re 
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discovery brandif 
11-09-99 Filed: pla' s memo in support of motion to compel deposition brandif 
11-09-99 Filed: pla's motion to compel depositions (oral argument 
requested) brandif 
11-09-99 Filed: affidavit of david j. burns brandif 
11-09-99 Filed: pla's memo in opposition to def's motion to compel 
responses to discovery brandif 
11-09-99 Filed: plafs motion for protective order re discovery brandif 
11-17-99 Filed: Motion and memo in support of motion for extension of 
dispositive motion cutoff brandif 
11-17-99 Filed: reply memo in support of motion to compel responses to 
discovery brandif 
11-17-99 Filed: affidavit of j on e. waddoups brandif 
11-22-99 Filed: Notice to Submit brandif 
11-30-99 Filed: Motion for summary judgment brandif 
11-30-99 Filed: memo in support of motion for summary judgment brandif 
11-30-99 Filed order: Order (re: 11/22/99 hearing) matellew 
Judge shenriod 
Signed November 30, 1999 
11-30-99 Filed: ***DENIED***Ex-parte motion and order granting leave to 
file overiength memorandum matellew 
12-14-99 Filed: plafs memo in support of motion to strike fact exhibits brandif 
12-14-99 Filed: pla' s motion to enlarge time for responding to def's 
motion for summary judgment brandif 
12-14-99 Filed: Pla's motion to strike fact exhibits brandif 
12-15-99 Filed order: DENIED pla's ex-parte motion & order granting 
leave to file over-length memo brandif 
Judge shenriod 
Signed December 15, 1999 
12-17-99 Filed: amended memo in support of motion for summary judgment brandif 
01-03-00 Filed order: Plaintiff's motion and order to enlarge time for 
responding to defendant's motion for summary judgment matellew 
Judge shenriod 
Signed January 03, 2000 
01-03-00 Filed: transcript of deposition - alan hill brandif 
01-03-00 Filed: deposition of thomas wignstad brandif 
01-04-00 Filed: pla's memo in support of motion to strike fact exhibits 
contained in def's amended memo in suppport of motion for 
summary judgment brandif 
01-04-00 Filed: pla's motion to strike fact exhibits contained in def's 
amended memo in support of motion for summary judgment brandif 
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01-04-00 Filed: pla's motion £ memo in support of motion to strike def's 
amended memo in support of motion for summary judgment & motion 
for summary judgment brandif 
01-04-00 Filed: affidavit of eugene a. francisconi brandif 
01-04-00 Filed: memo in opposition to def's motion for summary judgment 
(oral argument requested) brandif 
01-10-00 Filed: notice of change of address - david burns brandif 
01-12-00 Filed: Defendant's reply memorandum in support of the motion 
Printed: 05/30/00 11:12:36 Page 5 
CASE NUMBER 960904423 {Civil} 
for summary judgment matellew 
01-12-00 Filed: Memorandum in opposition to plaintiff's motion to strike 
defendant's amended memorandum in support of motion for summary 
judgment matellew 
01-12-00 Filed: Memorandum in opposition to plaintiff's motion to strike 
fact exhibits contained in defendant's amended memorandum in 
support of motion for summary judgment (hearing requested) matellew 
01-12-00 Filed: Notice to submit for decision (hearing requested)-motion 
for summary judgment matellew 
01-12-00 Filed: Notice to submit for decision-deft! s motion for summary 
judgment matellew 
01-22-00 Filed: Notice to Submit (pla' motion to strike def's amended 
memo in support of motion for summary judgment & motion for 
summary judgment) brandif 
01-22-00 Filed: Notice to Submit (pla's motion to strike fact exhibits 
contained in def's amended memo in support of motion for 
summary judgment) brandif 
01-22-00 Filed: reply memo in support of pla's motion to strike def's 
memo in support of motion for summary judgment brandif 
01-22-00 Filed: reply memo in support of pla's motion to strike fact 
exhibits contained in def's amended memo in support of motion 
for summary judgment brandif 
01-27-00 DEFT'S MOTION SUMMARY JUDG scheduled on March 07, 2000 at 09:00 
AM in Fourth Floor - W47 with Judge HENRIOD. matellew 
03-17-00 Filed: pla's supplemental memo in opposition to def's motion 
for summary judgment brandif 
03-20-00 Filed: Plaintiff's supplemental memorandum in opposition to 
defendant's motion for summary judgment matellew 
03-21-00 Filed order: Memorandum decision (3/7/00 hearing-summary 
judgment granted in favor of Union Pacific—Union Pacific to 
prepare an order consistent with this ruling) matellew 
Judge shenriod 
Signed March 21, 2000 _ ; 
03-22-00 Filed: def's supplemental reply memo in support of motion for 
summary judgment brandif 
03-23-00 Filed order: Ex parte motion and order sealing memoranda matellew 
Judge shenriod 
Signed March 23, 2000 
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-00 Filed: verified memo of costs 
-00 Filed order: Judgment 
Judge shenriod 
Signed April 11, 2000 
-00 Case Disposition is Jdmt summary 
Disposition Judge is STEPHEN L. HENRIOD 
-00 Filed: notice of entry of judgment 
-00 Filed: Notice of Appeal 
-00 Filed: Notice of Appeal 









-uu rnea: supreme Court letter to counsel (sc # 20uu04ub-SC) -
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Notice of Appeal received by Supreme Court 
05-18-00 Filed: request for transcripts (request from pla1) 
kathys 
brandif 
iafiar n l i f^ur r ta tais..i] (press 33£TE3*N)5 
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APPENDIX E 
Plaintiff's Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
Dated March 21, 2000 
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| David J. Burns, Esq. (7157) 
i PARSONS, DAVIES, KINGHORN & PETERS 
I Attorneys for Plaintiff Eugene Francisconi 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-4300 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 








MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. 960904423 
Judge Stephen Henriod 
Plaintiff Eugene Francisconi, by and through undersigned counsel, in accordance with the 
Court's direction at oral argument, hereby submits the following supplemental memorandum in 
opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Toward the conclusion of oral argument on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
held on March 7, 2000, Defendant's counsel, John E. Waddoups represented to the Court that 
as part of its 1996 corporate audit of employee expense reports, Union Pacific had created 
category 1 through 3 exceptions to grade the severity of expense policy violations and ensure 
uniformity of treatment. He referred to these categories as "buckets," and represented that Union 
Pacific had determined at the time of Mr. Francisconi's audit that he was a category 3 exception. 
Mr. Waddoups also represented that only the most serious offenders were placed in a category 
3 "bucket" and all were terminated as a result of the corporate audit. These representations are 
material misstatements of the record, and therefore require correction. 
r - \ n A T A M i h \ r i l a e \ C D A M r i Q r \ M n T i n M \ Q . i n n M a m n A n n M C I umH 
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II. THE "BUCKETS" PLAYED NO PART IN THE DECISION TO TERMINATE 
The "guidelines" establishing the category exceptions were created (if ever) well after Mr. 
Francisconi was terminated (Bernard pp. 81, 88-89, Exhibit A hereto.) For this reason, any such 
guidelines "would not have played a part in Mr. Shoener's or someone else's consideration of the 
[April 27, 1996] interview, the result of the interview, [or] the recommendations contained in that 
interview." (Id. p. 81.) Indeed, Union Pacific admitted Mr. Francisconi and other audited 
employees were "retroactively categorized." (Id. p. 89.) Thus, contrary to Mr. Waddoups' 
assertion, the "buckets" were not employed at the time of the corporate audit to ensure fair 
treatment of Mr. Francisconi, and otherwise have no bearing on this case.1 
III. PLAINTIFF WAS TREATED AS A SPECIAL CASE 
The record is also contrary to Mr. Waddoups' assertion at oral argument that Mr. 
Francisconi was among the worst offenders of the expense policy. In fact, a simple comparison 
of the exceptions noted in the audit report prepared for Mr. Francisconi and the reports prepared 
for other employees, as well as 30(b)(6) deposition testimony concerning those reports, clearly 
reveals that Union Pacific treated Mr. Francisconi as a special case in relation to all other 
employees for whom expense account exceptions were noted.2 For instance, Mr. Francisconi 
was treated unlike any other employee in the following respects: 
• Union Pacific pursued a criminal case against Mr. Francisconi, going so far as to 
contact the Salt Lake County District Attorney's Office. (Lawrence Curley p. 6, 
Exhibit C hereto.) Union Pacific could not say that a criminal case was ever 
pursued or even evaluated for any of the four other employees whose 
employment ended as a result of the corporate audit. (Bernard p. 92.) Indeed, 
1That Union Pacific may have created the category exceptions solely in response to this 
litigation is suggested by the fact that, despite specific request therefor, it has never produced a 
copy of these "guidelines." 
2Michael Bernard, Union Pacific's Director of Auditing, prepared an audit report of findings 
in connection with the audit of Mr. Francisconi's expense reports. On August 6, 1999, Mr. 
Bernard provided 30(b)(6) deposition testimony on behalf of Union Pacific on the foregoing audit 
report as well as reports that had been prepared for other employees. Attached hereto as Exhibit 
B are copies of the audit reports for the other Union Pacific employees referred to in this 
memorandum, which copies, because they were produced subject to a stipulated confidentiality 
order, are here submitted under seal. 
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Substantial evidence that he intended to defraud the company. (Bernard p. 151.) 
For instance, responding to a derailment in Laramie, Wyoming, Mr. Frazier flew 
there on the corporate jet, but claimed personal mileage traveling there. Changed 
a $40 receipt to $250 in connection with entertainment of people involved in 
cleanup. Collected ticket stubs at restaurants and used those as support for 
fictitious items. Obtained claim checks that were in sequential order and used 
them periodically to obtain reimbursement for fictitious items. Restitution: 
$15,500. 
G.L Benham, Systems Consultant (UP 001848-49). On 20 occasions, 
reimbursed for unused flight coupon but flew on the corporate jet. Reported 46 
credit card purchases in Mexico City, Mexico, even though amounts billed by 
American Express disclosed the exchange rate used by Mr. Benham was less 
than the rate used by American Express. Claimed between $30 and $45 for one-
way taxi fare from the Railroad's marketing and sales office to the Mexico City 
airport although the current one-way fare is approximately $15. Submitted 
duplicate requests for reimbursement on four occasions ($317). Expensed a 
three-day trip to Bethlehem, PA but was in Omaha the whole time. Restitution: 
$11,928. , 
Just as illuminating is the fact that other employees were permitted to keep their jobs 
despite their serious violations of the expense policy. Indeed, the following examples clearly 
demonstrate that Union Pacific tolerated patterns of abuse and fraud that far exceeded the worst 
allegations made against Mr. Francisconi. 
J.D. Gallamore, Senior Director, Maintenance Operations (UP 1800-01). 
Reimbursed $1,984 for airline tickets. Paid for the tickets with his corporate credit 
card and then was reimbursed twice, when he sought reimbursement for the 
charge to his credit card and when he returned the coupon for reimbursement. 
Reported an airline ticket ($534) that was charged directly to the company, even 
though the ticket coupon had been stamped "non-reimbursable" by the travel 
agent. Reimbursed $9,100 for 13 trips to St. Louis (his home town), where he 
expensed weekend, holiday and vacation days. The purpose of the business trips 
was not adequately explained. Purchased 160 Omaha Steaks gift certificates with 
a value of $9,500. The Company was told that the steaks and gift certificates 
were purchased for the Company's Spot Awards Program; however, the steaks 
were distributed just prior to the year-end holiday season and were issued to Mr. 
Gallamore's cousin, his neighbor, unidentified persons, senior-level managers, 
and other inappropriate persons. Reimbursed $6,540 for payments to Thomas 
Campbell for staying at his house in lieu of commercial lodging. For part of that 
time, Mr. Gallamore paid Mr. Campbell $55 per day. Reimbursed on 43 occasions 
($1,666) for entertainment of locally-based employees. These 43 instances 
represented 37 percent of the workdays Mr. Gallamore spent in the Omaha office 
during the 11-month period in question. Unable to account for much of the 
expense report exceptions. Restitution: $5,202. Also, "He was suspended by 
Mir. Shoener and Mr. Shoener told him to go home and don't come back to 
the office for a week and think about why you want to stay employed with 
Union Pacific, and that was the reprimand. Mr. Gallamore sacrificed his merit 
pay for 1997. He did not receive a merit pay increase for 1997, and his bonus for 
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the 1996 performance year, which would have been approximately $10,000, was 
not given to him." (Bernard pp. 110-11.) 
D.E. Klaus, Senior Director, Maintenance Operations (UP 001801-02). Reported 
an expense of $457 in connection with a rental car obtained in Pocatello for a trip 
made to attend a meeting in Salt Lake City. Vehicle was rented by Mr. Klaus's 
wife and was driven 1,523, although the round trip mileage between Pocatello and 
Salt Lake City was only 325 miles. Reported vacation time during the period the 
carwas rented. Initially denied that the vehicle was rented for anything other than 
a business purpose, but later acknowledged that it was rented for personal 
reasons and should not have been reported on his expense report. Also 
submitted a report for an airline ticket that was charged directly to the company. 
Reported on his expense report that the BTA ticket had been incurred by him 
rather than the company. Also reported a portion of a car rental expense that was 
used for a vacation trip taken in Missouri. Restitution: $1,168. Mr. Shoener 
reprimanded Mr. Klaus and deferred his merit pay and bonus. (Bernard p. 
114.) 
J.A. Leutzinger, Manager, Health Promotion (UP 001843). Reported airline 
tickets ($803) that had been charged directly to the company, even though travel 
agents had stamped "non-reimbursable" on the tickets. Reimbursed for six 
unused or exchanged airline tickets that were returned for credit. In nine 
instances, reported expenses twice. Restitution: $2,747. No further action. 
(Bernard p. 135.) 
A.L Faulkner, Senior Director, Maintenance Operations (UP 001802-03). 
Accounts payable processed the same expense report twice. The first check for 
$1,159 was deposited by Mr. Faulkner on March 8, 1995, and a duplicate check 
for $1,159 was deposited by Mr. Faulkner one week later, on March 17. 
Restitution: $1,159. No further action; company accepted explanation that it was 
an "honest mistake." (Bernard p. 117.) 
CONCLUSION 
Thus, to summarize, Union Pacific clearly attempted to mislead this Court when it 
represented that Mr. Francisconi's termination was a product of a systematic process that was 
designed to ensure fairness and uniformity of treatment. In fact, Mr. Shoener's decision to 
terminate Mr. Francisconi, as well as his decisions with respect to other audited employees, was 
the product of personal wim and carpiciousness. It cannot be doubted, for example, that the 
intentional fraud of Messrs. Gallamore and Klaus was more serious than Mr. Francisconi's noted 
exceptions, and yet the former employees were permitted to keep their jobs. The evidence points 
inexorably to the conclusion that the exceptions noted for Mr. Francisconi were a pretext for the 
termination. The true motivation was some other factor. The record creates a strong inference 
that this other factor was his and Mr. Shoener's shared connection to Barbara Tower. 
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an auditor was unaware of any instance where Union Pacific has ever made a 
criminal referral as a result of an audit. (Henley p. 16, Exhibit D hereto.) 
• The restitution amount of $2,525 was the lowest amount paid by any other 
employee whose employment ended as a result of the corporate audit, and was 
even less than several other employees who had expense report exceptions noted 
but were permitted to keep their jobs (e.g., $5,202 (J.D. Galiamore)and $2,747 
(J.A. Leutzinger)). 
• . Arthur Shoener, Senior Vice President of Operations, approved the 
restitution/discipline for all persons with noted exceptions who worked in car 
maintenance operations; that is, Messrs. Francisconi, Frazier, Gallamore, Klaus, 
Faulkner, Witt and Phillippie. (Bernard p. 139.) Of these persons, only the 
employment of J.L. Frazier and G. Francisconi ended as a result of the audit. 
Union Pacific determined that Mr. Frazier was the most "egregious" offender of the 
two hundred employees reviewed as part of the corporate audit. (Bernard pp. 71, 
154.) 
Union Pacific asserts that Mr. Francisconi altered six receipts (amounts unaltered, but 
itemization redacted) submitted under the "in lieu of policy. (Bernard p. 52.) The receipts total 
$978.15 in reimbursements. Union Pacific deducted $2,525 from Mr. Francisconi's pay as 
restitution. Of that amount, $1,934 relates to use of the "in lieu of policy and $261 to 
unauthorized weekend stays. The airfare statements and expenditures for basketball league fees 
also mentioned in the audit report were "honest mistakes." (Id. p. 61.)3 
' • ' < ' • * - • . • . • • $ * - $ , . • . . . 
As further proof that Mr. Francisconi was unjustifiably treated as a special case, it is 
helpful to compare the exceptions noted for other employees whose employment, Union Pacific 
asserts, also ended as a result of the audit.4 
J.L. Frazier, Senior Director, Maintenance Operations (Exh. D, UP 001827-37). 
Reported fictitious personal mileage that he claimed at $5,000; inappropriate 
meals and entertainment charges totaling $3,200; altered and fabricated receipts. 
3
 Union Pacific has never adequately described the way in which it calculated the 
restitution amount. Attached as Exhibit E is the breakdown that Union Pacific provided to Mr. 
Francisconi. After the interview of April 26,1996, Union Pacific claims it had Gary Johnson, Mr. 
Francisconi's supervisor, review the expense reports he had previously approved to determine 
whether any weekend stays were unauthorized after all. (Bernard p. 68.) The second time 
around, Mr. Johnson apparently identified 18 unauthorized days, 10 of which relate to stays in 
Pocatello in April 1995 just prior to and at the death of Mr. Francisconi's mother. Union Pacific 
then assigned a value of $43.73 to each one of the unauthorized days ($787) and multiplied by 
50% the remaining value of total "in lieu of reimbursements on 27 occasions ($1,147). 
4
 Union Pacific claims that four persons other than Mr. Francisconi were terminated as a 
result of the corporate audit. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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DATED this / 7 day of March, 2000. 
PARSONS, DAVIES, KINGHORN & PETERS 
//^U^_ 
DAVID J. BURNS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the l~> day of March, 2000, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT was hand-delivered to the following: 
Jon E. Waddoups 
KIRTON & McCONKIE \ 
60 East South Temple, Suite 1800 ' 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
and sent via US Mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Daniel Darger 
Attorney at Law 
1000 Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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"N THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 




UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD CO., 
a Utah Corporation, 
Defendant. 
CIVIL NO. 960904423 
D-E-P-O-S-I-T-I-O-N-
DEPOSITION OF MICHAEL BERNARD, taken before Allan G. 
Kuhlman, a Registered Professional Reporter and General Notary 
Public within and for the State of Nebraska, beginning at the 
hour of 9:25 a.m., Friday, August 6, 1999, at 1416 Dodge 
Street, Omaha, Nebraska, taken on behalf of the plaintiff in 
the above-entitled matter, pursuant to the within 
stioulations. 
ALLAN G. KUHLMAN 
REGISTERED PROFESSIONAL REPORTER 
OMAHA, NEBRASKA 
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MICHAEL BERNARD - DIRECT EXAMINATION 
in written form on the expense statement? 
A. I think my testimony was that he needed to have an 
itemized receipt. 
Q. If he doesn't have an itemized receipt, he can have a 
receipt with the amount and then identify the description on 
the expense statement, right? 
A. An itemized receipt was provided to us. 
Q. Is there a requirement that you provide the itemized 
receipt, or can you'just provide the same information on the 
expense statement by writing it in? 
A. You need to have an itemized receipt. 
Q. So that refers to two of the receipts where there were 
some redactions? 
A. Six. I thought there was -- almost all the receipts were 
not itemized. 
Q. Two receipts you've identified had the deletions made, 
right? 
A. There were six receipts that were altered. 
Q. Six receipts were altered. When you say altered, the 
descriptions were redacted, right? 
A. Meticulously cut out. 
Q. There were deletions from the receipt, right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. That would refer to six of the receipts? 
A. Yes. 
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MICHAEL BERNARD - DIRECT EXAMINATION 58 
A. It may or may not be. 
Q. Are there any other items? 
A. I think that's pretty much it. 
Q. The total amount that you found that needed to be 
reimbursed -- excuse me -- returned, I guess, would be the 
best way to describe it, to Union Pacific was $2525; is that 
right. 
A. That was with input from Gary Johnson. 
Q. I'm sorry. What was that? 
A. That was input from Gary Johnson. We produced a list of 
days that appeared to be personal in nature and he should not 
have claimed any business expenses and along with the list of 
the in lieu of lodging gifts and he determined the amount. 
Q. The total amount for all of the problems that you've 
identified, the receipts, under the in lieu of policy, the 
airfare, and the- expenses for weekend stays that weren't' 
approved or authorized, that accumulated to $2525? 
A. Yes. 
Q. The total for the airfare problems that you identified, is 
that $269, plus $110? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you know what the amount was on the weekend stays? 
A. No. 
Q. So those two categories are the airfare minus --or 
subtracted from the $2500, okay. 
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MICHAEL BERNARD - DIRECT EXAMINATION 7 
A. No. 
Q. Let's pull out what has been marked as Exhibit 4. If you 
will look at the audit report. 
I'm curious about the statement in the introduction 
to the first report which concerns Mr. Gallamore, the sentence 
states we expanded our review of expense reports --
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. And that was of the car maintenance operations? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Why was the review expanded under these circumstances? 
A. Our initial review, we started with roughly two hundred of 
the top reimbursements, the two hundred employees who.had 
received the most reimbursements. 
Q. Is this according to gross amounts? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You took the two hundred highest and just looked at them? 
A. That's how we started. And John Frazier and Jim Gallamore 
hit that sample, and I think Gene Francisconi was on there, 
t O O . • ,.;.• • • '
 r -. , . •":...• 
Q. Was Gene part of the car maintenance operations 
department? 
A. I think he was. 
Q. Do you know --
A. He would have worked -- I can't speculate. I think he 
worked in the diesel shop. I'm not sure where he worked. > 
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MICHAEL BERNARD - DIRECT EXAMINATION 8 
A. I assume so. 
MR. BURNS: We will want a copy of those. 
MR. WADDOUPS: I'll be happy to look for you if you 
send me a ieuter. 
Also David, for the record, I think we ought to 
clarify when uhe business conduct committee came into being 
and when these were created. 
It's my understanding that was after Mr. 
Francisconi's interview and you may want to cover that now. 
Q. (By Mr. Burns) Were the guidelines created after Mr. 
Francisconi's interview on approximately April 27, 1996? 
A. I believe so. 
Q. When generally were they actually created? 
A. I think it was in the summer of 1996 sometime. I don't 
know the specific date. 
Q. So these guidelines would not have played a part in Mr. 
Shoener's or someone else's consideration of the interview, 
the result of the interview, the recommendations contained in 
that interview. Is that what you're saying? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Are these guidelines --
MR. WADDOUPS: Just for the record here, to clarify, 
I just have had a conference with Ms. Henley and she has a 
recollection as far as the creation of the guidelines that was 
a little bit different than that. When she is deposed we may 
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MICHAEL BERNARD - DIRECT EXAMINATION 8 
honest pattern of abuse? Is that fair? 
A. An example would be in the case of Mr. Gallamore, where he 
had traveled to St. Louis on quite a few occasions and he 
would stay, he would schedule his trip around a weekend or a 
holiday. 
There was a pattern. In my opinion, there was a 
pattern of abuse there. 
Q. We were starting to talk about Mr. Gallamore. You have 
identified five instances in which he was reimbursed for 
unused airline coupons. We talked about that. I'll let much 
of this just speak for itself. 
Mr. Gallamore was also reimbursed in the amount of 
$9,100 for thirteen trips to St. Louis, which was his 
hometown, you noted? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you prepare this report? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. Did you prepare all the reports you're testifying about 
today? 
A. Yes, with the exception of, I think Janice Arthur prepared 
one of them. 
Q. Do you recall which one that was? 
A. No, I don't. 
Q. Let's go back to the interrogatory real quick. In 
interrogatory twenty IT? has stated that there are 4 6 employees 
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who had category one exceptions. Is that a true statement? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Interrogatory number twenty-one says there were eight 
individuals who were classified as category two exceptions. 
Is that also true? 
A. Yes. 
Q. There were four persons who were assigned a category three 
exception? 
A. I think so, yes. 
Q. Who were the eight persons who were assigned a category 
two exception? 
A. Jim Gallamore. Joe Leutzinger. 
Q. Before you get into this, when were these assignments 
made? 
A. After the committee had formally assembled. 
Q. Did it consider all of these persons at the same time or 
separate times? 
A. Any of the employees where interviews had already taken 
place they went back and retroactivity categorized them. 
Q. Does the business conduct review team, do they produce 
minutes from their meetings? 
A. No, not to my knowledge. 
Q. Is there any written record that is prepared when those 
meetings are held? 
A. No, not to my knowledge. 
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MICHAEL BERNARD - DIRECT EXAMINATION o2 
A. No. 
Q. No discipline whatsoever? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Did he have to pay back --
A. He had to pay back che amount, yes. 
Q. That's not really discipline. Of those eight persons was 
anybody disciplined? 
A. Yes. Jim Gallamore; Dan Klaus. 
Q. Anyone else? 
A. Rich Elder. 
Q. Three of eight were disciplined? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Of category three, was a criminal referral made of any of 
these persons? 
A. No. 
Q. How about Gene Francisconi? 
A. Not to my knowledge. 
Q. You note in your report that Mr. Lottmann indicated 
pursuit of a criminal case against Mr. Francisconi would be 
evaluated. 
Was a criminal case against any of these other four 
persons in category three evaluated? 
A. Not to my knowledge. Well, I take that back. John 
Frazier might have been. . . 
Q. But you are not sure? 
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MICHAEL BERNARD - DIRECT EXAMINATION 110 
Q. Was Mr. Gallamore aware of the policy on being reimbursed 
for entertaining locally-based employees? 
A. Yes. 
Q. But he still submitted the request for reimbursement? 
A. In certain situations it's appropriate for local employees 
to entertain each ocher. 
In the case of Mr. Gallamore the amount of 
entertainment was excessive, in my opinion, and Mr. Gallamore, 
in my opinion, exercised poor business judgment. 
Q. But you found no intent to deceive? 
A. That's right. 
Q. Is that why he is not category three? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Mr. Vargason informed Mr. Gallamore, you've written at the 
bottom, Mr. Gallamore would be disciplined for these issues, 
et cetera, et cetera. What was the discipline that he 
received? 
A. He was suspended by Mr. Shoener and Mr. Shoener told him 
to go home and don't come back to the office for a week and 
think about why you want to stay employed with Union Pacific, 
and that was the reprimand. 
Mr. Gallamore sacrificed his merit pay for 1997. He 
didn't receive a merit pay increase for 1997. 
And his bonus for the 1996 performance year, which 
would have been approximately ten thousand dollars, was not 
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MICHAEL BERNARD - DIRECT EXAMINATION 12 
given to him. 
Q. So Mr. Shoener had the ultimate, or the last word, I 
should say, on the discipline that was meted out to Mr. 
Gallamore? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How about Mr. Klaus? What problems were noted with him? 
And I believe Mr. Klaus was a --
A. Category two. 
Q. -- category two, okay. 
A. As I recall, he had reported a car rental expense that 
pertained to a -- it was not a business related expense. 
It was for a vacation he had taken. He also reported 
a BTA ticket. 
Q. Didn't Mr. Klaus in particular attempt to defraud Union 
Pacific by renting a car for personal reasons and then 
declaring it as an expense, a business expense? 
A. Did he attempt to defraud? 
Q. Let me separate that. Isn't it true that he admitted that 
he rented a car for personal reasons and reported it as a 
business expense? 
A. He admitted that, yes, he admitted that he had rented the 
car for personal reasons and had accidentally reported it on 
his expense report. 
Q. You don't say that in your report. What was the basis for 
your conclusion that he accidentally did that reporting? 
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A. Yes, unless uhe employee admits that he knew what he was 
doing and he put it down on the expense report. 
Q. Fair enough. Was there an interview held for Mr. Klaus? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was there any review by Mr. Shoener of the discipline for 
Mr. Klaus? 
A. Yes. . 
Q. What was the recommendation of the parties that attended 
the interview? 
A. The recommendation was to reprimand Mr. Klaus; to defer 
his merit pay and bonus. 
Q. That was the extent of the discipline, right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Plus restitution? 
A. Plus restitution, yes. 
Q. Did either Mr. Gallamore or Mr. Klaus prepare any kind of 
a statement at the interview about what had happened? 
A. I believe Mr. Gallamore may have prepared a handwritten 
personal statement. 
Q. Was he asked to do that or did he volunteer to do that? 
A. I don't recall. 
Q. Mr. Klaus didn't prepare a personal statement? 
A. Not that I remember. 
Q. Mr. Witt, what was his problem? 
A. He had two instances of --
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A. Well, first of all, it was nothing that Mr. Faulkner had 
done to receive the second check. 
He didn't create any action that would cause him to 
be paid the second check. 
Q. Granted, but cwo checks received within a week for a 
relatively sizable amount, he wouldn't have caught that? 
A. That's why I interviewed him. He didn't remember that. 
Again, he travels all the time. He gets a lot of expense 
checks . 
He didn't realize that that other check was exactly 
the same amount of the check that he had received ten days 
earlier. 
Q. Basically you accepted his explanation for what happened 
and left it at that? " 
A. I accepted his answer, but I challenged him on it. 
Q. Was any further investigation done to determine whether lie 
is telling the truth or not, that it was just an honest 
mistake? 
A. No. 
Q. He was a category one? 
A. He was a category one. That was the only mistake we 
found. 
We looked at all these individual's expense reports 
for a two year period and that was the only problem we had 
with Mr. Faulkner. 
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Q. Did he instruct his assistant to seek reimbursement for 
these tickets? 
A. He gave her the tickets. 
Q. For the purpose of being reimbursed? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So at least it's suspicious, wouldn't you say? 
A. Yes. 
Q. It also says that expenses totaling $691 were reported 
twice. Was that just one instance in which there was double 
reporting? 
A. There were nine items. It may have been one instance, but 
it happened with nine items during that particular time 
period. 
Q. Could it have been nine separate instances? 
A. Right. 
Q. Was Mr. Leutzinger disciplined in any way? 
A. He was required to provide restitution to the company. 
Q. Was an interview provided for him? 
A. We interviewed him, yes. 
Q. Other than restitution, no discipline? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Did Mr. Shoener review the decision? 
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MICHAEL BERNARD - DIRECT EXAMINATION 13 
Q. So it was only when discipline was considered, that's when 
he was involved? 
A. In the case of the employees that worked for Neil 
Vargason, he was very concerned with those issues. 
Q. Why is that? 
A. Because it had the appearance of being something that was 
out of control. 
Q. Was Mr. Francisconi in Neil Vargason's chain or line of 
authority if Mr. Wagenseil had been in good health? 
A. I'm not sure what the reporting relationship was. 
Q. Mr. Johnson reported to Mr. Wagenseil when he was in good 
health; is that correct? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. Was there any question when you were conducting this audit 
that Mr. Wagenseil's line of responsibility was, as you say, 
out of control? 
A. No. ' -
Q. Is it your testimony that Mr. Shoener reviewed the 
decisions on all the category two and three disciplinary 
decisions? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Those would have included persons other than the car 
maintenance staff, right? * 
A. I don't know with respect to Mr. Parry and Mr. Leutzinger. 
I'm not sure if he was involved in those decisions or not. 
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He reported inappropriate meals, entertainment 
charges totaling S32 00. There were alteration and fabrication 
of these. 
" There was a substantial evidence that he intended to 
defraud the company. 
Q. Would you say that there was an intent to defraud with 
respect to the other category three persons or just Mr. 
Frazier? 
A. I think there was an intent to defraud for any category 
three, I think by definition, any person that has been 
categorized as category three there was an intent to defraud. 
Q. How did Mr. Frazier alter receipts? 
A. In one case he flew out to Laramie, Wyoming, on the 
corporate jet. There was a derailment. 
He was playing golf and he got a phone call around 
3:00 o'clock. 
And he was told to get out to Laramie, there had been 
a derailment, and the corporate jet is flying out there. 
, He went out there on the corporate jet, but what he 
did was he claimed personal mileage going out there. 
He reported that he had entertained a number of 
people that were involved in the clean up of the derailment, 
and he had a $40 receipt, a credit card receipt, and he 
changed the $40 to $250. That was one instance. 
Q. Was that indicative of the other types of alterations of 
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Q. Mr. Lottmann was in attendance a: Mr. Frazier's interview? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did Mr. Lottmann indicate that a criminal referral would 
be made for Mr. Frazier? 
A. Did he indicate --
Q. That any kind of criminal referral or criminal matter 
would be pursued for Mr. Frazier? 
A. During the interview? 
Q. During the interview or any time afterwards? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. Do you know if a criminal referral was ever made for Mr. 
Frazier? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. Do you think this was a more serious circumstance than Mr. 
Francisconi's? 
A. Yes. 
Q. This is probably the most --
A. Egregious. '•. ;'- v 
Q. -- serious violation of the expense policy as a result of 
the audit you did at this time? 
A. Yes. • ':-;• r 
Q. Did Mr. Shoener review Mr. Frazier's discipline? 
A. Yes. 
MR. BURNS: Thank you very much for coming by. 
"-••_ MR. WADDOUPS: Before we conclude the deposition, 
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UNION PACIFIC CORPORATION - ^ - ^ ^ 
Corporate Audit Staff 
Expense Report Irregularity of 
J. L. Frazier. Senior Director - Maintenance Operations (Car") 
On March 1, 1996, R. D. Banse, Director - Auditing, and I, together with Railroad 
representatives G. T. Lottmann, Director - Police Operations, and J. N. Vargason, Chief 
Mechanical Officer (Car), met with J. L. Frazier, Senior Director - Maintenance Operations 
(Car), to discuss numerous alleged expense report irregularities. 
Our review covered the 13-month period ended January 31, 1996 during which Mr. 
Frazier was reimbursed 575,000 including purchases of merchandise aggregating $8,500 
(primarily golf merchandise) and $7,500 for use of his personal car (over 25,000 miles). Mr. 
Frazier was also reimbursed $4,200 for entertainment expenses that were supported only by 
restaurant stubs and for duplicate expenses of $1,500. 
We identified numerous instances in which receipts were altered and expenses were 
fraudulently reported by Mr. Frazier. For instance, a $40 receipt was altered to indicate $250; 
the cost of a stereo system and speakers was reported as the purchase of two computer 
printers; a sports blazer was represented as a " spot award"; and golf equipment for Mr. 
Frazier's personal use was reported as a retirement gift for M. L. Wall, former Assistant Vice 
President - Maintenance Operations. On numerous occasions, Mr. Frazier reportedly used his 
personal auto for travel to various business sites; however, examination of credit card charges, 
cellular phone records, and other business receipts disclosed that the automobile trips were not 
legitimate. In addition, none of the meal and entertainment expenses documented by 
restaurant stubs appeared on Mr. Frazier5 s Corporate American Express card and we 
determined that a number of the charges were fictitious. 
* © * • 
Initially, Mr. Frazier denied any wrongdoing; however, he later admitted that he had 
intentionally reported fraudulent expenses and resigned from the Company. Mr. Frazier 
agreed to restitution of $15,500 representing fictitious business trips ($5,000), inappropriate 
restaurant and entertainment charges ($4,200), personal merchandise ($2,900), duplicate 
expenses ($1,500), and other miscellaneous items ($1,900). 
M. E. Bernard 
March 1, 1996 
UP 001827 
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(CEPT10N DOLLAR AMOUNTS: 
List the total dollar amount of over (under) payment to employee due to expense reporting: $15,500.25. 
List the total number of exceptions noted for expense reporting: . 
iriod Reviewed: 12/3/94 to 1/31/96 
jta! Number of Expense Reports during period: 16 
)tal Amount of Personal Expenses during period: $75,052.00 
CCEPTIOHS NOTED: 
ite: Mr. Frazier's employment was terminated. He repaid the Company $3,295.82 on 6/10/96. 
:ulations for the dollar amount of over payment to employee: A M T _ _ D U u-.XLS 
heduiesthat document the exceptions of John Frazier h R A Z i r z R . X L S 
"Jffl 
anscript from interview with John Frazier on March 01,199B: F R A Z _ J N T . D O C 
Summary of Expense Report Review 
3pies of Airline Tickets: 
All airline ticksts that wers submitted had the date tabs pulled off. If possible, flight dates were verified from 
:EC0 data set. 
acation Expenses Charged to the Company: 
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Ent. 81A4 $325.10 
Vacation claimed February 3. Frazier included receipts from a trip to Oklahoma City that occurred on 2/2 to 215. 
Page two was missing from the expense report, but the totals of the lodging receipt and mileage were included in the 
amount asked for reimbursement: 
Lodging: $240.31 
Mileage: $338.72 $579.03 
Vacation claimed on April 16. Entertainment at Pinnacle Peak Golf Course was expensed. The explanation was to 
discuss emergency equipment placement. 
Golf: $ 76.07 
Vacation claimed on May 19. An expense for hardware (AMEX bill) was submitted with no explanation. 
Westlake $ 41.45 
Vacation claimed July 31 and August 1. Entertainment receipts were submitted for reimbursement. Explanation 
for July 31 was to discuss D (or P)/M changes. No explanation was provided for 8/01. 
7/31 Champps Americana $21.50 
8/01 Charlies 54.31 $ 75.81 
Vacation to Virginia/West Virginia. Round trip airfare for Frazier and his spouse (B/17 to 8/20) to fly to Roanoke, 
VA were claimed as WABCO meeting (no date • the expense was noted on the July 95 report). Car rental was claimed as 
part of the Cozad derailment on 9/14 (mileage also expensed). Golf Prize for Tournament from Greenbrier Pro Shop in WV 
was claimed as part of a KC trip on 8/20. Frazier claimed meals and mileage on 8/20 as part of a trip to KC to audit MBO. 
Frazier returned to Omaha from Roanoke at approximately 11:25 AM (parking receipt) on 8/20. 
Airfare $1185.00 
Car Rental 90.69 
Golf Prize 187.09 
Meals/Mileage 172.45 $1636.23 
Vacation claimed October 5. A receipt from Tiburon Golf Course, dated 10/05, was listed as other on 10/02 (no 
trip was claimed that day). The explanation on the receipt was a Prize for Maint. Op. Golf Tournament Oct. 14th. 
Golf Receipt $ 150.35 
Vacation to Pebble Beach, CA on October 13 to October 15. Airfare from Portland (business trip) to San Jose to 
Omaha was claimed as part of TTX Meeting in Carmel (10/12 and 10/15 only). Golfing merchandise from Spanish Bay golf 
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Meals '"•; - 33.39 $ 495.SB 
Pull Tabs: 
Frazier submitted 44 pull tabs for $4,133.36. None of the pull tabs appeared on his American Express bills. Most 
of the pull tabs were for entertainment. Several pull tabs have been refuted, as is highlighted below. 
Pull Tabs in Sequence: 
311232 9/7 $57.98 Colonial House in Pine Biuff, AR Merger SP/UP 
Claimed Entertainment with H.Wagenseil, J. Santamaria,M.Legg, 
and 3 other SP employees. Wagenseii, Santamaria, and Legg were 
in El Paso 
511233 1/17/96 $53.41 Echo Restaurant in Hinkle Discuss Hinkle etc., 
with Smith and R. Beilsmith (Hermiston, OR). 
311234 5/5 $132.41 Echo Restaurant Discuss ops., etc., 
with M. Smith (other names are difficult to read). 
led Lion Pull Tabs: 
I) Frazier had dinner and drinks with at least one other person at the Red Lion (Maxi's) in Portland on October 10. 
The meal and tip cost $49.95, and was billed to Frazier's hotel room. The dinner was later broken out as a separate 
ixpense, and claimed as entertainment for $49.95 on Fraziers personal expense report on October 11. The explanation on 
:orm 32253 was dinner to "Discuss ALB Oper." Frazier listed Rick Philiippie (Portland) and C. Glenn (Hermison?) as persons 
mtertained. The ticket number of the guest receipt was 55336 (faxed copy of receipt). 
Frazier claimed another entertainment expense for $86.05 from the Red Lion in Portland on October 12. The 
supporting documentation was the matching pull tab from the previously mentioned guest receipt, numbered 5539B. 
'10/12" and "$86.05" were written on the pull tab. The explanation on Form 32253 was lunch to "Discuss Shop". Milton 
Hunt (Portland), R. Middleton (possibly Lloyd Middlston), George Rosebrook (Portland), and Rick Philiippie (Portland) were 
isted as persons entertained. 
I) Frazier and another person ate dinner at the Red Lion in Pendleton on January 17. The meal and tip cost $34.40, 
ind was billed to Fraziers hotel room. The dinner was later broken out as a separate expense, and claimed as entertainment 
in Fraziers personal expense report on January 17. No explanation for the meal was provided on Form 32253. The ticket 
lumber of the guest receipt was 75347 (faxed copy of receipt). 
. On January 19, Frazier claimed another entertainment expense for $35.05 from the Pendleton. The supporting 
iocumentation was the matching pull tab from the previously mentioned guest receipt, numbered 75347. 1/15 and $35.06 
vere written on the pull tab in handwriting that is similar to Fraziers. The explanation on Form 32253 was entertainment 
o discuss safety. Frazier listed C. Smith (unable to determine), Rick Beilsmith (Hermiston), and K. (last name looks iike 
Vhithiker) as persons entertained: 
I I P nniR^n 
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Marriott Pull Tabs 
Frazier claimed entertainment at the Marriott in Salt Lake City on April 24. A pull tab from Fazzios in the Portland 
Marriott was used as supporting documentation. The Salt Lake City Marriott has no restaurant named Fazzios. The cost 
w a s $44.66. The business purpose was to Discuss Provo Funding & IQDO Mi, and Frazier stated that he entertained John 
Renth from Salt Lake City. 
Frazier claimed entertainment at the Marriott in San Francisco on November 25. A pull tab from The Paviliion in 
the St. Louis Marriott was used as supporting documentation. The San Francisco Marriott has no restaurant named The 
Paviliion. The cost was $75.81. The business purpose was to Discuss Operations, and Frazier stated he entertained a 
party of 1 (name difficult to read). 
Entertainment at Harrys in St Louis: -
Entertainment for $173.17 was expensed on May 18. The supporting receipt was a pull tab that was originally 
dated 5/23. 5/17 was written over the date. The explanation on the supporting detail provided no establishment and 
stated the purpose was to Discuss Union Issues and Merger. 
Entertainment for 115.75 was expensed on May 17 as part of a trip to St. Louis. The supporting detail was a pull 
tab, originally dated 5/24. 5/16 was written over the date. The explanation on the supporting detail was dinner at Harrys 
in St. Louis to Discuss Union Issues. Harrys accepts American Express and it gives customers the original check as a 
receipt for cash payments. Harrys does not use quest receipts/pull tabs for receipts (phone conversation • 2/13). 
Cross Reference on Pull Tabs: 
"fUVf't r. •••:- . . 
Six pull tabs were refuted through cross referencing for a total of $588.74. 
Merchandise Purchases: 
Frazier submitted 51 purchases for $8475.17 for reimbursement. Purchases included golf merchandise, stereo 
equipment, and clothing. 
Purchases at Best Buy: 
Ten receipts from Best Buy for a total of $2304.68 were submitted for reimbursement. Products that were 





Dunston leather computer case and film 
Panasonic Phone w Caller ID 
Business Reason 
No business reason given | 
Phone for Staff Mtg (a) 
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2-Phone handsets, Camcorder BTY, Panasonic Phone w/Calier 
ID, Blank Video Tape, and Universal Twin Light for a 
Camcorder 
2 • 4MB memory chips and Microsoft Fiioht Simulator, V. 5.1. 
3-Music CD's, Surge protector, Adapter switch, printer cable, 
and phone cord. 
Motorola 14.4 Modem, 3-VHS C Adapters, Leather Case for a 
Celiular Phone, and Camcorder Case. 
Electronics/Appliances (AMEX Bill was the receipt) 
Shelf System Mini Stereo and 1-Music CD 
Texas instrument graphic calculator and batteries 
G200 2-way stereo speaker 
Equip, for Video Camera for Derailment 
investigation(a) [ 
i 
Upgrade for Laptop (a) 
No business reason given 
No business reason given 
Scanner (a) 
Portable Printer ??? (a) 
No business reason given 
Printer ("Printer for Lab Top" on receipt) 
urchases at Office Depot; 
Frazier purchased a color bubble jet printer for $382.35 and a graphic calculator for $95.84. 
ilf Merchandise: 







2-golfing gloves ($22.00 each) and clothing ($61.00) 
Sweaters (Look at AMEX) 
Taylor Made Putter, Odyssey Dual Force Putter, Ping Solid Color 
Shirt, Hat 
Men's Shorts, Putter, and 2-accessories under $20 













Sporting Goods/Apparel (AMEX Bill) 
Apparel/Accsssories (AMEX Bill) 
Sporting Goods Eauioment (AMEX Bill) 
Men's Shirt ($57) and a hat ($17) 
Posted as Entertainment 
Golf Merchandise 
Merchandise 
Sporting Goods/Equipment (AMEX Bill) 
"Golf" is written on the receipt 
Dm ah a Steaks 
Frazier claimed a total of $697.00 in Omaha Steak purchases. The business reason for mostof the purchases 
was spot award for people that did not work for Frazier. 
Amt Items Purchased 












Ron Sagehorn (Supervisor • Dave Levyl/Dave Archuleta (Supervisor • Dave 
Levy) 
Spot Award for J. Methany (Supervisor • AL Faulkner) 
Spot Award for Rick Thomas (Nampa, ID; Sup. • R. Thomas?) 
Spot Award Thomas, Huiet (No supervisor listed), Smith, Vargason 
(Frazier's supervisor), and Wakefield (Supervisor • A. StrongU. Frazier). 




Duplication of Expenses: 
Airline Tickets 
An airline expense for $421.00 was claimed on January 9 and January 10 for a trip to Portland. The dates were 
on two different expense reports. There were no supporting documents with the January 9 posting, but a copy of an 
airiine ticket, Delta #114605036, was submitted with the January 10 expense. 
January 9 No ticket enclosed 
January 10 Ticket# 1145505036 
Car Rental 
A car was rented from Portland and returned to Pasco, WA on 6/19 to 5/23. Frazier claimed car rental expense of 
$264.74 for 6/18 to 6/23, supported by a Hertz receipt. On 7/8, car rental was expensed for $290.93 as part of a business 
trip to Kansas City (mileage was also claimed). The supporting receipt (from Hertz) was for a rental that was picked up 
from Portland and returned to Pasco on 6/19 to 6/23. The vehicle numbers on both receipts are identical. The difference in 
the totals was due to a mistake in the sales tax on the receipt for $264.74. Frazier's AMEX bills showed that he was billed 
once for $290.93. 
Meal Duplicates 










THE MEAL THAT WAS DUPLICATED 
Dinner and Entertainment 
Dinner and Entertainment 
Dinner and Entertainment 
Dinner and Entertainment 
Dinner and Entertainment 
Lunch and Entertainment 
Dinner and Entertainment 


















Dinner and Entertainment 
Dinner and Entertainment 
Dinner and Entertainment 
Dinner and Entertainment 








Frazier incurred a charge of $105.00 on his American Express account on 5/11 and 5/27 for a total of $210.00. 
The charges were deposits on a reservation at the La Duinta Hotel (La Duinta, CA) for an upcoming trip on 6/8 • 6/12. Dn 
5125, Frazier claimed $105.00 on his personal expense report. No explanation was provided, but the receipt from the 5/11 
deposit was.used as supporting documentation. 
Frazier stayed at the La Duinta on 6/8 • 6/9. The total charges were $244.10 for lodging ($233.10) and phone 
($11.00), but the bill was credited $210.DDso the balance due was $34.10. Frazier claimed the entire lodging and phone 
expenses on his personal expense report on 6/9 and 5/10. Since he also received reimbursement for one of the deposits, 
Frazier was overpaid $105.00. ^ 
Trip to Kansas City 
A trip to Kansas City was claimed on April 8 (Saturday) and April 9 (Sunday) on two separate expense reports. 
Fraziers phone bill (Motorola Monthly Statement) showed that Frazier was in Omaha on April 9. The amount claimed for 
April 9 was $161.26. 
Unverified Derailments: 
There were 13 claimed derailments which were either contradicted by the derailment report or Frazier's receipts. 
Costs associated with those derailments totaled $3988.18. 
L a ramie Derail men t: 
Frazier claimed mileage, entertainment, and meals as part of a trip to Laramie to inspect the derailment on 
November 17 and 18. The derailment occurred at 1:32 PM on November IB. 
The only supporting documentation was a credit card receipt from the Best Western Country Inn for the 
entertainment. The receipt had been altered from $40.03 to $250.03. Fraziers American Express account was billed 
$40.03 (credit card bill). The date on the receipt and credit card bill was November 12. 
There was a Tiburon Golf receipt submitted with the expense report, which indicated that Frazier played golf on 
the morning of November 18. Fraziers celiuiar phone bill also showed that he was in Omaha during the afternoon of 
November 13. 
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Frazier claimed mileage for $413.00, entertainment for $250.03, and meals for $50.00. 
rcher, Wyoming 
Frazier claimed expenses for a derailment in Archer, Wyoming on October 29 (Sunday). He stated that he drove 
205 round trip miles in one day, before flying to Salt Lake City the next day. A derailment occurred in Archer on October 
4. 
rownson, Nebraska 
Travel expenses of $358.70 were claimed on October 22 (Sunday) for 8 derailment in Brownson, Nebraska (475 
.lies from Omaha). 
Brsonal Mileage 
Sixty seven trips were claimed as personal mileage for a total of 25,129 miles ($7513.59). 
luncil Bluffs Trips: 
. A total of 939 miles for $281.14 was claimed for trips to Council Bluffs. 
eekend Kansas City Trips: 
There were 11 instances of weekend trips to Kansas City for a total of $2138.34. 
dahoma City Weekend Trip 
On May 13 to May 14, Frazier claimed a weekend trip to Oklahoma City to Audit Facility. Oklahoma City is out of 
aziers jurisdiction. Total expenses were $434.91. 
sals Expensed After Returning to Omaha: 
Frazier returned to Omaha on December 16 J 994 before 1:34 PM (parking receipt). He claimed dinner for $13.30. 
Frazier returned to Omaha on February 26 before 12:55 PM (parking receipt). He claimed dinner for $12.87. 
Frazier returned to Omaha on May 18 before 3:33 PM. Dinner was expensed for $14.33. 
Frazier returned to Omaha on July 7 before 1:53 PM (parking receipt). He charged dinner and entertainment (Red 
n in Portland • dated 7/05) for $29.88. 
Frazier returned to Omaha on September 8 before 11:47 AM (parking receipt). At 1:37, he had a charge from 
braska Golf for $425.99, which was explained as a retirement gift for Ml Wall. The expense was claimed on September 
is part of a business trip to Houston. 
tertainment in Omaha: 
Frazier entertained employees from his office in Omaha on 38 occasions for a total of $1414.81. 
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CONFlDhN 
TELECOMMUNICATION EXPENSES 
1. List the number of purchases of leiecommunciaiions equipment [i.e. cellular phones): 0 
Provide a brief description of the item(s) expensed.: NA 
2. List the number of telecommunications services that individual expenses (Examples would include PC lines and cellular phone charges. 
List the number of services expensed -not the number of bills submitted.) : 0 
Provide a brief description of the service(s) expensed.: NA 
Ivester 05/09/96 
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— * CONFIDENTIAL 
UNION PACIFIC CORPORATION 
Corporate Audit Staff 
Expense Report Irregularity of G. L. Benham, Systems Consultant, 
Union Pacific Pvaiiroad Company 
On May 17, 1996, representatives of the Corporate Audit Staff, together with 
J. B. Baird, Director - Telecommunications Operations, and G. T. Lottmaim, Director - Police 
Operations, met with Mr. Benham to discuss expense reporting discrepancies. These discrepan-
cies were identified during our review of expense reports processed during the 27-month period . 
ended March 31, 1996 for which Mr. Benham was reimbursed S137.335. 
Mr. Benham's responsibilities included providing telecommunications and LAN 
administration support for the Corporate office. Mr. Benham informed us that he coordinated his 
travel to Bethlehem with the Administrator - Corporate Travel in order to use Corporate aircraft 
when possible. Our review identified 20 instances in which Mr. Benham claimed round-trip 
airfare (includes six tickets purchased by Mr. Benham for other business associates) although his 
American Express Corporate Card had been credited ($9,106 total) for a portion of each ticket It 
was determined that Mr. Benham or associates of him used Corporate aircraft for one leg of most 
of the trips. In addition, Mr. Benham reported round-trip airfare and meals during a three-day 
period in October 1995 when he claimed to have traveled to Bethlehem; however, we noted that 
no airline, car rental, or lodging receipts were provided for this trip. Furthermore, the unused 
airline ticket was returned for credit within a few days of the time Mr. Benham submitted his 
October 1995 expense report and three purchases from Omaha-area retailers were charged to Mr. 
Benham's American Express Corporate Card during the time he claimed to be in Bethlehem. 
Mr. Benham also traveled to Mexico City and Monterrey, Mexico on a number of 
occasions. Comparison of the amounts reported by Mr. Benham for 46 credit card purchases in 
Mexico with amounts billed by American Express disclosed the exchange rate used by 
Mr. Benham was less than the rate used by .American Express on 41 occasions (over half of the 
rate variances exceeded 10%) and, as a result, Mr. Benham was overpaid SI,875. In addition, Mr. 
Benham claimed between $30 and S45 for one-way taxi fare from the Railroad's marketing and 
sales office to the Mexico City airport although the current one-way fare is approximately SI5. It 
was also noted that supporting documentation was not provided for the taxi expenses 
(undocumented taxi fares during the review period aggregated SI,209). 
Our review also disclosed that Mr. 3eiiham incurred personal mileage between 
Omaha and North Platte, Nebraska on 19 occasions. Although Mr. Benham was reimbursed for 
the milease, he also reported related fuel expenses totaling S522. In addition, we noted four 
instances in which Mr. Benham duplicated expenses of S317. 
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Mr. Benham acknowledged that he returned the unused airline coupons to the 
American Express travel group with the intent of receiving credits to his American Express 
Corporate Card. He also agreed that expenses incurred in Mexican currency were not convened 
accurately and that the Company was owed SI,875. He informed us that he did not keep track of 
the taxi expenses inclined in Mexico but reported what he felt was a reasonable amount. 
Although he agreed that the fuel expenses and other duplicated items should not have been 
included on his expense reports, he indicated that he was unaware that fuel expenses were not 
reimbursable or that he had inadvertently-duplicated the other items. Mr. Benham's employment 
was suspended pending farther review and he agreed to repay the Company for the overcharges 
($11,928). 
M. E. Bernard 
(date) 
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McrLYmvxTB . CONFIDENTIAL . _ 
Aft 
UNION PACIFIC CORPORAHON I SXH/BITMO!21 Corporate Audit Stair 
Expense Report Discrepancies of 
Employees of Car Maintenance Operations 
JA- KUHLMAA/ 
M As a result of our disclosure of fraudulent activities attributable to J. L. Frazier, forms 
Senior Director - Maintenance Operations (Car), we expanded our review of expense reports 
prepared by employees of the Car Maintenance Operations function. Our review primarily 
covered reimbursements processed during 1994 and 1995. On March 28, 1996, J. A. Hale, 
Jr., Assistant Controller - Auditing, and I, together with J. N. Vargason, Chief Mechanical 
Officer (Car) and G. T. Lottmann, Director - Police Operations, met with six management 
employees (three of which had approved Mr. Frazier's expense reports) to discuss expense 
report discrepancies. Significant findings are summarized in the following paragraphs: 
\ D. Gallamore, Senior Director - Maintenance Operations (Car) 
Mr. Gallamore was reimbursed $79,200 for personal expenses during 1994 and 1995. 
3ur review identified five instances (SI,984) in which Mr. Gallamore was inappropriately 
eimbursed for unused airline coupons that were either returned for credit to his American 
Express card or exchanged for other tickets. Mr. Gallamore also reported an airline ticket 
S534) that was charged to the Company's Business Travel Account (the ticket had been 
tamped "non-reimbursable" by the travel agent); 23 meals ($239) occuring prior to departure 
>r after return from a business trip; 17 duplicate meals ($181); and seven instances ($144) of 
nappropriate lodging or meals. 
During 1994 and 1995, Mr. Gallamore was reimbursed $9,100 for 13 trips to St. 
JDUIS (Mr. Gallamore's home town) involving a weekend layover including 10 trips in which 
Ir. Gallamore departed for St. Louis either on a Friday, Saturday, or the day before a 
oliday. Four trips revolved around holiday weekends and Mr. Gallamore reported vacation 
me for four of the other trips. Although business expenses were generally claimed 
iroughout the weekend, holidays, and vacation days, the purpose of the business trips was not 
dequately explained. 
During 1994 and 1995, Mr. Gallamore purchased 160 Omaha Steaks gift certificates 
ith a value of $9,500 and Mr. Frazier purchased an additional 268 packages of Omaha Steaks 
alued at $16,500. We were informed that the steaks and gift certificates were purchased for 
te Company's spot awards program; however, these items were generally distributed just 
dor to the year-end holiday season. Fifteen packages or certificates (51,300) were distributed 
) senior-level managers in the department including six packages (S465) received by either 
[r. Gallamore or Mr. Frazier; two gift certificates (SI 12) were redeemed by Mr. Gallamore's 
)usin (resident of St. Louis) or Mr. Gallamore's neighbor; and six certificates (S342) were 
deemed at the Omaha Steaks head office by three unidentified persons. Mr. Gallamore 
formed us that the department did not maintain a list of persons receiving the gift certificates 
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or steal: packages nor did the department maintain an accounting of unissued or unredeemed 
certificates. 
Mr. Gallamore was promoted to the position of Senior Director in January 1994 and 
was required to relocate from the Kansas City area to Omaha. Although his relocation was 
delayed until July 1994, he was authorized to claim meals, lodging, and travel expenses in 
Omaha during the period January 1994 to July 1994. T. A. Campbell, Assistant Vice 
President, provided lodging for Mr. Gallamore at his residence during the eight-month period 
ended August 31, 1994. Between January 1, 1994 and August 31, 1994, Mr. Gallamore was 
reimbursed $6,540 for payments'to Mr. Campbell. Effective July 15, the rate paid Mr. 
Campbell increased from S600 per month to S55 per day for the 45-day period following the 
permanent relocation of Mr. Galiarnore's spouse to the Omaha area. Although the lodging 
arrangement between Mr. Campbell and Mr. Gallamore had been approved in advance by Mr. 
Vargason, the rate increase had not been authorized. We noted the transaction between Mr. 
Gallamore and Mr. Campbell had not been disclosed on Mr. Campbell's conflict-of-interest 
statement and Mr. Campbell was not issued a form 1099 from the Company. 
The expense policy allowed entertainment of in-town personnel by other employees of 
the same office/facility only in extenuating circumstances. Our analysis of entertainment 
expenses reimbursed to Mr. Gallamore during the 11-month period ended November 30, 1995 
identified 43 instances ($1,666) in which Mr. Gallamore entertained or was entertained by other 
locally-based employees. Further analysis indicated that the 43 instances represented 37 percent 
of the work days Mr. Gallamore spent in the Omaha office during the 11-month period. 
Mr. Gallamore agreed to repay $5,202 attributable to expenses inappropriately claimed 
on expense reports. He informed us that he did not keep track of his actual meal expenses 
which, in his opinion, caused the erroneous meal expenses. He contended that, while in St. 
Louis, he worked throughout the weekend and holidays and, consequently, should be 
reimbursed for all travel expenses; however, Mr. Vargason advised us that the amount claimed 
($2,081) beyond Saturday afternoon and certain other entertainment and meal expenses should 
not be reimbursable. He also informed us that the vacation records attributed to him were 
inaccurate. 
Mr. Gallamore indicated the Omaha Steaks gift certificates issued to his neighbor and 
cousin were appropriate because they had provided transportation for him to or from the 
Omaha or St. Louis aiipons. He denied having knowledge of the six gift certificates redeemed 
at the Omaha Steaks head office. 
Mr. Vargason informed us Mr. Gallamore would be disciplined for these issues and 
that he would not qualify for a merit pay increase or management incentive compensation in 
1996. Mr. Vargason also Indicated that, effective January. 1, 1996, entertainment of locally-
based employees had been discontinued. 
D. E. Klaus. Senior Director - Maintenance Operations CEast) 
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On June 2, 1995, Mr. Klaus reported expenses of $457 in connection with a rental car 
obtained in Pocatello during the period May 16 through May 22, 1995. Mr. Klaus specified 
on his expense report that the rental car expenses were incurred in connection with a trip made 
by employees attending a meeting in Salt Lake City. Our review identified that the vehicle (a 
Ford Explorer) was rented by the wife of Mr. Klaus and that the vehicle had been driven 
1.523 miles although the roundirip mileage between Pocatello and Salt Lake City was only 325 
miles. Furthermore, Mr. Klaus reported vacation on Thursday, May 18 and Friday, May 19 
and the vehicle was not returned to the Pocatello rental agency until the following Monday. 
During the interview, Mi. Klaus contended that the vehicle was rented for the Duroose 
^ J. 
stated on his expense report but could not recall who attended the conference in Salt Lake City 
or why the car had been driven over 1.500 miles. He also indicated the vehicle was probably 
returned to Pocatello on Friday and parked at the Railroad facility over the weekend. 
Subsequent to conclusion of the meeting, Mr. IGaus acknowledged that the vehicle was rented 
for personal reasons and should not have been reported on his expense report. 
Our review also identified an instance in which Mr. Klaus was reimbursed for a S655 
airline ticket charged to the Business Travel Account and another instance in which Mr. Klaus 
reported a portion of a car rental expense that was used for a vacation trip taken in Missouri. 
Mr. Klaus agreed to repay the Company (SI, 168). Mr. Vargason informed us Mr. 
Klaus would be disciplined for these issues and that he would not qualify for a merit pay 
increase or management incentive compensation in 1996. 
H. G. Witt. Jr., Manager - Freight Car PS&P 
Our audit identified two instances (S253) in which Mr. Witt reported the same expenses 
twice and, three instances ($580) in which Mr. Witt was inappropriately reimbursed for 
unused airiine coupons that had been returned for credit. In connection with his relocation to 
Omaha, Mr. Witt was also reimbursed for lodging expenses of SI,700 (based on $45 a day) 
for payments made to his mother, a resident of Omaha. 
Upon review of these issues, it was determined that Mr. Witt had not reported the 
expenses of a one-way airline ticket acquired, in part, through an exchange of an unused 
airline coupon and Mr. Witt repaid the net amount owed the Company (S552). Mr. Witt 
informed us that the arrangement between his mother and him had been approved by his 
supervisor and, at our request, he provided copies of cancelled checks issued to Mrs. Witt. 
A. L. Faulkner. Senior Director- Maintenance Operations (Car) 
Accounts Payable personnel processed the same expense report twice and, 
consequently, Mr. Faulkner was overpaid SI, 159. The first check was deposited by Mr. 
Faulkner on March 8, 1995 and the duplicate check was deposited by Mr. Faulkner on March 
17. 
Mr. Faulkner refunded the Company SI,159. 
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CONFIDENTIAL 
p.. L. Phillippie, Manager - Mechanical Maintenance 
On Thursday, October 12, 1995, Mr. Phillippie traveled to Las Vegas for a meeting. 
Personal expenses were reported through Monday, October 16, which was also reported as a 
vacation day. In addition, we noted an instance in which Mr. Phillippie claimed an extra night 
of lodging expense after he had checked out of the hotel. 
Mr. Phillippie acknowledged that he should not have been reimbursed for travel 
expenses in Las Vegas after October 13 or for the extra night of lodging and he repaid the 
Company S892. 
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STRICTLY P R I V A X E 
CONFIDENTIAL 
UNION PACIFIC CORPORATION 
Corporate Audit Staff 
Expense Report Discrepancies of J. A. Leuizinger. Manager - Health Promotion, 
Union Pacific Railroad Company 
On June 3, 1996, representatives of the Corporate Audit Staff, together with 
R. S. Bannister, Director - Health Promotion, and G. T. Lottmann, Director - Police Operations, 
met with Mr. Leutzinger to discuss expense reporting discrepancies. These discrepancies were 
identified during our review of expense reports processed during the 24-month period ended 
December 31, 1995 for which Mr. Leutzinger was reimbursed 270,000. Mr. Leutzinger's expense 
reports were approved by M. L. Trainer, Health Services Project Coordinator, rather than by 
Mr. Bannister, Mr. Leutzinger's immediate supervisor. 
The review identified four instances in which Mr. Leutzinger claimed airline 
expenses totaling S803 although applicable tickers had been charged to one of the Company's 
.American Express business travel accounts (BTA). On two of these occasions, travel agents had 
stamped " non-reimbursable" on the tickets. We also noted that (1) Mr. Leutzinger was 
inappropriately reimbursed SI.253 for six unused airline coupons that were either returned for 
credit to his American Express Corporate Card or exchanged for other tickets; (2) expenses 
totaling S691 (represented nine charges) were reported twice; and (3) Mr. Leutzinger expensed a 
S232 "no show" charge incurred at the Washington D. C. Marriott hotel on October 17, 1994 as 
well as a S250 lodging expense at another Washington D. C. hotel. 
At the outset of our discussion, Mr. Leutzinger informed us that Chris Hawes, a 
contract employee, prepared his expense reports at his direction. Mr. Leutzinger speculated that 
Ms. Hawes did not understand that tickets charged to the BTA and unused flight coupons did not 
represent reimbursable expenses. Mr. Leutzinger informed us that Ms. Hawes had been instructed 
to sign his name to his expense reports and that he seldom reviewed the reports prior to submittal 
to the accounts payable function. Mr. Leutzinger also indicated that Ms. Hawes had been 
requested by him to reconcile all expense report items with individual charges to his American 
Express Corporate Card and that Ms. Hawes had erroneously determined that some credit card 
charges had been omitted from his expense reports. Mr. Leutzinger agreed to provide restitution 
of S2,747 to the Company and to comply with expense reporting procedures in the future; 
however, he informed us that he should not be responsible for the i;no show" charge inasmuch as 
American Express Travel Service agents had failed to cancel his guaranteed reservation 
M. E. Bernard 
(date) 
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Q. Do you know what the circumstances were that Mr. 
Schleiger told you this? 
3 I A. What were the circumstances? 
4 Q. Yes, sir. 
5 A. As far as what? 
6 Q. Why was he telling you this, just to be friendly 
7 or --? 
8 A. I -- just pass on information I guess. 
9 Q- Okay. Did you have any role in any investigation of 
10 Mr. Francisconi? 
11 A. At one point I was requested by Mr. Schleiger to 
12 contact the D.A.'s office to inquire about the case. 
13 Q. Did you? 
14 A. I did. 
15 Q. Who did you contact? 
16 A. I contacted Craig Bown, I believe, B-O-W-N. Not too 
17 sure on the spelling on that. 
18 Q. "Bown" or "Bownd"? 
19 A. B-O-W-N. I don't know how to pronounce it for sure. 
2 0 Q. And who was he with? 
21 A. He was with the D.A.'s office here in Salt Lake. 
22 Q. So the District Attorney now? 
23 A. I believe he is a screening officer. 
24 Q. As a part of your assignment to contact the -- was it 
25 a prosecutor? 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
EUGENE FRANCISCONI, 
Plaintiff, 
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD CO., 
a Utah Corooration, 
Defendant, 
CIVIL NO. 960904423 
D-E-P-O-S-I-T-I-O-N 
DEPOSITION OF CHANDRA HENLEY, taken before Allan G. 
Kuhlman, a Registered Professional Reporter and General Notary 
Public within and for the State of Nebraska, beginning at the 
hour of 3:20 p.m., Friday, August 6, 1999, at 1416 Dodge 
Street, Omaha, Nebraska, taken on behalf of the plaintiff in 
the above-entitled matter, pursuant to the within 
stipulations. 
ALLAN G. KUHLMAN 
REGISTERED PROFESSIONAL REPORTER 
OMAHA, NS3RASKA 
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CHANDRA HENLEY - DIRECT EXAMINATION 1 
Q. You are personally not aware of any? 
A. No, not that I was involved in, no. 
Q. By involved, you mean directly involved? 
A. Meaning where the railroad's internal audit staff was 
involved from a period of 1994 to 1996. 
Q. Are you familiar with any instance where the railroad has 
ever even contacted the criminal authorities regarding any 
finding of fraud or any finding as a result of an audit? 
A. As a result of an audit? No. 
Q. Mr. Fillmore was asked to provide restitution of how much? 
A. He was not. 
Q. He was not asked to provide restitution? 
A. No. -..;. 
Q. Why was that? 
A. The issue was not che money. The issue was the nature of 
the act, and the railroad, the department head, had the 
discretion to make a decision about restitution prior to the 
implementation of the business conduct committee. 
Q. Did the business conduct committee make the ultimate 
decision about this person's status? 
A. No, the business conduct committee was not in place, I 
don't believe, until 1996. So it was after this event. 
Q. When did the interview occur? 
A. This was 1995. 
Q. So the committee's recommendation was that restitution not 
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Total in Lieu of Gifts 
Disallowed Lodging Days 
(used avg per day :$42.73 MS) 
Remaining In Lieu of Gifts 






•OTAL DISALLOWED IN-LIEU OF LODGING EXPENSES: 
'87 + 1147) 
$1,934 
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DISALLOWED PQCA7ELLO EXPENSES 
Mar-94 Sun 20 
Apr-94 Sat 23 
Sun 24 
Jul-94 Sat 23 
Sun 24 
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APPENDIX F 
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Motion to 
Strike Fact Exhibits Contained in Defendant's Amended 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
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David J. Bums, Esq. (#7157) 
DAVID J. BURNS, P.C. 
1000 Boston Building 
Nine Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-6686 
Facsimile: (801) 531-6690 
Daniel Darger (#0815) 
Attorney at Law 
1000 Boston Building 
Nine Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-6686 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE TfflRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
EUGENE FRANCISCONI, ) PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN 
) SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STRIKE 
Plaintiff, ) FACT EXHIBITS CONTAINED IN 
) DEFENDANT'S AMENDED 
v. ) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
) MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
UNION PACIFIC RAIL ROAD CO., a ) 
Utah Corporation, ) Civil No. 960904423 
) 
Defendant. ) Judge Stephen Henriod 
Plaintiff Eugene Francisconi, through his counsel, hereby files the following memorandum in 
support of his Motion to Strike Fact Exhibits Contained in Defendant's Amended Memorandum in Support 
of Motion for Summary Judgment. 
FACTS 
1. Plaintiff moves to strike the Affidavit of John A. Ivester. 
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By way of background, on or about August 22, 1996, Plaintiff served a First Set of 
iterrogatories and Request for Production of Documents on Defendant Union Pacific Rail Road Co. 
iterrogatory no. 1 of that discovery asked Defendant to identify "all persons with discoverable information 
Pairing to this action." Defendant identified nine persons. Defendant did not identify John A. Ivester 
> one of those nine persons. Later, Plaintiff took the depositions of most of the latter persons at " 
efendant's headquarters in Omaha, Nebraska. During the course of these depositions, Defendant's -
nployees identified John Ivester as the person who conducted the actual financial audit of Plaintiffs -•— 
:pense reports. This was the first time that Plaintiff became aware of Mr. Ivester's existence. Defendant 
lrported to terminate Plaintiff as a result of this audit. 
After the Omaha depositions, Plaintiff requested that Defendant produce in Salt Lake City, 
[r. Ivester and another critical employee it had failed to identify. Defendant's counsel denied the request, ' 
guing that Defendant's answer to the interrogatory was "accurate and appropriate." Plaintiff thus moved 
compel the depositions and this Court granted the motion. On December 1, 1998, Plaintiffs counsel 
i 
jposed Mr. Ivester in Salt Lake City. The deposition lasted approximately three hours and spanned 95 
iges of transcribed testimony. Defendant's counsel declined to ask any questions of Mr. Ivester or to 
herwise clarify any of his statements. ( 
In the fact section of its memorandum in support of motion for summary judgment, 
sfendant has submitted 42 numbered paragraphs. Approximately one-third of the numbered paragraphs 
late to exhibit c of the motion for summary judgment, the Affidavit of John A. Ivester and attached "In 
eu Of Lodging Schedule." No other deponent or fact item is more relied upon by Defendant in support 
• its motion for summary judgment. Apparently, Defendant now counts Mr. Ivester a person "with ( 
scoverable information pertaining to this action." 
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Plaintiff moves, in part, to strike the affidavit because it contradicts the 30(b)(6) testimony 
of the company. In particular, on August 6, 1999, Plaintiff took the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of the 
company. Item number seven of the 30(b)(6) notice of deposition instructed Defendant to identify its 
designee who would provide testimony on the following subject matter: "The basis for your belief that 
Plaintiff violated the 'payment "in lieu of policy' by 'altering receipts, concealing the true nature of 
expenses, and by requesting and subsequently receiving reimbursement for improper unauthorized 
expenses' as more fully set forth in the audit report prepared for Plaintiff and produced at UP 000208, 
passim."1 Defendant identified Michael Bernard, the director of auditing, to testify on behalf of the 
company. 
2. Plaintiff moves to strike the "interview summary" purportedly prepared by Janice Arthur. 
In her deposition, Ms. Arthur was asked about why the "interview summary" read like a transcript, even 
though she claimed that the recording device she brought to the interview was not used. For instance, she 
was asked why her purported summary states that the interviewer said, "Okay, Lets [sic] back up for a 
•A 
minute." She replied in her deposition: "I guess you'd have to say it was a paraphrase. I mean, I distinctly 
recall him [Bernard] saying, 'Okay. Let's back up for a minute.' But as far as the other three or four 
sentences that are in that paragraph, you know, it was probably a generalization or a, you know, shortness 
of, you know, the questions that he asked,..." (Janice Arthur depo. p. 29, Exhibit A hereto.) She went 
1
 Earlier, in response to an interrogatory which asked it to state "which company rules 
Plaintiff allegedly violated and how said rules were violated," Defendant had answered that 
Plaintiff had violated the company's personal expense policies "by altering receipts, concealing the 
true nature of expenses, requesting and subsequently receiving reimbursement for improper and 
unauthorized expenses." (Defendant's answer to Interrogatory No. 6 of Plaintiffs First 
Interrogatories.) Thus, because the company itself had refused to provide definitive testimony on 
the precise violations which it relied upon in terminating Plaintiff, the 30(b)(6) deposition was 
designed to obtain concrete testimony on the subject matter. 
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i to acknowledge that it was "very difficult to keep up with the pace of the conversation. I did the best 
could." (Arthur depo. p. 30.) Even so, she says she was able to write notes not only in the printed 
aestionnaire she had but also on blank pieces of paper. (Arthur depo. p. 31.) She admitted that she left 
le room at some point in the interview. (Arthur depo. p. 31.) 
IV 
i 
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ARGUMENT 
A motion for summary judgment must be supported by the existing record. Utah Rule of 
Civil Procedure 56(c) identifies the record as the "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file," as well as affidavits. In other words, the available record consists of sworn 
testimony, and evidence otherwise admissible at trial. See also, 4-501(2)(B) CJ.A. (the points and 
authorities in opposition to a motion for summary judgment "shall specifically refer to those portions 
of the record upon which the opposing party relies"). The following exhibits attached to Defendant's 
motion for summary judgment should be stricken because they are not part of the record in this 
action. 
I. The "Application For Employment" Attached As Exhibit A Should Be Stricken 
In paragraphs one and two of its fact section, Defendant offers as exhibit a a document it 
describes as "Application for Employment," which, it alleges, contains a statement of the "Terms 
and Conditions of Employment." Defendant makes a cursory and unsupported assertion that Plaintiff 
signed a document entitled statement of terms and conditions of employment. (Defs Mem. at i.) But the 
document that Plaintiff was shown at his deposition is not the same document that Defendant offers as 
exhibit a. At the deposition. Plaintiffs counsel objected to the document that was offered as an incomplete 
copy of whatever it purported to be. (Eugene Francisconi depo. p. 10, Exhibit B hereto.) With respect 
to the document that he was shown, Plaintiff was not asked to authenticate the document that was offered 
(i.e., never confirmed that the document is what Defendant claims). Instead, he was only asked if he 
recalled signing page three of the document, which is dated August 10, 1970. He replied that he did not. 
(Francisconi depo. p. 10.) 
The document submitted as exhibit a is not the document that was offered at Plaintiffs 
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position, and Defendant makes no showing that it has ever been authenticated. Absent this condition 
ecedent to admissibility, exhibit a is inadmissible, and should be stricken. Utah R. Evid. 901(a). In 
dition to lack of authentication, exhibit a is inadmissible hearsay because it is a statement, other than one 
ade by the declarant while testifying at trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the 
atter asserted. Utah R. Evid. 801(c). 
The Affidavit of John A. Ivester Attached As Exhibit C And "In Lieu Of Lodging 
Schedule"Attached As Exhibit CI Should be Stricken 
Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that an affidavit supporting or 
)posing a motion for summary judgment "shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth 
ich facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to 
stify to the matters stated therein." Thus, for an affidavit to be effective in support of a motion for 
immary judgment, it must set forth facts that would be admissible at trial. Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 
57 (Utah 1983). Moreover, as a general rule, a party may not rely on a subsequent affidavit that 
mtradicts his deposition testimony. Webster v. 5/7/, 675 P.2d 1170 (Utah 1983); Gaw v. State, 798 P.2d 
130 (Utah App. 1990). 
Mr. Ivester's affidavit should be stricken because it fails to satisfy the evidentiary requirements 
f Rule 56(e) and contradicts his prior deposition testimony. In particular, it contains statements for 
iiich there is a lack of foundation and that are conclusory in form. The statements are also duplicative 
f those made in Mr. Ivester's deposition and/or have not been previously disclosed despite specific request 
lerefor. 
Three general objections may be made to Mr. Ivester's affidavit. First, the affidavit is a 
lear attempt to circumvent the statements Mr. Ivester made in his lengthy deposition. By submitting an 
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affidavit, he is able to avoid cross-examination at deposition. Whereas Mr. Ivester was equivocal in his 
deposition, he is emphatic in his affidavit. Further, Mr. Ivester's affidavit is an attempt to proffer either 
duplicative testimony or testimony that contradicts his deposition. Plaintiff has made repeated requests 
to discover the basis for Defendant's belief that Plaintiff altered receipts and otherwise received improper 
reimbursement. 
Mr. Ivester was asked to disclose this same information in his deposition. Therefore, the 
only relevant information that can be contained in Mr. Ivester's affidavit has either been stated in his 
deposition, or should have been stated in his deposition or in a previous interrogatory propounded 
to Defendant. In either case, the affidavit is inappropriate and designed to circumvent the ordinary 
practice of discovery. Defendant's offer of the affidavit is a bald attempt to ambush Plaintiff with new 
evidence after the close of discovery. This Court has already stricken Defendant's most recent 
discovery requests on the same subject matter as untimely. 
Second, Defendant does not demonstrate either through Mr. Ivester's affidavit or elsewhere 
4 
in its motion for summary judgment, that the factual assertions contained in the affidavit were ever 
communicated to and relied on by any decision maker of the company. The personal knowledge of 
an agent of the corporation who is not a corporate officer regarding the facts to which he has sworn 
will not be presumed, and therefore the specific "means and sources" of his information must be 
shown. Utah Farm Prod, Credit Ass'n v. Watts, 137 P.2d 154 (Utah 1987). There is, for instance, 
no foundation established in Mr. Ivester's affidavit or elsewhere in Defendant's memorandum indicating 
that Arthur Shoener, the Vice President of Operations who made the decision to terminate Plaintiffs 
employment, ever relied on the specific assertions made in Mr. Ivester's affidavit As such, his assertions 
are irrelevant. 
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The assertion in paragraph thirteen of Mr. Ivester's affidavit stating that he "turned the In 
leu of Lodging Schedule and supporting audit materials over to my supervisor, Janice Arthur, 
r further action," does not alter this conclusion. No evidence is presented elsewhere in Defendant's 
emorandum that Ms. Arthur ever in fact received the information and that she communicated to Mr. 
loener the specific information contained in Mr. Ivester's affidavit and the lodging schedule that is 
tached as Exhibit 1 to the affidavit. The assertion in paragraph 33 of Defendant's statement of facts 
at Mr. Shoener met with unspecified "auditors" to review audit information does not establish the ,-
jcessary link between Mr. Ivester and Mr. Shoener. 
In addition to general objections of duplication, contradiction and lack of foundation establishing 
ie relevance of the assertions, Mr. Ivester's affidavit is objectionable because it is superseded by the Rule 
3(b)(6) testimony of the company on the same subject matter. The testimony of the 30(b)(6) deponent, 
lichael Bernard, director of auditing, is the company's testimony on the foregoing subject matter. That 
^position testimony is attached hereto as Exhibit "A." There the company stated that 22 receipts were 
Dt "adequate" because they did not contain "itemized descriptions," but refused to identify which specific 
jceipts were problematic, because that would require it to "speculate." (Michael Bernard depo. pp. 57-58, 
xhibit C hereto.) Since this limited testimony is the company's testimony, Mr. Ivester's testimony on the 
ime subject matter is irrelevant. 
More particularized objection can be made to each of the substantive, numbered paragraph 
l Mr. Ivester's affidavit: 
• In paragraph 5, Mr. Ivester asserts that Plaintiff "received reimbursement for a 
lrge number of 'in lieu of expenses." In his deposition, Mr. Ivester never asserted that Plaintiff 
ad received reimbursement for a "large" number of such expenses. As made in the affidavit, the 
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assertion is without foundation, is conclusory and opinion. 
• In paragraph 6, Mr. Ivester asserts that 27 "in lieu of lodging expenses for which 
Plaintiff received reimbursement "involved trips to Pocatello where Mr. Francisconi's father, Alfred 
Francisconi, resided." In his deposition, Mr. Ivester testified that neither he nor anyone else that he was 
aware of ever contacted Alfred Francisconi concerning the stays. At the time of the audit, "we weren't 
even sure who the items were going to, because we did not have a name of the person that these items 
went to." (John Ivester depo. p. 45, Exhibit D hereto.) Thus, paragraph 6 is inadmissible because it 
contradicts Mr. Ivester's deposition testimony. 
• In paragraphs 7 through 10, Mr. Ivester provides testimony that is duplicative of 
his deposition. 
• In paragraph 11, Mr. Ivester opines that Plaintiff altered six store receipts "to conceal the 
nature of the merchandise purchased." This statement is inadmissible opinion. Moreover, the statement 
contradicts Mr. Ivester's deposition testimony. There he stated that he did not make independent decisions 
concerning the appropriateness of Plaintiffs expense statements, but rather would defer to his supervisors. 
(Ivester depo. p. 46.) > 
The foregoing arguments can also be made to exclude exhibit cl, the In Lieu Of Lodging 
Schedule, which Defendant cites separately in the fact section. Among other deficiencies, this document 
lacks foundation and is grounded on hearsay within hearsay. Paragraphs 25-27 and 29 of Defendant's facts 
section explicitly refer to unnamed "store personnel," unidentified "information to the auditor," unattached 
American Express statements, and the like as the basis for the information contained in the 
Schedule. The document is entirely derivative and therefore inadmissible hearsay. 
III. The 'Interview Summary" Attached As Exhibit E Should Be Stricken 
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Defendant also offers in support of its motion for summary judgment, a document which it 
fers to as an "interview summary" and which it alleges was prepared by Janice Arthur. In paragraph 20, 
jfendant asserts that Ms. Arthur "took detailed notes of the interview," and "then prepared a written 
mmary of the questions asked and given by Mr. Francisconi." (Defs Mem. at iv.) However, Defendant 
>es not attach the sworn testimony of Ms. Arthur or any other person to authenticate the "interview 
mmary" that is attached as exhibit e to Defendant's memorandum. 
Defendant cites but does not attach to its memorandum, certain deposition testimony of 
s. Arthur. Pages 26 through 28, referred to by Defendant, and pages 29 through 31, are attached hereto 
Exhibit "B." From this testimony, it is clear that the "interview summary" was never made an 
thenticated exhibit to Ms. Arthur's deposition. Nor was Plaintiff ever asked in his deposition to 
thenticate any of the alleged admissions contained in the "interview summary." Accordingly, the 
iterview summary" is inadmissible pursuant to Utah R. Evid. 901(a). 
The "interview summary" is also inadmissible because it is not based on personal knowledge, 
her deposition, Ms. Arthur stated she prepared a report of the interview that was "a paraphrase 
sed upon my memory and the notes that I had, yes." (Arthur depo. p. 28.) The notes that she had, 
e further stated, included the notes of "Mike Bernard and Jim Hale" as well as her own. But she 
ide no attempt to identify which part, if any, of the "interview summary" was a product of her notes 
d of other's notes. (Arthur depo. p. 27.) Therefore, contrary to Defendant's assertion that Ms. 
rthur "took detailed notes" and "then prepared a written summary," the document is entirely 
irivative. By Ms. Arthur's own admission, it is merely a paraphrase of her memory and scribbled 
•tes that may or may not be her own. 
The "interview summary" is also inadmissible because it is hearsay, and/or hearsay Within 
6 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
hearsay. It purports to contain statements by a person or persons other than Plaintiff. That other 
person or persons are identified in the body of the summary only by the letter "I." These statements 
attributed to "I" are inadmissible hearsay. 
As for the admissions attributed to Plaintiff, these too are hearsay. Curiously, none of the 
alleged statements that Defendant has cited in its memorandum as an admission of Plaintiff appears in the 
handwritten notes Ms. Arthur says she prepared at the time of the interview. It is reasonable to assume 
that if Plaintiff had made a statement against interest, then it would have been recorded somewhere in the 
fifteen pages of notes kept by Ms. Arthur. The alleged statements are therefore, as Ms. Arthur admits, at 
best "a paraphrase" of her memory. But a vague paraphrase is not direct evidence of anything, and is only 
hearsay. Moreover, each of the statements Defendant attributes to Plaintiff is also hearsay (notes of 
Bernard, Hale or Arthur) within hearsay (Arthur's paraphrase of notes or recollection). 
IV. The "Summary" Attached As Exhibit H Should Be Stricken 
In paragraph no. 32 of the fact section, Defendant represents that the "Corporate Audit 
4 
Staff prepared a summary of its findings," and that summary is attached thereto as exhibit h. However, 
no demonstration is made as to the authenticity of the document or why it is not hearsay. A "summary," 
by its very nature, is derivative and in this instance, hearsay within hearsay. 
V. The "Separation Agreement" Attached As Exhibit J Should Be Stricken 
In paragraph no. 35 of the fact section, Defendant claims that Plaintiff received a "Separation 
Agreement" from the company. In his deposition, however, Plaintiff merely acknowledged that he 
received an unspecified document after speaking with Thomas Campbell. Plaintiff was never asked 
to authenticate exhibit j and it was never offered as an exhibit at his or anyone else's deposition. The 
document is also inadmissible hearsay. 
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I. The Letter Attached As Exhibit L Should Be Stricken 
In paragraph no. 38 of the fact section, Defendant claims that in a letter dated June 7, 1996, "Mr. 
-ancisconi was notified of his right to elect COBRA continuation coverage." Plaintiff claims that 
efendant threatened to withhold COBRA coverage to force Plaintiff to resign, and when he did not 
sign, Defendant withheld the coverage in violation of law. 
The letter purports to be from Larry L. Reiff, but Defendant did not depose Mr. Reiff and 
is not attached an affidavit to its motion for summary judgment, authenticating that the document 
what Defendant claims. Moreover, the document is stamped "Cobra Offer File," in yet Defendant 
is not shown that the document satisfies the business records exception to the hearsay rule. Finally, 
efendant did not offer the letter dated June 7, 1996, as an exhibit at Plaintiffs deposition and did 
3t even question Plaintiff about it. Indeed, there is no showing that the letter was ever sent to 
laintiff or that he ever received it. 
II. The letter Attached As Exhibit M Should Be Stricken 
The foregoing grounds for striking exhibit 1 apply as well to exhibit m. This document . 
urports to be a letter from Larry L. Reiff to Dennis Seals of United Health Care of Utah. Defendant 
[aims that this document demonstrates that on June 21, 1996, "Sharlene Francisconi [Plaintiffs wife] 
lected COBRA coverage." (Def s Mem. at 9.) However, there is no demonstration that Mr. Reiff ever 
Lithenticated the document, that it in fact was delivered to Mr. Seals, was kept in the ordinary course of 
usiness, or that it otherwise proves what it purports to prove, namely, that Ms. Francisconi elected 
10BRA coverage on that date. 
TIL The Letters Attached As Exhibit O Should Be Stricken 
In paragraph no. 41 of the fact section, Defendant offers exhibit o in support of the affirmative 
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allegation that the UPGRADE Policy "has never been applied to management employees." But 
rather than attach sworn testimony, Defendant merely proffers two letters: one dated September 6, 1994, 
from Rene Orosco to Kevin L. Newton, and another (unsigned copy) dated June 29, 1994, from D.D. 
Matter to Kevin L. Newton. Both of the letters are inadmissible. 
What Mr. Orosco or Mr. Matter allegedly stated to Mr. Newton in 1994 is irrelevant and 
hearsay. It is irrelevant because the issue in question is whether Defendant breached an implied-in-fact 
contract of employment based on the UPGRADE Policy's guarantee of certain grievance procedures 
before an employee may be terminated, and in this regard the law is only concerned with the 
representations made between employer and employee. Defendant did not offer the letters at Plaintiffs 
deposition, or otherwise attempt to establish that Plaintiff received copies of the letters or was ever made 
aware of their contents. As such, they are irrelevant to the question whether an implied-in-fact contract 
existed. 
Additionally, the letters are hearsay. As noted above, Defendant has submitted the letters 
4 
in support of the affirmative allegation that the "policy never applied to management employees." 
As such, under Utah R. Evid. 802, the letters are inadmissible hearsay. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff Eugene Francisconi respectfully requests that the following 
exhibits attached to Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment be stricken 
because they are not part of the existing record, along with the corresponding numbered paragraphs in 
Defendant's "Statement of Undisputed Facts": 
1. The "Application for Employment" attached thereto as exhibit a (paragraph nos. 1-2) 
on the grounds of lack of authentication and inadmissible hearsay; 
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2. The Affidavit of John A. Ivester and "In Lieu Of Lodging Schedule" attached thereto as 
tiibits c and cl (paragraph nos. 5-7, 9-15, and 25-29) on the grounds of irrelevance, lack of foundation, 
nclusory in form, and duplicative and/or contradiction of prior deposition testimony; 
3. The "Interview Summary" attached thereto as exhibit e (paragraph nos. 20-23, 28, 
d 30) on the grounds of lack of authentication, lack of personal knowledge and inadmissible 
arsay; 
4. The "Summary" attached thereto as exhibit h (paragraph no. 32 (last sentence)) on 
5 grounds of lack of authentication and inadmissible hearsay; 
5. The "Separation Agreement" attached thereto as exhibit j (paragraph nos. 35 (last 
itence)-36) on the grounds of lack of authentication, inadmissible hearsay and irrelevance; 
6. The letter attached thereto as exhibit 1 (paragraph no. 38) on the grounds of lack of 
thentication, inadmissible hearsay and irrelevance; 
7. The letter attached thereto as exhibit m (paragraph no. 39) on the grounds of lack 
authentication, inadmissible hearsay and irrelevance; and 
8. The letters attached thereto as exhibit o (paragraph no. 41) on the grounds of lack 
authentication, inadmissible hearsay and irrelevance. 
DATED this 3^ > day of December, 1999. . 
DAVID J. BURNS, P.C. 
DAVID J. BURNS 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 3° day of December, 1999, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STRIKE FACT EXHIBITS 
CONTAINED IN DEFENDANT'S AMENDED MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT was sent by U.S. mail, postage prepaid, to: 
Jon Waddoups 
KIRTON & McConkie 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
P.O. Box 45120 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120 
Daniel Darger 
Attorney at Law 
1000 Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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DIRECT - ARTHUR
 2-
A. I'm net sure. He may be a finance major. 
Q. Is he still in college? 
A. No. 
Q. Let me direct your attention to -- if you'll look at 
volume one, page 154. 
MR. WADDOUPS: While she's looking for 
that, let's go off the record for a minute. 
(An off-the-record discussion was held.) 
Q. (By Mr. Darger) If you could look at page 154 of volume 
one . 
A. Okay. 
Q. Do you recognize the document that starts at 154 of 
volume one? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What is that document? 
4
 4' 
A. It's the document that I prepared from my notes and my 
recollection of the interview on April 26th. 
Q. How were your notes recorded? 
A. In longhand. 
Q. There wasn't a recorder there? 
A. No. Well, I believe that there was a recorder there, but 
it wasn't used. 
Q. Why wasn't it used? 
A. Well, we had had -- I really don't know why i- wasn't 
used. I had brouaht the recorder over, and I believe I 
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DIRECT - ARTHUR 27 
gave it to Mike Bernard, and he - - when we had used 
recorders in the past, they hadn't been very successful 
in the quality. You couldn't hear. So I just think we 
decided to skip it. 
Q. Well, let me ask you about this thing. 
Mow, other than the individuals listed up at the top 
of the page here, no one else was in the room during this 
interview? 
A. No. 
Q. And let me just go through a few things here. 
Look at page 155, and I'd like to sort of track 
this, what you've written here in this interview with 
your notes, which starts on 116. So maybe if you could 
just like put a little stick-em on 116, and that way you 
can kind of go back and forth. 
Are those notes on 116 taken by you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Are these the notes that you say were the basis of the 
transcript at 154? 
A. These, and some others that I wrote on some plain paper 
and, also, notes that I got from Mike Bernard and Jim 
Hale. 
Q. Nov/, uhe ones you wrote on plain paper, would they scar: 
at 125? 
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DIRECT - ARTHUR 2 8 
Q. Okay. Look, if you will, again, to 155. 
Well, first of all, let me just ask you, generally, 
this transcript: that starts at 154 appears to be almost 
like a verbatim quoted transcript such as the one that's 
going to be prepared of your testimony today. Is it your 
testimony that the interviewer actually asked these 
questions as they're written and Mr. Francisconi answered 
them as they are written, or is this a paraphrase based 
upon your memory? 
A. It's a paraphrase based upon my memory and the notes that 
I had, yes. 
Q. For example, look at page 155, if you would, the fourth 
• paragraph down. The interviewer: "Okay. Let's back up 
for a minute." 
Could you show me where in your notes that comment, 
"Let's back up for a minute," is found? 
A. It may not be in my notes. I said that not only did I go 
from my notes bun my memory of the conversation that took 
place during the interview. 
Q. How long after the interview did you write this 
transcript? 
A. Maybe an hour. 
Q. And who was ihe interviewer that said, "Okay. Let's back 
up for a minuce"? 
i 
I 
ii Mv recollection is is thai was Mike Bernard. I 
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DIRECT - ARTHUR 2 9 
Q. And you r e c a l l e d h im s a y i n g t h a t ? 
A. Y e s , I d o . 
Q. Okay. Now, is that question that he's got there, is that 
a verbatim quote of his question, or is it just a 
paraphrase based upon your memory? 
A. Which question are you referring to? 
Q. "Okay. Let's back up for a minute," and then the rest of 
that paragraph. 
A. I guess you'd have to say it was a paraphrase. I mean, I 
distinctly recall him saying, "Okay. Let's back up for a 
minute." But as far as the other three or four sentences 
that are in that paragraph, you know, it was probably a 
generalization or a, you know, shortness of, you know, 
the questions that he asked, and I'm sure that he -- Gene 
Francisconi answered before, you know, Mike asked the 
next question that I have listed there, but it was a 
series of questions that he asked. 
Q. At the top of 156'-- actually, that's the wrong one. 
Where is it? 
There it is. The middle of 157. Could you show me 
in your notes where Mr. Francisconi said, "I've never 
bought a pair cf Docker pants in my life"? In fact, 
according to your transcript, he said it twice. 
A. I don't see where I specifically wrote that in my notes. 
Q. Well, that seems sort of like a auote to me. Did you 
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DIRECT - ARTHUR
 3 Q 
just make up that wording or - -
A. No, I didn't. That's what I recalled Mr. Francisconi 
said. 
Q. Okay. Look at the second to last paragraph on 157, the 
last sentence: "I don't know if the company would 
approve" -- "I don't know if the company would approve of 
the purchases." 
How do you know that that's what he said in response 
to that question? 
A. That's what I recalled from being at the interview. 
Q. And so you were able to go through, and with either your 
notes or your memory, determine which specific things he 
said in response to various specific questions? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So then this is not really what Mr. -- necessarily what 
Mr. Francisconi may or may not have said; it's what you 
remember that he said. Is that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, I notice in your notes that begin on 116, there are 
a lot of questions for which you didn't write any 
answers. Is there any reason for that? 
A. It was very difficult: to keep up with the pace of the 
conversation.. 1 did the besi I could. 
Q. Was it difficult sometimes to keep up with just listeni:::' 
tc the conversation cr just writina it? 
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DIRECT - ARTHUR 31 
A. Writing it. 
Q. But you were able to, apparently, write notes not only in 
the printed questionnaire but, also, on blank pieces of 
paper at the same time? 
A. Yes, I had both of those items. 
Q. And you remembered all of the comments that he made, as 
well. That's pretty good. 
Did Mr. Francisconi have anybody there with him as 
opposed to people who were interviewing him? 
A. Gary Johnson and Neil Vargason were there. 
Q. Well, they were there to interview him, right? 
A. They didn't participate in the interview. 
Q. Neil Vargason didn't participate? 
A. He was in the room, but he didn't ask any questions. 
Q. Wasn't there a period of time when Mr. Vargason and some 
of the gentlemen stepped outside of the room for a few 
minutes? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Which gentlemen were they besides Mr. Vargason? 
A. Gary Johnson, Jim Hale, Mike Bernard, and Gary Lottmann. 
Q. Do you know what they were doing out there? 
A. Not the whole time. I, myself, left the room at some 
peine. 
Q. And what were they doing out there when you were out 
there? 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 




UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD CO., 






BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 17th day of September, V 
1997, the deposition of EUGENE FRANCISCONI, produced as a 
witness herein at the instance of the defendant, in the 
above-entitled action now pending in the above-named 
court, was taken before JENNIFER KENDELL, a Registered 
Professional Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State 
of Utah, commencing at the hour of 1:30 p.m. of said day at 
at the offices of Van Cott Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy, 50 
South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah. 
That said deposition was taken pursuant to Notice. 
CERTIFIED COPY 
JENNIFER KENDELL 
CSR No. 97-339161-7801 
INDEPENDENT REPORTING 
& VIDEOGRAPHY 
1710 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801)538-2333 
Fax (801) 538-2334 
• * 
One-Source Court Reporting Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
straight, we can also refer to these by UP-102. It's -- I 
think that's how we referred to it in Volume 1, Page 102, and 
that would be-this document as I take it. 
MR. WADDCUPS: That's a good suggestion. Let's 
refer to this as UP-102, 103 and 104. 
MR. DARGER: My only question is it appears to 
start with Paragraph 20 which indicates that this isn't the 
entire document. That is. 
9 I actually a question I had about the original 
0 page. And I don't mind you asking him questions about the 
1 rest of it but I'd like to have the entire document. 
2 MR. WADCOUPS: You've received everything that 
3 J was in the personnel file, but we can go back and check on 
that as well. 
.5 I MR. DARGER: All right. I appreciate it. 
6 Q4- (By Mr. Waddoups:) Mr. Francisconi, this 
L7 document appears to be dated August 1970, is that correct? 
L8 A. That's correct. 
19 Q. Do you recall signing this document? 
2 0 A. I don't, no. . 
21 Q. But that appears to be your signature on the last 
22 page, doesn't it? 
23 A. That's definitely my signature, yes. 
24 Q. All right. Mr. Francisconi, you began to work 
for Union Pacific Railroad during 1970. Did you work for the £3 
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EXHIBIT C 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 




UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD CO., 
a Utah Corporation, 
Defendant. 



















DEPOSITION OF MICHAEL BERNARD, taken before Allan G. 
Kuhlman, a Registered Professional Reporter and General Notary 
Public within and for the State of Nebraska, beginning at the 
hour of 9:25 a.m., Friday, August 6, 1999, at 1416 Dodge 
Street, Omaha, Nebraska, taken on behalf of the plaintiff in 
the above-entitled matter, pursuant to the within 
stipulations. 
ALLAN G. KUHLMAN 
REGISTERED PROFESSIONAL REPORTER 
OMAHA, NEBRASKA 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
MICHAEL BERNARD - DIRECT EXAMINATION 57 
Q. In your report you've identified thirty-two occasions 
where Mr. Francisconi was reimbursed $3470 for gifts for 
individuals who provided him lodging. 
So of those thirty-two, which receipts did Union 
Pacific determine were inappropriate, not authorized by the 
expense policy or any other policy? 
A. The receipts that do not provide, that were not adequate, 
in our opinion, were the twenty-two that did not have itemized 
descriptions. 
Q. Which twenty-two are those? Why don't you read those into 
the record, the dates on those receipts. 
MR. WADDOUPS: I'll object here as going beyond the 
scope of the notice of the deposition. 
Mr. Bernard, I'll instruct you, if you know, you can 
answer, but I'll also instruct you not to speculate. 
Q. (By Mr. Burns) Which means you can answer the question, 
if you can. 
A. I don't want to speculate. 
Q. Do you have a document in front of you that would allow 
you to answer that question? 
A. No. 
Q. In number seven of my notice, plaintiff's notice of 
30(b) (6) deposition, we have requested that a person be 
provided by Union Pacific to answer questions as to "The basis 
for your belief that plaintiff violated the payment in lieu of 
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MICHAEL BERNARD - DIRECT EXAMINATION 53 
policy by," quote, this is a quotation out of Union .Pacific's ' 
answers to interrogatories, I'll represent, "Altering 
receipts, concealing the true nature of expenses, and by 
requesting and subsequently receiving reimbursement for 
improper, unauthorized expenses," that's the end of the quote, 
"as more fully set forth in the audit report prepared for 
plaintiff and produced at UP 00028, passim," which 208 is your 
audit report, right? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. I'm trying to understand which receipts are problematic. 
A. Can I answer that question? 
MR. WADDOUPS: If you know you can answer. 
THE WITNESS: Do I have to speculate? 
MR. WADDOUPS: Do not speculate. 
MR. BURNS: Then somebody needs to be provided to 
answe^' that question, because we clearly identified the 
subject matter to be questioned, and it was Union Pacific's 
responsibility to identify a person who can answer questions 
on that topic. 
MR. WADDOUPS: We have identified a person who can 
speak generally as to those topics, but we haven't received 
specific notice as to whether you want greater detail that 
goes beyond the face of that audit report. 
And now you're questioning him about another document 
that is beyond the face of that audit reoort and we haven't 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
EXHIBIT D 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 




UNION PACIFIC RAIL ROAD CO., a 
Utah Corporation, 
Defendant. 
Civil No. 960904423 
Judge Stephen Henriod 
DEPOSITION OF 
JOHN A. IVESTER 
TAKEN AT THE LAW OFFICE OF KELLEY & KELLEY 
1000 BOSTON BUILDING, #9 EXCHANGE PLACE 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
- DECEMBER 1, 1998 -
HORIZON REPORTING & VIDEO, INC. 
REGISTERED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS 
10 EXCHANGE PLACE, STE. 52 7 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
(801) 532-DEPO (3376) 
(801) 322-FAXX (3299) 
horizon@xmission.com 
REPORTED BY: JULIE N. CLEGG, CSR, RMR 
REGISTERED MERIT REPORTER 
HORIZON FILE NO. 120198J 
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1 in-lieu-of policy, correct? 
2 A.- We concluded that it represented a potential,. 
3 violation of the in-lieu-of policy. 
4 Q. Did you also conclude that it represented an abuse of 
5 the in-lieu-of policy? 
6 A . I think what we concluded, that it was more of a 
7 violation as opposed to an abuse, sir. 
8 Q. Were you ever in a meeting where Mr. Bernard or 
9 Janice Arthur or yourself recommended to Mr. Hale that it was 
0 an abuse or violation? 
1 A. I never met with Mr. Hale directly on this. 
2 Q. How about a couple of lines down, the R.V. battery, 
3 the three plastic pots, the battery post, the washer, etc? 
••••• ' i 
4 What was your conclusion as to the appropriateness of those 
5 gifts? 
6 A. I did not feel they were appropriate. 
* * 
7 Q. Did you ever contact Mr. Francisconi's father to 
8 determine whether or not he had requested those items? ' 
9 A. At the time, we weren't even sure who the items were 
i 
0 going to, because we did not have a name of the person that 
1 these items went to. So, no, I did not. 
2 Q. Well, at the time or anytime, do you know whether 
3 anybody ever contacted him? v 
4 A. I do not believe so. 
5 Q. And you certainly didn't, did you? 
45 
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1 A. No, sir, I did not. 
2 Q. Would it have changed your mind as to cheir 
3 appropriateness if you, for example, found out: that they were 
4 indeed given to him and that he had requested those items as 
5 a gift? 
6 A. I don't know. That's something I would have to talk 
7 to Janice and Mike to -- depending on the situation. 
8 Q. So what I am getting here is that you would not 
9 independently make a decision as to appropriateness; you 
10 would review them with Janice and Mike? 
11 A. That is correct. 
12 Q. Okay. Well, tell me what on this list -- just go 
13 down one by one and tell me what items that you and Janice 
14 and Mike determined were inappropriate and why the food & 
15 beverage, the first one --
16 A. I personally did not feel that was inappropriate. 
17 Q. Were all of these items on this list felt by 
18 somebody -- either the items, the amount or the documenta-
19 tion -- are all of the items on this list determined to be 
20 problem items? 
21 A. I don't believe so. This is just a summary of 
22 everything, the in-lieu-of lodging. 
23 Q. Do you recall which one of these were problem items? 
24 A. The Bon Marche receipts were a problem, right, 
25 because the objects had been cut out. The Fred Meyer 
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APPENDIX G 
Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion to Strike 
Fact Exhibits Contained in Defendant's Amended 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
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David J. Burns, Esq. (#7157) 
PARSONS, DAVIES, KINGHORN & PETERS 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-4300 
Facsimile: (801) 363-4378 
Daniel Darger, Esq. (#0815) 
Attorney at Law 
1000 Boston Building 
Nine Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-6686 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 




UNION PACIFIC RAIL ROAD CO. a Utah 
Corporation, 
Defendant. 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE FACT 
EXHIBITS CONTAINED IN DEFENDANT'S 
AMENDED MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. 960904423 
Judge Stephen Henroid 
Plaintiff Eugene Francisconi, by and through counsel, hereby submits the following reply 
memorandum in support of his Motion to Strike Fact Exhibits Contained in Defendant's Amended 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. 
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ARGUMENT 
Defendant argues that Plaintiffs motion to strike is a "technical" attack on the exhibits in 
jestion. This argument is consistent with Defendant's ongoing cavalier approach to the 
>verning rules. But Defendant should not be allowed to so easily disregard these rules, which 
this instance provide that a motion for summary judgment must be supported by the existing 
cord. The record consists of sworn testimony, and evidence otherwise admissible at trial. UTAH 
CIV. P. Rule 56(c); 4-501 (2)(B) C.J.A. Because the following exhibits would not be admissible 
trial based on the foundation provided by Defendant, they must be stricken. 
The Fact Exhibits Should Be Stricken 
In general, Plaintiff moves to strike most of the exhibits in question on grounds of lack of 
thentication, inadmissible hearsay (including hearsay within hearsay), and inadmissible opinion. 
UTAH R. EVID. 901 (a) provides that the requirement of authentication or identification is a 
Dndition precedent to admissibility" andrequires a showing of "evidence sufficient to support a 
ding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims." Authentication and identification 
present a "special aspect of relevancy," Rule 401. M. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
IOCEDURE § 6821 at 668. For instance, a telephone conversation offered to show knowledge 
the part of a speaker is not relevant unless the person speaking is sufficiently identified, nor 
a purported letter of the defendant relevant unless it is properly shown that the defendant 
tually wrote the letter. See, e.g., Mayer v. Angelica, 790 F.2d 1315,1338 (7th Cir. 1986), cert, 
nied, 479 U.S. 1037 (1987) ("The basic error is the admission of the four letters without any 
2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
authentication whatever. There was no proof that Frank Kimball wrote any of the letters, that any 
of them were ever sent, or that Angelica ever received or saw any of them.") 
UTAH R. EVID. Rule 803(6), the business records exception to the hearsay rule, provides 
that otherwise inadmissible hearsay may be admissible but only after the following showing is 
made: 
A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation in any form, of 
acts, events, conditions, opinions or diagnosis, made at or near the 
time by, or from information transmitted by a person with knowledge, 
is kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity and if 
it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the 
memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the 
testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, unless the 
source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation 
indicate lack of trustworthiness. 
Admissibility under Rule 803(6) rests upon "proof of a routine of making accurate records." 
M. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 6757 at 341. Whoever provides foundation 
testimony must show that 
the gathering of the information, its transmission, and its 
memorialization must all occur (1) in the course of a regularly 
conducted business activity and (2) it must be the regular practice of 
that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or 
data compilation in the form in which it was made. Thus the familiar 
questions: "Was it the regular course of business to make this 
record?" and "Was this record kept in the regular course of business?" 
An alternative form of question gaining popularity is "Was this record 
kept in the regular course of a regularly conducted business activity?" 
With respect to either alternative, the following questions are added: 
"Was this record made at or near the time of the matter recorded?" 
and "Was the record made by a person within the business with 
knowledge of, or made from information transmitted by a person 
within the business with knowledge of the acts, events, conditions, 
opinions or diagnosis appearing in it?" 
3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
f. at 354-358. 
Defendant primarily attempts to qualify Michael Bernard, director of auditing of the 
)mpany, as the custodian of some of the documents in question. When a party attempts to 
>tabiish the foundation through the testimony of the custodian of the record or other person 
miliar with the business and its mode of operation, the custodian must identify the record and 
itablish that it was made in the regular course of a regularly conducted business activity by or 
)m information transmitted by a person within the business with knowledge.1 Thus, the records 
jst be made by a person with knowledge or created from information transmitted by a person 
th knowledge.2 In addition, all persons furnishing and recording information must be under a 
1
 See Coghlin v. Capitol Cement Co., 571 F.2d 290, 307 (5th Cir. 1978) (There 
n be no doubt but that the party who seeks to introduce written evidence must in 
me way authenticate it. We agree that under the [business records] exception, 'the 
sstimony of the custodian or other qualified witness who can explain the record 
eping of the organization is essential. If the witness cannot vouch that the 
^uirements of Rule 803(6) have been met, the entry must be excluded." citing, 4 
EINSTIEN'S, EVIDENCE § 803(b) [02] at 803-143 (1972)); United States v. Reese, 561 
Id 894 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (copy of car rental agreement not admissible as business 
:ord without calling of custodian of car rental records); United States v. Hitsmsn, 604 
Id 443 (5th Cir. 1979) (copy of college transcript not admissible absent custodian or 
alified witness to testify as to how such records are kept). 
2/c/.ln N.LR.B. v. First Termite Control Co., Inc., 646 F.2d 424, 425-30 (9th Cir. 
81), the plaintiff, N.L.R.B., attempted to establish the necessary amount of interstate 
mmerce, and in this regard introduced evidence in the form of freight bills that were 
spared by Southern Pacific Railroad, but delivered to the purchaser of the goods, 
;onomy Lumber Co. ("Economy"). Tthe custodian of records for Southern Pacific, 
wever, was not called as a witness. Instead, the N.LR.B. called Economy's 
okkeeper as a witness. The bookkeeper testified that she had received the freight 
I, and that she had paid it, no other witnesses were called to support the admission of 
3 freight bill. The defendant objected to the introduction of the freight bill on grounds 
hearsay. On appeal, the N.LR.B. argued that under Rule 803(6) it is not necessary 
at the witness have knowledge of the preparation of the record; that it is sufficient if 
4 
i 
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duty to do so. United States v. David, 96F.3d 1477,1481-82 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The mere custody 
of the record by the proponent of the record does not incorporate the record into the proponent's 
business records. Belberv. Upson, 905 F.2d 549, 552 (1st Cir. 1990). 
A. The "Application for Employment" Should be Stricken Because it Lacks 
Proper Authentication and is Inadmissible Hearssay. 
Defendant maintains that Plaintiff authenticated the "relevant portions" of exhibit a during 
his deposition. (Def s Mem. at ii.) This assertion is false. Exhibit a was never shown to Plaintiff 
at his deposition. Plaintiffs counsel objected to the document that was offered as an incomplete 
copy of whatever it purported to be. (Eugene Francisconi deposition p. 10, attached to Plaintiffs 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike Fact Exhibits.) With respect to that document, Plaintiff 
the records "have all the indicia of trustworthiness that the federal rules require for the 
admission of hearsay evidence." The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected this 
argument, stating: 
The provision in the rule [803(6)] that requires that the 
record be supported by "the testimony of the custodian or 
other qualified witness" ensures the presence of some 
individual at trial who can testify to the methods of keeping 
the information. If the witness is not knowledgeable as to 
the manner in which the records are made and kept, he or 
she cannot be subjected to meaningful cross-examination. 
Without cross-examination on the keeping of the records, 
the trier of fact would have no rational basis on which to 
evaluate the accuracy of the record, and therefore the 
trustworthiness of the evidence. Thus, "[t]he testimony of 
the custodian or the qualified witness who can explain the 
record-keeping of his organization is ordinarily essential.' 4 
J. WIEINSTEIN & M. BURGER, WIEINSTIEN'S EVIDENCE fl 803(6) 
[02] at 151-52. 
With these principles in mind, the Ninth Circuit excluded the freight bills. "The 
bookkeeper from Economy had no knowledge of how Southern Pacific's records were 
made or maintained." Id. 
5 
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as never asked if he recognized it. He was only asked if he recalled signing page three, which 
dated August 10, 1970. He replied that he did not. (Francisconi Depo., p. 10) Clearly, an 
cknowledgment that his signature is affixed to some unrecognized document does not establish 
lat Plaintiff has personal knowledge that the application is what Defendant claims. Thus, if 
efendant was to properly authenticate the document through personal knowledge, it had to do 
) through the testimony of some witness other than Plaintiff. Defendant's decision to forego 
Gaining this other necessary testimony is fatal. 
Exhibit a is also inadmissable hearsay. Michael Bernard, the Director of Auditing for the 
)mapny, alleges: 
No. 6 Attached hereto as Exhibit 2 is a copy of the Application for 
Employment of Eugene Austin Francisconi dated August 10, 1970. 
Contained within the Application for Employment is a statement of the Terms 
and Conditions of Employment. The Application for Employment including 
the Terms and Conditions of Employment is part of the company's official 
records and is maintained in the normal course of business within Mr. 
Francisconi's personnel file. 
lefs Mem. at ii.) The basis for this conclusory assertion is not given. 
Mr. Bernard's statement completely fails to establish record evidence that exhibit a was 
epared by a person with knowledge or transmitted to the custodian of the record by a person 
th knowledge, fails to identify the regularly conducted business activity that supposedly 
merated exhibit a, fails to identify the record keeping practices of the company pursuant to which 
e record was supposedly maintained over the past 30 years as part of a regularly conducted 
jsiness activity, fails to identify the location of the alleged personnel file, and so forth. This 
>mplete and utter failure to satisfy the requirements of 803(6) is understandable, however, since 
6 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Mr. Bernard is the Director of Auditing. It would be surprising indeed if his duties included 
custodian of records more likely found in the personnel department or some department other 
than auditing. As such, exhibit a should also be stricken because it is inadmissible hearsay. 
B. The Affidavit of John Ivester and "in Lieu Of Lodging Schedule" Should be 
Stricken Because They Lack Proper Authentication and are Inadmissible 
Hearsay. 
Exhibit c, the Affidavit of John Ivester, is irrelevant because Defendant provided 30(b)(6) 
deposition testimony on the exact same subject matter. It was precisely because Plaintiff had 
received a variety opinions on the same subject matter that the 30(b)(6) deposition was taken. 
That the 30(b)(6) deponent declined to provide detailed testimony on the basis for Defendant's 
belief that Plaintiff submitted improper expense statements does not alter the fact that that was 
the company's testimony on the subject matter. Mr. Ivester's testimony on the same subject is 
therefore improper. Moreover, Mr. Ivester's personal knowledge as an agent of the corporation 
regarding the facts alleged in his affidavit cannot be presumed to have been imparted and relied 
upon by any decision-maker of the company. Utah Farm Prod. Credit Ass'n. v. Watts, 737 P.2d 
154 (Utah 1987). No showing is made that anyone at the company relied upon any information 
allegedly gather by Mr. Ivester. For this reason his testimony is irrelevant. 
Mr. Ivester's affidavit is a clear attempt to circumvent the statements that he made in his 
lengthy deposition. By submitting the affidavit, he is able to avoid cross-examination. At his 
deposition he was asked to disclose all information concerning his audit of the expense 
statements. Therefore, the only relevant information that could be contained in Mr. Ivester's 
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ffidavit has either been stated in his deposition, or should have been stated in his deposition or 
i a previous interrogatory propounded to defendant. 
The affidavit also contains inadmissible opinion. For instance, Paragraph 11 of the affidavit 
Dines that Plaintiff altered six store receipts "to conceal the nature of the merchandise 
jrchased." This opinion further contradicts Mr. Ivester's deposition testimony. There he stated 
at he did not make independent decisions concerning the appropriateness of plaintiffs expense 
atements, but rather would defer to his supervisors. (John Ivester deposition p.46). 
With respect to the In Lieu of Lodging Schedule, this summary contains hearsay within 
>arsay, and is entirely derivative. This point is proven conclusively by paragraphs 25 through 
7
 and 29 of Defendant's statement of facts, which rely upon the summary for information 
legedly supplied by unnamed "store personnel," unidentified "information to the auditor," 
lattached American Express statements, and so forth. 
No foundation is laid that the summary is based on personal knowledge, and that the 
immary satisfies the business records exception. Mr. Ivester's conclusory assertion that the 
immary "are business records maintained in the normal course of business" is completely 
thout foundation. 
C. The "Interview Summary" Should be Stricken Because it is Inadmissible 
Hearsay. 
Defendant attempts to rehabilitate the "interview summary" by attaching an affidavit from 
nice Arthur, the purported author of the summary. But Ms. Arthur's affidavit cannot be offered 
contradict her deposition testimony, wherein she testified that she had prepared a report of the 
:erview that was "a paraphrase based upon my memory and the notes that I had, yes." (Janice 
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Arthur Depo., p. 28). The notes that she had, she further stated, included the notes of "Mike 
Bernard and Jim Hale" as well as her own. She made no attempt (and makes no attempt in her 
affidavit) to identify which part, if any, of the "interview summary" was a product of her notes and 
of others' notes. (Arthur depo., p. 27). As such, the summary is not based on Ms. Arthur's 
personal knowledge, and is therefore irrelevant. By Ms. Arthur's own admission, the summary 
is merely a paraphrase of her memory and scribbled notes that may or may not be her own. 
Defendant fails completely to lay a proper foundation for the business records exception 
as well. The summary is hearsay, and/or hearsay within hearsay, because it purports to contain 
statements made by a person or persons other than Plaintiff. Moreover, that other person or 
persons are identified in the body of the summary only by the letter " I . " The statements attributed 
to " I " are inadmissible hearsay. With respect to the admissions attributed to Plaintiff, these too 
are hearsay. It is notable that none of the alleged statements that Defendant has cited in its 
memorandum as an admission of Plaintiff, appears in the handwritten notes Ms. Arthur says she 
prepared at the time of the interview. The alleged statements are, as Ms. Arthur admits, at best 
a paraphrase and a product of her notes, others' notes and her memory. Since there is no attempt 
made to distinguish between Ms. Arthur's memory and the others' notes, the alleged statements 
are inadmissible hearsay. 
D. The "Audit Summary" Should be Stricken Because it is inadmissible Hearsay. 
Defendant alleges that the "summary" is a product of Mr. Bernard's participation in the 
interview of Plaintiff on April 26,1996 as well as "the expense report irregularities disclosed by the 
audit." (Def s Mem. at vi). However, no attempt is made to distinguish between Mr. Bernard's 
9 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
srsonal knowledge about the statements made in the summary, if any, and statements made 
:the interview. The latter statements are primarily hearsay within hearsay, or information derived 
Dm some indirect source. The summary is also inadmissible hearsay because no attempt is 
ade to satisfy the business records exception. 
Eu Exhibits "L", "M" and "O" Should be Stricken Because They are Inadmissible 
Hearsay. 
Without reference to the record, Defendant makes a cursory and groundless assertion that 
e letters attached as exhibits I and m are "maintained in the company's COBRA offer and 
ections files and constitute business records maintained in the normal course of business." 
rithout more-much more-the letters are therefore inadmissible hearsay. The same situation 
evails with respect to exhibit o, for which no foundation is laid either. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court strike the foregoing 
chibits for the reasons stated. 
DATED this ^ / v day of January, 2000. 
PARSONS, DAVIES, KINGHORN & PETERS 
xL~j?, / ^ „ -
DAVID J. BURNS" 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing REPLY MEMORANDUM 
IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE FACT EXHIBITS CONTAINED IN 
DEFENDANT'S AMENDED MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT was delivered via United states mail, postage prepaid this ^ ^ d a y of January, 
2000, to the following: 
Jon E. Waddoups 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
60 East South Temple, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
Daniel Darger 
Attorney at Law 
1000 Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
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11 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
/ 
TabH 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
APPENDIX H 
Transcript of Hearing on Union Pacific's Motion 
for Summary Judgment, Dated March 7, 2000 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 




[N THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 





PACIFIC RAILROAD ) 
Utah Corp, ) 
Defendant. ) 
Case No. 960904423 
Supreme Court No. 20000408 
BEFORE: 
Hearing 
Electronically Recorded on 
March 7, 2000 
THE HONORABLE STEPHEN L. HENRIOD 
Third District Court Judge 
For the Plaintiff: David L. Burns 
SUITTER, AXLAND & HANSON 
175 S. West Temple #700 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: (801) 532-7300 
Daniel Darcrer 
9 Exchange Place #1000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)531-6686 
For the Defendant: Jon E. Waddoups 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & 
MCCARTHY 
50 South Main #1600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84144 
Telephone: (801)532-3333 
Transcribed by: Beverly Lowe RPR/CSR/CCT 
1771 SOUTH CALIFORNIA AVENUE 
PROVO, UTAH 84606 
TELEPHONE: (801)377-0027 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-2-
P R O C S S D I N G S 
(Electronically recorded on March 7, 2000) 
MR. WADDCUPS: (Court already in session when recorder 
was turned on) thank you, your Honor, and seated at counsel 
table with me is co-counsel, Alexander (inaudible). Your 
Honor, in order to proceed most efficiently through the 
argument today, I would like to just work our way through the 
various causes of action. There are five specific causes of 
action— 
THE COURT: As I said a minute ago, I've read 
everything you submitted. You did a good job outlining the 
five causes of action and why you believe that the plaintiff 
made a case on any of them, but you don't need to be redundant. 
MR. WADDOUPS: All right, let's go ahead and dive 
right through it, then. First of all, your Honor, I'd like to 
start with the second cause of action, this is the one for 
termination in violation of public policy. 
You'll note that plaintiff doesn't contest our 
arguments as to why this cause of action is without merit, and 
therefore we really don't need to address that any further. 
The second cause of action that I'd like to address is 
the third cause of action of the complaint. This is the cause 
of action for defamation. There are some facts in dispute in 
this case, but even with the facts in dispute we believe that 
this cause of action is without merit and should be dismissed. 
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The alleged factual basis for this cause of action is 
a statement by an employee, Tom Hague, on Union Pacific wherein 
he told a former employee, Barbara Tower, that Mr. Fransisconi 
had been terminated because he had been, quote, "cheating on 
his expense account," end quote. 
Putting aside for a moment the hearsay nature of this 
statement which was made by Barbara Tower during her deposition 
concerning the statement by another employee, Tom Hague, this 
cause of action is without merit for a number of reasons. Very 
first of all, there is no evidence that Mr. Hague made this 
statement, if he made this statement, within the course and 
scope of his employment for Union Pacific. Mr. Hague was not 
involved in the investigation of Mr. Fransisconi's expense 
accounts. He was not involved in a decision to terminate him. 
He wasn't in the same chain of authority as Mr. Fransisconi, 
and indeed appeared to have absolutely nothing with Mr. 
Fransisconi's employment or termination. 
THE COURT: Doesn't Mr. Fransisconi admit that he 
cheated on the in-lieu of account? 
MR. WADDOUPS: That's the next issue, your Honor, is 
that even if the statement were made and even if it were within 
the course and scope of the employment, the statement itself is 
true. Any other statements that the representatives of the 
company may have made are privileged because they were made 
within the narrow scope of trying to determine what should 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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1 happen to Mr. Fransisconi in connection with the investigation. 
2 Finally, Mr. Fransisconi hasn't put forth any evidence of any 
3 damages associated with that claim for defamation. 
4 Next, your Honor, I'd like to address the fourth cause 
5 of action, and this is for intention infliction of emotional 
6 distress. Again, the facts on this are in dispute, but let's 
7 look at the specific allegations and to see if this would 
8 possibly rise. 
9 First of all, Mr. Fransisconi claims that Union 
10 Pacific accused him of being a liar and a thief during a four 
11 hour meeting in Omaha, and that they were considering pursuing 
12 criminal prosecution against him. He alleges that they 
13 threatened to have the police search his father's home for 
14 stolen property. He claims that Union Pacific induced Mr. 
15 Fransisconi to sign a statement admitting responsibility in 
16 order to save his job, but then subsequently denied that and 
17 fired him anyway. 
18 The most significant allegation that's raised here is 
19 that Union Pacific attampted to somehow coerce him into signing 
20 a separation agreement by threatening to withhold COBRA 
21 benefits while his wife needed some elective surgery that was 
22 associated with it. 
23 Now your Honor, even if those facts as alleged by Mr. 
24 Fransisconi were true, and we believe that they are not true, 
25 your Honor, but even if they were they wouldn't meet the very 
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high standard that's necessary in order to make that a cause or 
action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
There's an extremely high standard there. It's not enough, 
even if the conduct is offensive or even immoral conduct. It 
has to be an extraordinary high standard of outrageous conduct 
that would support such a cause of action. 
We believe that the claim fails because any of these 
allegations or all of the allegations taken together doesn't 
allege a conduct that is sufficiently severe as to support a 
claim for intentional infliction. 
Let's look at the COBRA issue. First of all, let's 
make it real clear that Union Pacific did offer COBRA 
continuation coverage to Mr. Fransisconi and to his wife. Mr. 
Fransisconi declined that coverage and Mrs. Fransisconi 
accepted that COBRA continuation coverage. She had her 
surgery, and thank goodness she's fine with that. 
The indication we have, your Honor, is that for a 
brief period of time Union Pacific was considering the 
possibility of not offering COBRA continuation coverage to Mr. 
Fransisconi. It was entitled to do this under the COBRA 
provisions because of Mr. Fransisconi's gross misconduct. 
There is a gross misconduct exception to the COBRA coverage. 
If an employee commits a very serious misconduct, for example, 
misappropriation of company funds, then the company is not 
required to offer COBRA continuation coverage to the employee 
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1 or to any covered dependents. 
2 Union Pacific considered this for a period of time, 
3 had even discussed with Mr. Fransisconi that it intended not to 
4 offer him COBRA continuation coverage if he didn't accept the 
5 separation agreement, but Union Pacific later made the 
6 determination that it would in fact offer the coverage and it 
7 did, and everything is fine, thank goodness. 
8 Next, your Honor, I'd like to address the cause of 
9 action for fraud. Essentially within the cause of action Mr. 
10 Fransisconi alleges that Gary Lottman, who was director of 
11 police operations for Union Pacific during the April 26, 1996 
12 interview in Omaha, Mr. Fransisconi claims that Mr. Lottman 
13 told Mr. Fransisconi that if he would just sign a statement 
14 acknowledging his guilt then he could keep his job and all of 
15 his benefits if he would just sign that statement. 
16 First of all, your Honor, it didn't happen, but let's 
17 presume for a moment that it did. Even if it happened as Mr. 
18 Fransisconi says it did, well, first of all the claim has got 
19 to fail, first of all, because in order to state a cause of 
20 action for fraud there has to be a misstatement of a presently 
21 existing fact. Mr. Fransisconi claims that the promise that 
22 was made to him was some future performance, that if he signed 
23 now he would be allowed to keep his job in the future. 
24 Therefore, that is a statement of some future conduct, and 
25 specifically it is not sufficient to support a cause of action 
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1 for fraud. 
2 Next thing, your Honor, there was no detrimental 
3 reliance on behalf of Mr. Fransisconi. He really didn't change 
4 his position in any way in reliance on the alleged promise. He 
5 signed a statement acknowledging his responsibility for his 
6 misconduct. However, he didn't do anything different. He was 
7 relieved from his employment and he was offered a separation 
8 agreement, but he really didn't do anything and change in 
9 reliance on that promise. 
10 Next, your Honor, there's absolutely no clear and 
11 convincing evidence, specifically in dealing with a cause of 
12 action for fraud, as the Court well knows, a case must be made 
13 out with absolutely clear and convincing evidence, and there is 
14 no such proof here. 
15 Mr. Fransisconi is talking about something that 
16 occurred in a meeting with lots of people in attendance, and 
17 none of these people indicates that there was any such a 
18 promise, and in fact, Mr. Lottman himself did not have 
19 authority to make any such a promise on behalf of the company. 
20 Finally, your Honor, I'd like to turn to the first 
21 cause of action, and this is the most significant one that we 
22 need to deal with, and this is for the breach of an express 
23 contract. One of the things that is clear from Mr. 
24 Fransisconi's opposition memorandum is that he does not really 
25 claim that there was an express contract. Instead he claims 
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1 that there were several incidents that gave rise to an implied 
2 in fact contract between himself and Union Pacific. 
3 In fact, when you look at the various claims that Mr. 
4 Fransisconi makes and as you work through them individually, 
5 it's clear that none of these alleged incidents really creates 
6 any sort of an entitlement to continued employment by Mr. 
7 Fransisconi. 
3 I'd like to just highlight some of the key points that 
9 have been identified in our memoranda in support for the Court. 
10 First of all, your Honor, Mr. Fransisconi first became employed 
11 during 1970, and contained within his application for 
12 employment is a statement of the terras and conditions of his 
13 employment. This is attached to our memorandum in support of 
14 our motion for summary judgment as Exhibit A. 
15 If you turn to that specific statement of the terms 
16 and conditions of his employment, if you look right below where 
17 it says, "Terms and conditions of employment," the very first 
18 paragraph is something we need to point out. It says, quote, 
19 "Nothing in this application contained shall be construed as a 
20 contract of employ, but I hereby agree that in the event of my 
21 employment by the company pursuant to the foregoing application 
22 and continuing during the entire period or periods of my 
23 employment with the company in any capacity whatsoever, the 
24 following shall constitute the terms and conditions of my 
25 employment with the company, except insofar as any of such 
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terms or conditions may be in conflict with applicable 
collective bargaining agreements or prohibited by law." 
That's a very important point, your Honor, because it 
brings out the issue that the railroad has both agreement 
employees who are covered by a collective bargaining agreement, 
and non-agreement employees, such as management employees who 
are not covered by a collective bargaining agreement and do not 
have the benefits of that bargaining agreement. 
The other points which we have pointed out, paragraph 
No. 2 where it describes the term of employment, and in this 
paragraph Mr. Fransisconi specifically acknowledges that his 
employment except as identified during that first paragraph is 
at-will, it can be terminated at any time either with or 
without cause. &.>•• 
Then if you turn a couple of pages into the document 
to paragraph 20, there's the reflection that Mr. Fransisconi 
agrees that there can't be any waiver or modification of these 
terms and conditions of employment, including the at-will 
provision, unless there is a specific writing. 
Now with that in mind, your Honor, let's go ahead and 
turn back to Mr. Fransisconi's specific allegations. In his 
memorandum in opposition to the motion he relies on the in-lieu 
of policy, and he's got kind of a novel theory that the in-lieu 
of policy itself creates an implied in-fact contract, and the 
contract was that he wouldn't be terminated for using the in-
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1 lieu of policy, and he cites this Idaho case, 1989 Idaho case 
2 of Metcalf vs. Intermountain Gas. Well, your Honor, that's 
3 inapplicable for a couple of reasons. 
4 Very first of all, that's not Utah law. As a matter 
5 of fact, we have a case right on point, and we cite this in 
6 footnote 3 of our reply memorandum in support of the motion. 
7 This says the — here we go. This is the case of Robertson vs. 
8 Utah Fuel Company. This is Utah Court of Appeals 1995 case in 
9 which the court of appeals specifically rejected that same 
10 argument that an employer's policy itself creates an implied 
11 contract that says, "Well, you can't be terminated, you're no 
12 longer an employee at-will." 
13 This makes perfect sense, your Honor. If we turned 
14 every alleged violation of a company policy into a jury issue, 
15 there is no employment at-will doctrine, and a jury and not the 
16 company determines what its-policies are and what the 
17 applications are there. 
18 Finally, your Honor, I'd like to look at Mr. 
19 Fransisconi's claim that the upgrade policy itself somehow 
20 created an implied in-fact contract of employment. Now let's 
21 look at what Mr. Fransisconi has to say about that. He says, 
22 "Well, the upgrade policy itself created an implied contract of 
23 employment because on the very first page of the document, 
24 which is a transmittal letter, there is a statement that the 
25 policy will soon be implemented across the railroad's system." 
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Well, that doesn't mean anything for Mr. Fransisconi. It's 
simply indicating it's being implemented throughout the system 
rather than on a pilot program. 
In addition, Mr. Fransisconi looks at the same letter 
down at the bottom and he says, H0h, there's a provision down 
there where it says, 'Oh, look, this upgrade policy is a good 
thing, the company is going to implement it, and it's going to 
end up working as a benefit for all employees and for the 
company.'" Well, your Honor, that description itself indicates 
simply that it's going to be a good thing for the company, it's 
going to be a positive thing, and it doesn't make any 
indication that Mr. Fransisconi is going to be covered. 
When you look at the policy itself, and we've 
identified this in our memoranda, there are numerous provisions 
within a policy that make it very clear that this is intended 
to apply only to employees who are not covered by a collective 
bargaining agreement. There are numerous provisions in there 
dealing with representation by union representatives, being 
allowed to consult with your union representative, being 
allowed to be represented by a union representative during an 
upgrade hearing, et cetera. Of course, none of these applied 
to Mr. Fransisconi because he was a management employee. 
Your Honor, finally we have — Mr. Fransisconi himself 
has been employed — he had been employed with the railroad for 
approximately 25 years, couldn't identify one single incidence 
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in which a management employee had been offered an upgrade 
proceeding or had participated in an upgrade proceeding. 
We have the undisputed testimony of the executive vice 
president of the company saying that the upgrade policy was 
never intended to apply to management employees, but only to 
collective bargaining employees, and it has never been applied 
such. 
THE COURT: We do have Mr. Lottman saying something 
about a level 5 violation in that interview they had with Mr. 
Fransisconi? 
MR. WADDOUPS: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Level 5 is clearly referred to, at least 
some provisions in the upgrade policy. 
MR. WADDOUPS: That's correct, and your Honor, when 
you read Mr. Fransisconi's deposition — excuse me, when you 
read Mr. Lottman's deposition and determine what it is that he 
was talking about, Mr. Lottman was using — had referred to a 
level 5 upgrade as an indicia of how serious the misconduct was 
by Mr. Fransisconi. 
THE COURT: That's how Mr. Lottman tries to explain it 
after the fact, but it seems to me like maybe Mr. Lottman was 
mistaken and thought the upgrade thing did — why else would he 
use (inaudible). 
MR. WADDOUPS: Well, what he said within his -\ 
deposition, your Honor, was that he wanted— 
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THE COURT: I've read the transcript (inaudible), 
MR. WADDOUPS: He wanted Mr. Fransisconi to understand 
that. Further, your Honor, let's presume for a moment that Mr. 
Lottman somehow misunderstood that and thought that upgrade 
applied to Mr. Fransisconi. Mr. Lottman was not in a position 
to be able to change the terms and conditions of employment. 
You go back to the very first document that we had talked 
about, it's Exhibit A, which is the agreement where Mr. 
Fransisconi says, "Hey, my employment is at-will, it can be 
terminated at will at any time either with or without cause, 
and the only way that this can be changed is by an agreement in 
writing." We've got that very strong thing there. 
The next thing that you have to examine, your Honor, 
is when you're looking at an implied in-fact contract, as Mr. 
Fransisconi indicates, it's the burden of the plaintiff to 
establish very clearly that there was some sort of indicia of 
assent of intention by the employer to offer something other 
than employment at-will. It's got to be a very clear thing. 
In addition to that, the employee's belief that the employer 
offered some sort of employment other than at-will has to be 
very clear as well, and it has to be a reasonable belief. 
Now here's what we've got, your Honor. We've got a 
company with 20,000 employees in it, and in not one instance in 
which any management employee has been offered an upgrade 
hearing or has been placed into upgrade proceedings at any 
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time, there's just absolutely no evidence of any management 
employee ever being placed in that. We believe that that's a 
very strong indicia, _ ?r. ,••• 
Just to summarize, your Honor, Mr. Fransisconi got 
caught. He got caught altering receipts, he got caught 
purchasing things like makeup, pantyhose, maxi pads for his 
wife, RV batteries, a whole plethora of things that were 
identified in our memoranda. We've laid it out there for you. 
The termination was very clear. Mr. Fransisconi himself signed 
a statement indicating his acknowledgement of the facts. Even 
if you take that statement to the side, we've got Janice 
Arthur's notes that identify Mr. Fransisconi's own admissions 
and his statements against his interest that these items were 
purchased and they were given to his wife, they were given to 
his son, to his sister, that he altered the receipts to conceal 
the nature of the merchandise purchase and he knew that it was 
wrong. 
With that, your Honor, I'd like to reserve a little 
bit of time and we'll just leave Mr. Fransisconi to respond as 
he will. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Waddoups. 
Mr. Burns, are you going to argue for the plaintiff? 
MR. BURNS: Yes. Well, actually, our first cause of 
action and Mr. Darger will pick-up on the others. I'm not 
going to be repetitious and repeat the comments we make in our 
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memorandum in opposition. I just wanted to address the 
comments that are made primarily in the defendant's reply 
brief. 
Your Honor, the plaintiff has not made any admission 
that he violated the expense policy. He's not made any 
admission that he cheated on his expense policies. Gene 
Fransisconi is an honorable man, he's spent 26 years working on 
the railroad, he's a third generation railroader, a training 
officer, a meticulous person. 
I think it's important to dampen down some of the 
hysteria that seems to come out of the defendant's memorandum. 
If I might approach, your Honor, I want to (inaudible) the 
Court (inaudible) of what is being offered (inaudible). Union 
Pacific's position is that the receipts on the left were 
appropriate, and that's true for Gene Fransisconi as well as 
any other Union Pacific employee, and we know that from the 
many expense statements that they produced for other employees 
as well. 
Their position is that the expense — excuse me, the 
receipt on the right is a violation of the expense policy. We 
think that's a jury question as to whether in fact— 
THE COURT: Now these are the receipts Mr. Fransisconi 
carefully cut the receipt or took away the part that described 
what he actually purchased and left only the total, right? 
MR. BURNS: Gene Fransisconi was told this, your 
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Honor, he was told to get all the receipt onto one page 
(inaudible) cut out the itemized portion. 
There are two issues with respect to the expense 
policy. It is, was there a violation of the original receipt 
requirement? Gene Fransisconi always submitted the original 
receipt. Sometimes that original receipt contained those 
deletions, but it always contained the pertinent information 
which — again, the receipt on the left, which is appropriate, 
contains information like a date, name, the business, the total 
amount. He never submitted a receipt where the total amount 
wasn't exactly as it was on — at the point of sale. 
THE COURT: I don't think the defendant is alleging 
that he did that, they're saying he covered up the actual 
purchases because had they been visible people would have known 
he was buying things for his wife and other people and not just 
for his father with whom he stayed in Pocatello. 
MR. BURNS: And that's the second issue with respect 
to the alleged violation of the expense policy, wasn't it 
appropriate for Alfred Fransisconi? Now Union Pacific has 
simply misrepresented the record, to my mind, when it says that 
Gene Fransisconi has admitted that he bought these things for 
his wife, for his sister. That's simply not the case. Gene's 
testimony, the testimony of Alfred Fransisconi is that Alfred 
Fransisconi (inaudible) that those items— 
THE COURT: That's not going to fly very far, Mr. 
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Burns. I mean if that's his explanation then he violated the 
policy, as far as I'm concerned. That's a really lame 
(inaudible) to the allegation that he didn't use the policy 
properly. 
MR. BURNS: Well, that's the undisputed testimony, 
your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. BURNS: With respect to the contract — well, it's 
our position that all of the material issues of fact are 
disputed, and I'd refer the Court to the language in the in-
lieu of policy, which simply says that you will submit an 
original receipt in-lieu of some other expense. 
With respect to their — to the contract claims and 
their positions on that, the disclaimer, I think, is easily 
disposed of as a matter of law. The law in Utah is very 
explicit when it comes to disclaimers in the point of 
contracts. Disclaimers have to be conspicuous and they have to 
be set out ordinarily in bold print. We have an application 
that was executed in 1970. Gene Fransisconi didn't even have 
any personal knowledge of having signed it. 
The way that the disclaimer cases fall out, I give you 
an employment manual, I set forth in that employment manual a 
disclaimer. That disclaimer then is considered or is 
interpreted to be a part of any provision of that employment 
manual. For that reason this disclaimer had to be a part of 
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1 the expense policy, and it had to be a part of the upgrade 
2 policy that was to control those documents. 
3 We know from the Sanderson case, which involved an 
4 oral statement by a bank officer, "Take the time you need, get 
5 yourself better, you can come back when you feel better," that 
6 there was an expense — excuse me, that there was an employment 
7 manual, it had a disclaimer, the oral agreement superseded 
8 that. There was no disclaimer with respect to any of the 
9 contracts that we've alleged. 
10 With respect to the consideration argument, continued 
11 employment provides the necessary consideration. Gene 
12 Fransisconi was prevented from further performance. His 
13 further performance was (inaudible) in other words his 
14 continued employment, but that was rejected and he wasn't 
15 allowed to continue to be employed. We don't think there's a 
16 consideration issue here. 
17 With respect to the first cause of action — excuse 
18 me, the first claim that goes to the expense policy, in-lieu of 
19 policy in particular, the primary response on that is that 
20 Johnson is on point. Johnson was not reviewed by the Supreme 
21 Court, cert was denied, has not been applied by any other court 
22 in the State of Utah. To my mind it's distinguishable on its 
23 facts. The plaintiff in that case was not terminated because 
24 he used the drug policy. It simply said that if we ask you to 
25 take a drug test you may be terminated or disciplined if you 
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refuse to take that test. 
Gene Fransisconi was terminated, and they've 
admitted — and this is subject to an interrogatory, he wasn't 
terminated he used the expense policy. One of the critical 
distinctions between Johnson and Mr. Fransisconi's situation is 
that Gene Fransisconi could not perform his job unless he used 
that expense policy. It was a necessary intregal part of his 
job, he spent 5 0 percent of his time on the road throughout the 
nine state area, his area of responsibility (inaudible) 
necessarily that that became an implied part of that employment 
contract, the expense policy. 
Metcalf, we believe, is directly on point. Yes, it is 
an Idaho Supreme Court decision, but the facts are especially 
relevant; therefore, we think it certainly should have some 
persuasive authority. 
With respect to the upgrade policy, what seems to be 
the upgrade policy of Gene Fransisconi was delivered in 1994 
(inaudible). At the time he was delivered that — by the way, 
I should parenthetically say that Union Pacific has referred to 
numerous references in their upgrade policy to union employees, 
et cetera, but it doesn't cite anywhere in its memoranda the 
so-called provisions in which should have alerted Mr. 
Fransisconi to the fact that this didn't apply to him. I think 
necessarily we confer that they don't exist for that reason. 
Arthur Shoener, the vice president of Union Pacific, 
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1 was asked where in this upgrade policy does it say that it 
2 doesn't apply to Gene Fransisconi. He couldn't identify any 
3 provision. Mr. Shoener was asked to identify any 
4 correspondence, any written communication to Gene Fransisconi 
5 or any other employee that the upgrade policy didn't apply to 
6 someone like Gene. He couldn't identify it. All the 
7 defendants have come forward — all that the defendant has come 
8 forward with are two obscure letters between a union official 
9 and somebody else, which they have not demonstrated in any way 
10 was ever disclosed to Gene Fransisconi. 
11 Now whether the Union Pacific policy was that this 
12 applied to a manger or not may be probative, but it certainly 
13 isn't dispositive. All that matters with respect to the issue 
14 in question, which is was there a unilateral contract, is what 
15 did Union Pacific communicate to Gene Fransisconi, and all that 
16 Gene Fransisconi had before-him was this upgrade policy ever 
17 sent to him at a time when he didn't supervise anybody. He 
18 hasn't supervised anybody as a training officer since 1976. He 
19 gets his, he doesn't have any reason to get it, he doesn't 
20 handle union employees or anybody else. He looks at it, he 
21 looks at the front page, he looks at the rest of it. It 
22 appears to him that he qualifies. Gary Lottman in his — and 
23 they have not come forward with any evidence that Gene was 
24 informed of anything else throughout the duration of his 
25 employment. 
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Now we took the depositions of Alan Hill, Gene's 
replacement, and Alan Hill testified he thought it applied to 
him as well. Clearly there is a question of fact as to whether 
this upgrade policy applied to someone in his position or not. 
In any event, Gary Lottman could certainly raise the 
issue in the interview. Neil Vargoson, the most senior person 
there who was in Gene's direct line of authority. He in fact 
was standing in for a vice president in that meeting also 
admitted that he discussed the issue, and I believe it was Mr. 
Vargoson, actually, who testified that he raised it as some 
kind of indicia of the seriousness of Gene's alleged 
violations. 
So they've admitted that certainly it was discussed. 
Gene didn't just grab this out of thin air. He was offered 
upgrade and as part of his agreement to sign this confession. 
With hindsight, signing that confession admittedly, I think — 
certainly if I was his attorney and I was advising him at the 
time I would have told him not to sign it. Under the duress of 
the situation he did, we're dealing with it. 
By the way, we think that that statement just simply 
goes to weight. Certainly they cited — they've tried to refer 
the Court to the criminal laws with respect to the withdrawal 
of a confession. We simply don't believe that that's at all 
relevant. That's a question for the jury to decide and 
attribute weight to it or not. We've disavowed it, we don't 
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think that it certainly should be controlling here. 
• Gene only had the upgrade policy before him. We think 
that it's a question of fact as to whether that created an 
implied in-fact contract. We think that Alan Hill's belief 
that it applied to him necessarily proves positive that no 
reasonable juror — and that's the standard that this Court has 
to apply — Alan Hill believed it, and certainly it cannot be 
said that no reasonable juror could conclude that Union Pacific 
had unilaterally offered him terms of employment other than at-
will with respect to the upgrade policy, and we think for that 
reason it should go to a jury, at least on the upgrade policy. 
Now Sanderson is on point with respect to the 
interview. He signed this, I will — you can keep your job. 
The consideration is Gene would have been continuing 
employment. He was prevented from continuing to be employed. 
All that they've — they've tried (inaudible) opposition to 
that is a disclaimer, which again, we think is under the law is 
clearly not to be applied. Sanderson again is on point. With 
respect to the promise upgrade or resign, same situation, 
Sanderson controls. Thank you. 
- THE COURT: Mr. Darger goes first. 
MR. BURNS: Let me — does the Court have any question 
about the contracts? 
THE COURT: No. 
MR. BURNS: Thank you. 
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1 MR. DARGER: Your Honor, just briefly I want to run 
2 down these other causes of action. First off on the public 
3 policy issue, your Honor, I don't think there's any question 
4 but that the issue of continued health coverage for people who 
5 leave one job and go to another or are terminated is the issue 
6 of substantial public policy, and that that is codified not 
7 only in the federal law of COBRA, but in state laws. 
8 That is, I think, goes without saying it's a clear and 
9 substantial one. The issues here that they seem to be 
10 attacking on that are that it didn't apply to his firing, but 
11 the cases that they cite clearly indicate that the basis for a 
12 public policy claim is that the conduct must bring the public 
13 policy into play, and I believe here today, your Honor, that 
14 their allegation is that his conduct was gross misconduct, and 
15 that's why they had a right to deny COBRA, and they spent this 
16 period of time trying to decide whether or not they were going 
17 to do that. So his conduct clearly brought the public policy 
18 of whether or not he was going to be covered into play. 
19 The other issue was that the conduct which brings the 
20 public policy into play was a cause of his firing, and again, 
21 the cause of his firing, by their own admission, is this 
22 supposed gross misconduct. I would suggest to your Honor that 
23 it does meet those prongs, that essentially what they did was 
24 they determined, "Hey, we are going to — we want this guy to 
25 sign this resignation. We're going to yell and scream that 
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1 he's engaged in this gross misconduct and threaten him, that if 
2 he doesn't he's not going to have any coverage," and that ,v 
3 conduct that they claim was gross misconduct is exactly what 
4 brought the whole issue of COBRA into play, and I think that it 
5 does meet the test set out in Utah case law, your Honor. 
6 Secondly on the fraud issue, they claim that it has to 
7 presently exist imminent material fact, and that future 
8 employment is not a presently existing fact. I would just 
9 suggest to the Court that the presently existing material fact 
10 at issue here is not future employment, but the presently 
11 existing prospect of immediate termination that was present 
12 during that meeting, that he was facing immediate termination, 
13 and in reliance upon their representations, he filled out a 
14 statement in order to save his job. 
15 * They said there was no detrimental reliance. I can't 
16 think what's more detrimental than to first off sign a 
17 statement where you admit after 25 years of service to this 
18 company and loyal exemplary service where you admit that you 
19 cheated the company. And that's in the face of your father's 
20 40 years with the company and your grandfather's 25 years with 
21 the company. I'd suggest that that was very detrimental to Mr. 
22 Fransisconi, and nevertheless after doing so and after all of 
23 these threats he continued to refuse to resign and immediately 
24 disavowed that statement. The presently existing material 
25 facts and the reliance are present in this case, your Honor. 
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1 The third issue, defamation, Mr. Fransisconi does not 
2 admit that he cheated, and I know that the Court doesn't think 
3 much of his excuses about these items. I'd suggest to the 
4 Court Mr. Fransisconi is making $60,000 a year plus benefits, 
5 that according to our economist, add up to about $90,000 a 
6 year. His kids are raised, they're gone. He doesn't need to 
7 buy maxi pads and to cheat on his expense accounts. His father 
8 is up there, his mother just died, and his father is there, so 
9 now he's staying with his father. He's been paying 50 bucks a 
10 night to stay at the Cotton Tree Motel up there, and instead 
11 what he's doing is he's staying with his father. He takes his 
12 father shopping under the in-lieu of policy, which, by the way, 
13 allows cash. And his father says, "I want this and I want 
14 that. I want to stock my bathrooms because when you people 
15 come up I want you guys to have what you need, and I have a 
16 girlfriend now that's coming over," and it's his father's 
17 decision. 
18 I suggest to the Court that maybe in hindsight it was 
19 stupid that he would do that, but Mr. Fransisconi did not 
20 (inaudible) to cheat to get deodorant and maxi pads. 
21 THE COURT: Him needing to cheat isn't— 
22 MR. DARG2R: I understand that, your Honor, I 
23 understand that, but after 25 years with that company and to do 
24 something like that, it just doesn't add up, and I would 
25 suggest that a reasonable jury would say, "Well, maybe that is 
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1 something that at that time was reasonable. Maybe his dad goes 
2 and says, 'Let's go shopping, let's go down to CostCo, and I 
3 want this and I want that.' What's he going to say, 'No, Dad, 
4 you can't have it. I have to buy you a plant instead because a 
5 plant is what is appropriate.'" He could have given the cash 
6 to his father, his father could have gone shopping at CostCo by 
7 himself, same results. 
8 But nevertheless, your Honor, I think that overall and 
9 particularly given the fact that Mr. Johnson reviewed all of 
10 those statements never asking once, "What's this about, how 
11 come there is no detail here?" He reviewed them, he approved 
12 them, he sent them on, that over a period of time not only the 
13 receipts that were shortened and excised, but also receipts 
14 that didn't have any details because they were a credit card 
15 slip. 
16 Anyway, as to the defamation, there were only several 
17 people in that room that day who accused Mr. Fransisconi of 
18 being a thief, and yet here's Tom Hague now, a manager of Union 
19 Pacific down in Los Angeles telling Barbara Tower up in 
20 Seattle, "Mr. Fransisconi is a thief, and he was terminated for 
21 stealing." I suggest that the inference is the only place that 
22 Mr. Hague got that information was from one of the people in 
23 that meeting. If they're closed mouthed and they're saying 
24 that, then Mr. Hague as a manger of Union Pacific certainly has 
25 the — is in a position to bind the company. 
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1 With regard to the intentional infliction, your Honor, 
2 here is a man for 25 years starting out of high school, he has 
3 no educational training other than his career with the railroad 
4 for 25 years, and one day he goes to this meeting and he's told 
5 that he's a liar and a thief, and he goes, "Okay, well, what do 
6 I do to save my job?" Then they say, "Okay, you sign this 
7 thing, and now guess what, you're out of here. Here is your 
8 resignation. You sign that." They take him back accompanied 
9 by railroad police officers, he's met at the airport. This is 
10 a man who's been a manager, who's been the regional director of 
11 safety exemplary employee for 25 years. They take away his 
12 keys, won't let him go back to the office, they check out his 
13 house, get the camera and things out of his house, and then he 
14 starts getting phone calls and pressure from Union Pacific, 
15 "You better sign that thing because not only are we going to 
16 deny you COBRA, but,-you're not going to get your vacation pay, 
17 we're not going to pay you your last month's rent, and we're 
18 going to prosecute you criminally, and we're going to have your 
19 father's house searched and your relatives' houses searched," 
20 and on and on and on. 
21 You know, when I took over this case, your Honor, I 
22 sat there and said, "Now why would Union Pacific do this?" The 
23 facts as I see them simply say that first off it's very unclear 
2 4 as to what the in-lieu of policy provides, and why didn't 
25 somebody just say, "Hey, we want this information and that's 
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1 not right. We've got 25 years invested in you, Mr. 
2 Fransisconi, and we've never told you before, in fact we've 
3 been approving it, but we're telling you now you shouldn't be 
4 doing that even if your father wants to." I mean let's get it 
5 clear here, and don't do it anymore. No, that didn't happen. 
6 I'm saying to myself, "Why did this happen and why did 
7 they get rid of this exemplary employee?" That's when after I 
8 took depositions in Omaha and we're sitting there, and it turns 
9 out it's Mr. Shoener who had Mr. Fransisconi fired. It was his 
10 decision. We were sitting there in a restaurant and Mr. 
11 Fransisconi says, "I don't get this at all. I mean I thought 
12 Mr. Shoener liked me. I mean we used to sit around and talk 
13 because he used to tell me about this woman I went out with who 
14 he used to go out with as well." I looked at him and I go, 
15 "Really?" 
16 And as it turns out in taking Ms. Tower's deposition, 
17 not only was she Mr. Shoener's mistress before, but after Mr. 
18 Fransisconi's firing, and unbeknownst to him, he had been 
19 having a relationship with the executive vice president of 
20 Union Pacific's mistress. That to me provided the why in this 
21 case, and that is the kind of behavior that I think is 
22 outrageous. 
23 If you have an opportunity to listen to Mr. Shoener's 
24 testimony you'll find that he is a man of very large ego who 
25 was very happy living in (inaudible) at the top of the Union 
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Pacific building in Omaha where only the most powerful reside. 
I suggest to the Court that a jury would think, "We know what's 
going on here. We know why Mr. Fransisconi was terminated when 
numerous other employees who actually lied and changed numbers 
on receipts, who flew to Aspen to ski and then lied and said it 
was some sort of business meeting, they were all caught and 
'Oh, don't do that again.' They're all working there." 
Your Honor, finally, the argument of counsel that 
Union Pacific has every right to do what it is legally — to 
threaten to do to Mr. Fransisconi what it's legally entitled to 
do. Of course, they're talking about the COBRA, the vacation 
and things like that. They cite a New York case, your Honor, 
to the extent that you cannot claim that a coercion for doing 
something you have a legal right to do. 
But I suggest that the reason they cite a New York 
case is because that is not the law in Utah. The law in Utah 
is set out in another case, a Utah case, and that is the case 
of Athco Financial Services, and if I might approach the bench 
I didn't have a copy of that case, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. DARGSR: The Athco case on the — it's looks like 
it's the third page back there says as follows: "(inaudible) 
has become when the defendant was in fact coercing" and this is 
at the second paragraph at the top of the page, "was in fact 
forced to sign a contract by lawful (inaudible) or threats. If 
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1 plaintiff' s actions are lawful or unlawful or brought with 
2 improper motive, he cannot be heard to say that he was merely 
3 exercising a legal right." That's regardless of whether or not 
4 he had the legal right to do it. Why did they make that 
5 threat, and they go on to cite this case out of California, 
6 "one has no right to threaten another in order to accomplish an 
7 ulterior purpose with a grandless action or with an action to 
8 enforce some just legal demand where the purpose is not to 
9 enforce the demand but rather to — by exceeding the needs for 
10 enforcement thereof or to meet the legal process as to oppose 
11 his adversary and to cause some unnecessary hardship. A threat 
12 to use the legal process constitutes duress where its coercive 
13 effect is to overcome the freewill of the victim." 
14 I suggest, your Honor, that the fact that he was never 
15 prosecuted, the fact that he was eventually extended COBRA 
16 is — creates an inference that the purpose that they were 
17 making these threats were not because they were seriously 
18 considering it, but the purpose was — and if the Court has the 
19 opportunity, listen to the recorded phone calls of Mr. Campbell 
20 to Mr. Fransisconi, the purpose was clearly, clearly to coerce 
21 Mr. Fransisconi into signing that separation agreement. 
22 There's no question that Mr. Campbell knew Mrs. Fransisconi was 
23 in need of surgery and had scheduled surgery for a non-elective 
24 operation to avoid paralysis in her spine. That is the kind of 
25 conduct that a jury would say is outrageous, your Honor. That 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-31-
is not merely heavy handed, that is the kind of conduct that is 
made for this claim of intentional infliction. Thank you. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Waddoups? 
MR. WADDOUPS: There have been a number of points 
raised, and I'll try and address them briefly. First of all, 
your Honor, concerning the first cause of action for breach of 
contract, there's been a suggestion that somehow the in-lieu of 
policy itself was a contract and that he couldn't be fired if 
he used the in-lieu of policy the way that he was supposed to. 
However, your Honor, when you look at the policy itself 
contained in the expense reimbursement manual, it's clear that 
it's talking about a reasonable and proper substitution for the 
expense, it has to be supported by an original receipt. Your 
Honor, a receipt that's been cut in half and put back together 
to delete the description is not a proper description. 
In addition to the — excuse me, when you look in the 
personal expense handbook, and we submitted this as an exhibit, 
it's Exhibit D to our memorandum in support, this contains the 
in-lieu of policy on page 13, and if you go a couple of pages 
beyond to page 15 it has some additional information. It's 
very important to understand about what's authorized for use by 
the company. 
At the very top of the page it talks about business 
gift expenses, and there it very clearly lays out that in order 
for a business gift to be deductible by the company, the 
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business gift can't exceed $25 per person per year. That's an 
IRS regulation. In fact, Mr. Fransisconi gave thousands of 
dollars worth of merchandise to his father, and through his 
father to his wife, to his son, to his sister. 
In addition to that, your Honor, on the same page 15 
of the personal expense manual, it identifies some specific 
items that are not reimbursable as expense. Item No. 1 on that 
list says, "Items that are submitted without an adequate 
receipt or an explanation." Your Honor, that's what we had in 
this case. It's very unfortunate Mr. Fransisconi was 
terminated after 25 or 26 years with the company; however, it 
was Mr. Fransisconi that was responsible for that. 
Had Mr. Fransisconi clearly disclosed what he was 
doing, and if he had really thought that it was appropriate, he 
could have been corrected soon enough so that it wasn't — it 
didn't rise to the level that he had to be terminated for the 
offense. But the real key is where he cuts the receipts, 
actively conceals from his supervisor and from his others 
what's going on. 
Also, your Honor, on page 15 of the personal expense 
handbook it talks about other non-reimbursable expenses. Item 
No. 6 lists purchases of clothing or toiletries. Well, Mr. 
Fransisconi purchased both, clothing that ended up being given 
to his wife, and to others, and toiletries specifically 
referenced there. 
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THE COURT: I'm pretty much with you on that, Mr. 
Waddoups. 
MR. WADDOUPS: All right, thank you, your Honor. 
THE COURT: He violated the policy and he covered it 
up. I'd like to hear your response to Mr. Darger's argument, 
because frankly, this $2,250, if I remember roughly, what the 
audit showed that he took that he shouldn't have, it does feel 
as if there was an overreaction here to that extent of the 
problem, meeting with all of these people, going so far out of 
the company's way to threaten him. I understand big 
organizations are afraid of these kinds of lawsuits and so they 
like to create a paper trail. They wanted his admission to 
what he had done wrong and wanted him to sign a separation 
agreement. 
But it still feels — actually, I don't like the 
plaintiff's attempt to bring Ms. Tower in. Then it turns it 
into some of these distasteful areas that we'd rather avoid, if 
you can help it, but that sort of thing does seem more 
reasonable as the basis for what does appear like an 
overreaction than his (inaudible) cheating, which I believe he 
did, there's no question about that. 
MR. WADDOUPS: Your Honor, let me address that 
directly, then. Mr. Fransisconi was brought in in an audit of 
the 200 largest expense accounts within the company. When the 
company was looking at the various results of these audits, it 
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tried to classify the offenses into three general buckets. 
The first one were things like, oh, just kind of bad 
judgment or a mistake, an honest mistake would be the first 
bucket that they identified. 
The second bucket were things like poor business 
judgment where people had claimed things or reported things 
that were very poor business judgment, but really didn't rise 
to the level of the intent to really deceive the company. 
The third bucket that the company identified were 
those cases in which there was an actual intent to conceal or 
to deceive the company, showing some sort of culpability, and 
those individuals who fell into category No. 3 were terminated 
by the company. It didn't matter whether they were responsible 
for taking a very small amount, whether they were responsible 
for taking a very large amount. The fact is that the company 
looked at that and said, "If we've got somebody who is 
intentionally stealing from the company, we need to terminate 
their employment," and that's what they did. 
THE COURT: There were others than just the plaintiff. 
MR. WADDOUPS: Absolutely, your Honor. And you'll 
recall, we went through the discovery disputes over this, and 
the plaintiff has had a full opportunity to look at that. All 
of those individuals who were categorized and category No. 3 
were terminated, and that's the way that it worked out. Mr. 
Fransisconi fell within there because of his active intent to 
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1 deceive as demonstrated by the altered receipts, and that's 
2 what resulted in it. 
3 Just touch on a number of items here, your Honor. Mr. 
4 Fransisconi again talks about the upgrade policy and he says, 
5 "Hey, Alan Hill thought it applied to him." Your Honor, the 
6 case law is clear that a person's belief has to be reasonable. 
7 When you look at Mr. Hill's deposition he says, "Well, yeah, I 
8 thought it applied," but he didn't have any reason for why he 
9 thought it might apply to him. Later on he indicated, "Well, 
10 he really didn't know for sure, but that's kind of what he 
11 thought." 
12 When you look at the upgrade policy itself, Mr. 
13 Fransisconi says it doesn't have anything about how it doesn't 
14 apply to him. Well, if you look on page 1 of the upgrade 
15 policy it states that all collective bargaining agreements 
16 apply, it again makes a similar reference on pages 3, pages 4 
17 of the upgrade policy. 
18 The public policy, Mr. Darger talked about the public 
19 policy cause of action and has attempted to resurrect that, 
20 even though there's been no argument in the memorandum 
21 associated with it. Then he says, "Well, insurance rights are 
22 important, and that's surely an important public policy." Your 
23 Honor, that's why COBRA is there, and in fact Mr. Fransisconi 
24 was offered his COBRA continuation coverage, he declined it, 
25 and Mrs. Fransisconi accepted it. What more can you say on it? 
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1 I He further talks about the fraud cause of action and 
2 he says, "Well, I know what it was," Mr. Darger says, "He says 
3 the presently existing fact was that Mr. Fransisconi faced 
4 immediate termination and he wanted to be backed out of that 
5 immediate termination." Well, your Honor, if you look at that 
6 argument, Mr. Fransisconi wasn't terminated on April 26th, he 
7 was suspended. He was subsequently given a proposed separation 
8 agreement that would allow him to resign from the company 
9 effective a month later, May 27th, and he chose to reject it. 
10 So as far as the fraud argument, it's just simply not there.
 ;. .. 
11 Similar with the defamation cause of action, there's 
12 this alleged remark by Tom Hague somewhere in California to 
13 someone else that Mr. Fransisconi had been cheating. There is 
14 just nothing there. 
15 Your Honor, in addition, counsel cites this Athco 
16 Finance case, and I have to admit, your Honor, I haven't seen 
17 that before it was handed to me at counsel table, it wasn't 
18 cited in the brief. But in my very quick reading of that case 
19 it appears to deal with the issue of whether or not a contract 
20 is enforceable as a matter of duress. In this case Mr. 
21 Fransisconi did not accept the separation agreement, he did not 
22 voluntarily resign from the company; therefore, it appears that 
23 there would be no duress, and the legal standard that's cited 
24 there doesn't seem to apply specifically. 
25 Finally, your Honor, turning back to the intentional 
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infliction of emotional distress claim, again, your Honor, we 
dispute many of the claims that Mr. Fransisconi makes in 
support of this. The strongest one, it seems to be, this COBRA 
offering, and I'd just kind of like to go through the timeline 
to conclude on that. 
First of all, the interview in Omaha where Mr. 
Fransisconi was confronted and asked to explain his conduct . 
regarding his expense accounts occurred on April 26th of 1996. 
Mr. Fransisconi was then taken out of service, in essence 
suspended pending a formal decision. 
On May 1st Mr. Fransisconi was informed that his 
employment was going to be terminated and that the company was 
sending him a proposed separation agreement, and advised him to 
consult with an attorney. He received the proposed separation 
agreement on May 2nd, which again, called for him to 
voluntarily resign effective May 27th. He was given up until 
May 17th to either accept or reject that proposed agreement. 
He rejected it on May 17th. 
Now here's something that's particularly confusing, 
was that Mrs. Fransisconi had surgery scheduled for June 5th of 
1996, so more than two months after Mr. Fransisconi was 
interviewed in Omaha. According to the company's records the 
COBRA coverage continuation letter was sent on June 7th of 
1997. Mr. Fransisconi declined the coverage, but his wife 
accepted the coverage on June 21st, I believe, is the date 
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1 there. 
2 Your Honor, the way that that COBRA continuation 
3 coverage works is an employee is covered under a group medical 
4 insurance plan. When they are no longer employed by the 
5 company they are no longer covered under the plan- However, 
6 under the COBRA law, certain qualified employees and their 
7 dependents are offered continuation coverage for a period of 
8 time at their own expense. That continuation coverage is 
9 normally offered within 3 0 days after the termination of 
10 employment. 
11 The employee is then given a 60 day period during 
12 which to consider the offer, and they can either accept or 
13 reject at any time during that 60 day period after they've 
14 received a notice, and once they're received the notice, the 
15 coverage becomes retroactive and it goes right back to the date 
16 of termination when their coverage otherwise ended. 
17 And that's exactly what happened in this case. Mr. 
18 Fransisconi was offered COBRA continuation coverage, he 
19 declined and his wife accepted, the coverage became 
20 retroactive, and Mrs. Fransisconi's surgery was covered, and 
21 she admits in her deposition that all of the expenses were 
22 paid. 
23 With that, your Honor, unless there are other specific 
24 questions that the Court has, we'd like to go ahead and submit 
25 it on that for the reasons that we've stated. We think that 
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it's clear that none of the causes of actions that have been 
alleged are really ripe to go to a jury at all, that no 
reasonable jury could find on that basis, and we'd ask for 
summary judgment on all points. To the extent that the Court 
may believe that there are some issues, we'd request partial 
summary judgment. Thank you, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Waddoups. The matter is 
under advisement. I'll get back to you with a ruling as soon 
as possible. 
I assume you want your original upgrade policy back. 
MR. WADDOUPS: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: I have a copy in the materials you've 
provided me. What about these two receipts? 
MR. DARGER: Thank you, your Honor. There is one 
issue that I think the record needs to be corrected on, your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. DARGER: That is that we have evidence of numerous 
individuals who would be involved in this so-called third 
category who falsified records that were not terminated, and 
this was not really briefed in any of the briefs, but we've got 
a whole stack of them. If the Court recalls, we had to fight 
and actually come into court to get that information, but that 
is clearly a misrepresentation of the facts in that regard. 
THE COURT: If you'd love to file something responding 
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to that, something very brief, say, five pages to supplement, 
you may do that within the next 10 days and I'll take this 
under advisement. i 
MR. DARGER: Thank you, we appreciate that. 
THE COURT: You can have a day to respond to his if 
you would. 
MR. WADDOUPS: Thank you, your Honor. 
(Hearing concluded) 
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APPENDIX I 
Copy of Union Pacific Personal Expense Reimbursement Form 
Submitted by Gene Francisconi on or about 
July 6, 1995 
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APPENDIX J 
Union Pacific General Rules for Administering 
Discipline Effectively (UPGRADE Policy) 
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PGRADE 
POLICY 
Union Pacific General Rules for 
Administering Discipline 
Effectively 
Effective July 1, 1994 
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UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY 
m 6 D O 0 G £ STREET 
OMAHA. NEBRASKA 681 79 
May 27, 1994 
ear Fellow Employee: 
On July 1, 1994, Union Pacific will begin implementation of a new 
mployee Discipline Policy, called UPGRADE, (Union Pacific's General Rules for__ 
jministering Discipline Effectively), across the entire railroad system. UPGRADE has 
>en tested in a pilot project for the last eighteen months on three service units, some 
rstem maintenance-of-way gangs, the Harriman Dispatching Center and one 
:omotive shop. The positive results of the pilot justify the decision to implement 
DGRADE system wide. 
The goal of UPGRADE is to establish a Discipline Policy that is fair, 
nsistent and effective, with an emphasis on corrective action and training rather than 
punitive discipline. That goal was achieved during the pilot project. Specifically, 
5 UPGRADE pilot was very successful in that discipline in these areas was reduced 
d understanding of, and compliance with, the rules has increased. Such results 
mplement our efforts in the areas of safety, employee satisfaction and cost control. 
As I mentioned, the start-up date for system implementation is July 1. 
ere will be an UPLINC BTV broadcast on June 7th,at 10:30 a.m., to provide an 
erview of the Policy for all employees. This program will be rebroadcast on 
:cessive shifts on June 7th and again on June 9th. A more detailed BTV Broadcast 
UPGRADE will follow late in June for managers and Labor representatives. 
The accompanying copy of the UPGRADE Policy is for your information and 
erence. It would be beneficial when attending one of the BTV Broadcasts to bring 
' Policy with you. Any questions concerning UPGRADE should be directed to Lee 
ach, Director-Operating Practices and UPGRADE Coordinator, Room 625, Omaha. 
Again, based on the pilot results, I'm optimistic the new UPGRADE Policy will 
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erview 
UPGRADE Discipline Policy 
xjuction UPGRADE is intended to strvt as a consistent, less punitive, yet progressive 
method of documenting discipline problems and modifying behavior, with 
the objective of ensuring that problem behavior does not recur. 
ctlve July 1, 1994 
cy jellnes • All collective bargaining agreements apply. ~ • All possible rule violations, except certain Level 5 violations, must be re-
viewed with the Employee prior to implementing UPGRADE discipline 
procedures. 
• Employees must be allowed to discuss the terms of the discipline with 
union representation. 
• Managers are encouraged to verbally counsel Employees, when appropri-
ate. 
• For implementation, all Employees will enter the UPGRADE system at 
Discipline Level 0. Level 3 or 4 violations will, however, initiate a 
review of Discipline History for the preceding 36 months and this history 
will be considered in determining discipline to be assessed for the current 
infraction. In any case, discipline to be assessed for any infraction will 
be determined using the UPGRADE Discipline Assessment Table and the 
Progressive Discipline Table following procedures on page 3 of this 
policy. 
• Following implementation, current discipline status is established when 
discipline is issued. All non-dismissal disciplinary action clears after 36 
months without another violation. 
• The charging Manager shall not be the hearing Manager in any case. 
• Existing policy and procedures pertaining to Rule 1.5 (Rule "G") viola-
tions- shall continue to be followed and such cases shall be considered 
Level 5 violations. 
• Corrective Action Plans are required for all Employees assessed disci-
pline at Levels 2, 3, or 4. 
• Discipline cases for Level 5 violations will be reviewed for consistent 
policy application by an Executive Committee consisting of Representa-
tives from Human Resources, Labor Relations, and the Employing 
Department. 
• FRA Engineer Certification Requirements, with regard to suspension of 
certificate for certain rules infractions, are not preempted by this policy. 
• The UPGRADE Coordinator will be consulted before an Employee is 
charged with a Level 5 offense, other than for Rule 1.5 (Rule "G"). 
«< / M U I O U n A O i c i r D A I I o r \ A n i i D . ^ D A n : niQPIP! !KJP PROf-POl JRFR 
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Initiating the UPGRADE Process 
Introduction When possible, the Manager will conduct an initial review of an incident 
with the Employee in order to build an understanding of the incident, not to 
determine guilt. The Manager will: 
Procedure 1. Prepare Manager ponion of Form 1 (Incident Review). 
Note: Form 1 must not be used in a formal hearing or investigation. 
2. Ensure that Employee understands the purpose of the Form 1 Review 
(see Introduction). 
.. 3. Review Manager's understanding of the incident with the Employee as 
documented on Form 1. 
4. Obtain Employee's version of the incident for Form 1. 
Note: The Incident Review can be conducted over the phone or in person 
by having the Employee complete Form 1 in person. 
5. The following information should be used as a guideline in completing 
Form 1: 
• What happened? 
• Who was involved? 
• Where and when did the incident occur? 
• Do not cite rule violations. 
• No accusations are to be made. 
6. The Manager will then determine whether there is sufficient evidence to 
continue the UPGRADE process? 
if NO, Form 1 is destroyed and the Employee notified of the decision 
not to issue charge. 
if YES, Employee is notified of the decision to charge the Employee 
and proceed with the UPGRADE process. 
Note: Verbal counseling may be used in some cases by the Manager. 
n n n o T M incc? 
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etermining Discipline Levei 
reduction If the UPGRADE process is to continue upon completion of the Incident 
Review, the Manager must complete Form 2, determining the discipline level 
to be assessed by consulting applicable rule books, the UPGRADE Dis-
cipline Assessment Table and, when applicable, the Progressive Discipline 
Table. The Manager will: 
Dcedure 1. Determine the alleged rule violation using applicable rule book. 
2. Complete Form 2 as follows: ~ 
a. Specify the rule(s) violation(s) in Section One. 
b. Check or list the applicable ruie(s) or policy publication(s) (Section One). 
c. Determine the level of the alleged rule violation by reviewing the UP-
GRADE Discipline Assessment Table (pages 6 - 7) and complete Section 
Two. 
d. Obtain the Employee's current discipline status and/or history from PINS 
(PNX 034) and complete Section Three. 
1) For Level 1 or 2 violations, review PENS Discipline History for 36 
months or to effective policy date whichever is less. 
2) For Level 3 or 4 violations, review PINS Discipline History for 36 
months in all cases. 
3) Determine current discipline status by applying the UPGRADE Discipline 
Assessment Table to the highest level violation contained in the Disci-
pline History. Discipline History Prior To Policy Effective Date will be 
assigned status no greater than Level 3. 
e. Determine whether violation resulted in property damage (SI50,000) or a 
Lost Work Day Personal Injury requiring next higher level of discipline. 
f. Using the UPGRADE Progressive Discipline Table on page 8, complete 
Section Four (using information in Sections Two and Three). 
g. When applicable, complete and attach waiver portion of Form 5 (Engineer 
Certification SuspensionyRevocation Notice). 
3. Prepare the Notice of Investigation consistent with applicable Collective 
Bargaining Agreements and attach it to Form 2. 
Note: If the discipline level assessed is the result of an Investigation or 
Formal Hearing, Form 3 will then be completed with the information 
from Form 2 and evidence developed at the hearing. When applicable, 
complete and attach the Following Hearing portion of Form 5. 
'X /i iMinM DA.^ICI.^ DA ii o n AH ' i sosAnc m^r ip i IM£ p a r v ^ m IEPQ 
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Discussing Discipline with an Employee 
Introduction This portion of UPGRADE pertains to the effective communication that 
must take place between the Employee and Manager. The intent of this 
communication is to ensure complete understanding of the rule violation, the 
discipline called for under UPGRADE, and the Employee's options. The 
Manager will: 
Procedure 1. Explain to the Employee the UPGRADE process and the discipline 
assessment by reviewing Form 2 (Sections One - Four) for all Level 1-4 
\ cases. A formal hearing is required for Level 5 cases. (Except some 
Rule 1.5 cases.) . /'. > -
2. Discuss options available to the Employee. 
OPTION A: Accept discipline as explained. 
OPTION B: Proceed to Formal Hearing. 
Note: The Employee may talk with a union representative prior to selecting 
an option. 
3. Obtain the Employee's signature associated with the option selected. 
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he Corrective Action Plan 
ltroduction A Corrective Action Plan is required for all Level 2, 3, or 4 discipline 
assessments. The Corrective Action Plan will be used by the Manager and 
the Employee to address how the unacceptable behavior is to be modified. 
The Correcnve Action Plan should be creatively designed to meet the 
requirements of the UPGRADE policy and satisfy the needs of the Employee 
and the Company. The use of the Corrective Action Plan is considered 
development, not punishment. To develop the Corrective Action Plan, the 
Manager will: 
rocedure l. Discuss the purpose of Form 4, The Corrective Action Plan, with the 
Employee. 
2. Describe the behavior to be modified by the Employee and suggest how 
Employee may modify the behavior. 
3. Ask the Employee to describe their suggestions on how they plan to 
change or modify their behavior. 
4. Identify the training or helpful ideas required to modify the behavior 
with the Employee. 
5. Establish review dates and a completion target for the action plan. 
6. Review the requirements of the action plan with the Employee. 
NOTE: In the event an agreement cannot be reached for a Corrective 
Action Plan, the Manager has the responsibility to set an appropri-
ate plan. 
7. Sign and date Form 4, the Corrective Action Plan. 
8. Obtain the Employee's signature and the date on the Corrective Action 
Plan. 
9. Provide the Employee with a copy of the completed Corrective Action 
Plan, Form 4. 
10. Review Corrective Action Plan periodically for compliance. 
11. Upon completion of the Corrective Action Plan, note completion and 
place the form into the Employee's record. 
5 /UNION PACIFIC .RAILROAD UPGRADE DISCIPLINE PROCEDURES 
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The UPGRADE Discipline Assessment Table 
Introduction To determine the discipline level of the current rule infraction, use the 
following table to find the rule violated and the level of discipline which that 
rule infraction calls for. The significance of this table is demonstrated by 
the consistency of the application of discipline. 
Table 
UPGRADE Discipline Assessment Table •-•'•':\^-:':'-AC-''' 
1 Violation of these rules * 
General Code of Operating Rules 
• Chapter 1.0 General Responsibilities 
- Chapter 2.0 Railroad Radio Rules 
- Chapter 3.0 Standard Time 
• Chapter 4.0 Timetables 
• Chapter 5.0 Sicnais & Their Use 
UPRR Safety Rules (Ch. 70-83) 
I Maintenance of Way Rules (Ch. 56) 
General Code of Operating Rules 
- Rule 1.1 4 Condition of Tools and Equipment 
• Rule 1.2.5 Reporting 
• Rule 1.9 Resold of Railroad Co. 
- Rule 1.11 Si&spmg 
- Rule 1.13 Comply vsirth Instructions 
- Rule 1.33 inspection of Freight Cars 
• Ruie 2.5 Comm. Not Unde'siood— 
- Rule 5.3.3 Signal Disippsararice 
• Rule 5.4-5.5 Rags and Signs (Placement) 
• Chapter 6.0 Movement of Trains and Engines 
- Chapter 7.0 Switching 
- Chapter 8.0 Switches 
Train Dispatcher Rules (Ch. 20-26) 
Air Brake and Train Handling Rules (Ch. 30-34) 
Maintenance of Way Rules (Ch. 40-55 L 57) 
- Rules 1.3.1 & 1.3.3 (Chiei Engrs. last., Proc Manual & Stds., 
Signal Dept. FRA Insp. & M;ca. Instr., Book of Standards.) 
UPRR Safety Rules • Cardinal Safety Rules1 
- Rule 70.12 Safe Working Space j 
- Ruie 70.14 Lifting and Moving Materials ' 
- Rule 70.32.7 Crossing Through Equipment 
- Rule 71.1, 71.2, 71.4-71.6 Personal Protective Equipment ' 
• Rule 80.21.3 Coupler-KnuckJe Adjustment 
- Rule 80.21.7 Coupling Air Hoses 
- Rule 81.1.1 Riding on Moving Equipment 
- Rule 81.4 Getting OrvOff Equipment 
- Rule 81.5 Face Ladders or Steps 
- Rule 81.17 Hand Brakes 
Timetable and Special Instructions 
1
 Employees a/6 responsible lor all Cardinal Safety 
Rules which may apply to the nature of the work 
being performed. 1 
Results in '-. . 




Letter of Reprimand 
Up to one day of one round t rp 
alternative assignment with pay 
to develop a Corrective Action 
Plan to modrfy behavior. 
Pay will be in accordance with 
Employe* Involvement GukkFines. 
Where Chapter Numbert are thown, all Rules within Chapters) are Violation Level indicated EXCEPT FOR: Specific Rulw which may be feted 
by rule number e\ a different level Where rule number* are shown it includes Sub-Rules unless specified otherwise. Rules mciude any 
modification to rule through General Order, M of W General Order, SALERT, Timetable, of Timetable Special Instruction, 
Any rule violation which resufts in $150,000 property damage or a Lost Work Day Personal Injury will receive the next higher level discipline. 
For assessment d greater discipline when indicated per note 
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UPGRADE Discipline Assessment Table 
Violation of \i)e$e rules * 
| General Code of Operating Ruies 
- Ruie 2.13 (Radio) in Place of Hand Signals 
- Ruie 5 3.7 Raoio Response 
• Ruie 5.4 Reverse Movements 
- Ruie 5.13 Yarc Limns 
- Ruie 5.14 Restricted Lfmrts 
• Ruie 5.15 Apcrc-acning Raiircad Crossings .. 
• Ruie 5.19 Rag Protection 
- Ruie 5.23 Emerce.ncv Stco or Severe Slack Action 
• Ruie 5.29 inspecting Trains 
• Rule 7.5 Testing Hand Brakes 
- Ruie 7.5 Secunng Cars cr Engines 
- Ruie 8.15 Swnches Run Through 
- Rule 8.20 Deraji Location and Position 
- Chapter 9.0 Block System Rules 
- Chapter 10.0 Rules App. Only in CTC 
- Chapter 11.0 Ruies App Oniy in ACS/ATS 
- Chapter 12.0 Ruies App. Oniy in ATS 
- Chapter 13.0 Ruies App. Only in ACS 
- Chapter 14.0 Ruies App. Oniy within TWC 
- Chapter 15 0 Track Bulletin Ruies 
- Chapter 15.0 Ruies App. oniy in DTC 
Maintenance of Way Ruies 
- Chapter 42 On-Track Operations . . . 
• Rule 43.10 Protecmo Aaainst Pass. Eauioment 
| - Rule 55.1.2 Testing tor Quality 
General Code of Operating Ruies 
- Rule 5 4-5.5 "tags & Signs (Speec & Stepping Requirements) 
- Ruie 5.12 Protection of Occ Outfit Cars 
• Ruie 5.13 Blue Signal Protection of Workmen j 
- Rule 5.14 Signs Protecting Equipment 
- Ruie 5.2 lnruatmg Movement 1 
• Ruie 5.3 Main Track Authorization 
• Ruie 5.25 Movement Against Cum. of Traffic 
- Rule 5.27 Movement at Restricted Speed 
- Rule 5.31 Maximum Authorized Speed (when speed exceeds 
authorized speed by 10 mph or 1/2 authorized speed, which-
ever is less) 
- Ruie 9.5 Where Stop Must be Made (Except Rule 9.5.5) 
- Rule 15.1 Track 3ulietms 
• Rule 15.2 Protection by Track Bulletin Form B 
- Rule 15.3 Auth. Movement Against Curr. Traffic 
Maintenance of Way Rules 
- Rule 55.1.3 Compromising Signal Safety 
Timetable and SDecial Instructions 
- Rules 245(n). 2*5(p), and 245(q) 
General Code of Operating Ruies 
• Rule 1 i Drugs and Alcohol (Ruie "G'l 
I • Rule 1.12 Weapons 
I • Rule 1.6 Conduct. Employees must not be ... 1) Careless of 
Safety; 3) Insubordinate; 4) Dishonest; 5) Immoral; 
6) Quarrelsome 
- Rule 1.7 Altercation 
• Felony Conviction I 
• Fraud 
•Theft __[ 







j Discipline j 
Frve days off work without pey 
and may be required to review 
rules which pertain to the specific 
violations involved prior to return-
ing to work. A Correctrve Action 
Plan must be developed upon 
return to work. 
Thirty days off work without pay 
and must p a n necessary annual 
operating rules or equivalent in 
order to return to work. A Cor-
rectrve Action Plan must be de-
veloped upon return to work. 
60 Days off work without pay and 
must pass necessary annual op-
erating rules or equivalent in or-
der to return to work. A Correc-
tive Action Plan must be devel-
oped upon return to work.*" 
Permanent dismissal. 
Where Chapter Numbers are shown, all Rules within Chapterts) are Violation Level indicated EXCEPT FOR: Specific Rules which may be listed by 
rule number at a different level. Where rule numbers are shown it includes Sub-Rules unless specified otherwise. Rules include any modification 
to rule through General Order, M of W General Order, SALERT, Timetable, or Timetable Special Instruction. 
Any rule violation which results in $150,000 property damage or a Lost Work Day Personal Injury will receive the next higher level discipline. 
For assessment of greater discipline when indicated per note 
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UPGRADE Progressive Discipline Table 
Introduction The level of discipline to be assessed for the current rule infraction, is 
determined by referring to both the Progressive Discipline Table and the 











i And the Current Discipline 
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* Ln cases where Level 4.5 discipline has been assessed, the discipline status is 
considered Level 4 for the purpose of this table. 
** If the Employee's discipline status is Level 4 due to a single violation and the 
current violation is Level 1 or 2, the discipline status will remain at Level 4. 
NOTE: If an Employee commits three repetitions of the same rule infraction during a 
36 month period (deluding missed calls) the discipline will be assessed at 
Level 5 - Permanent Dismissal. 
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lesponsibility Tables 
itroduction UPGRADE details specific responsibilities for the Managers who will be involved in the 







Assess Discipline ; 
Enter Discipline In PINS 











Manager B * ~ 
UPGRADE Coordinator or 
Authorized Representative 
Manaaer B * 
UPGRADE Coordinator or 
Authorized Representative 
Core Person Designated By 
Superintendent or Equivalent 










1. Initiates UPGRADE Process. 
2. Determines Discipline Level. 
3. Evaluates the Application of UPGRADE. 
4. Discusses Discipline with the Employee. 
5. Processes Completed Discipline Forms. 
6. Conducts Level 1 - 4 Hearings. 
7. Assesses Discipline Levels 1 - 4 . 
8. Reports Discipline To core person for PINS entry. 
9. Reviews Discipline Process Continually to Ensure 
the Process is Meeting Policy Guidelines. 
10. Conducts Level 5 Hearings or Assigns a 
Representative. 
11. Authorizes Assessment of Discipline at Level 5. 
12. Reviev/s Level 5 Discipline for consistent policy 
application. | 
NOTE: Manager A, as the Charging Manager, may not be the Hearing Manager. 
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Appeal Authorities 
Introduction UPGRADE provides a two step appeal process consistent with the provisions 
of existing collective bargaining agreements. The table below explains who 
has responsibility for handling those appeals. 
Responsl-
bllltles 
Appeal . 1 Discipline Level 1 - 5: 
1 | Superintendent or Equivalent 
p Labor Relations 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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RRST HUrfE / U soc sec NCX 
TTTU HB£ DATE DEFLSEJMCE LHT WORK LOCATIOHGAXI 
MANAGER'S COMMENTS 
Employee's COMMENTS 
U > U G S r S SK>*TURE AKD DATE Erncicr*^ SGKA.TURE ANO DATE 
^ l t r ^ , n I ^ D A H C HIQHDI iwc PPOr.Fni 1RFS 
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B WAIVER/HEARING OFFER FORM 2 
Lfett NVM 
Job T)fa Krt C»» DapcServxa thrt 
TOOY-S CttTt 
RLE KfLMB£R 
Soc Sec No. 
Wort LoawarvG^g 
Section One Based on the facts brought forth in our discussion on you are allegedly in violation of Rule(s) 
found in the following Union Pacific Railroad pubiication(s) 
Check the appropriate box: 
• Union Pacific Rules 
• Timetable 
• Other: (specify) 
In connection with: (oescnbe incident) 
Section Two Under the UPGRADE Discipline Assessment Table, the violation listed in Section One requires a minimum discipline of LEVEL . 
Section Three Disciplinary action within the past 36 months or since policy effective date, when 
aoolicabie. (Rule and description) 
RULE DESCRIPTION OF VIOLATION LEVEL DATE 
mis equates to a current discipline status of: LEVEL 
Section Four Under the UPGRADE Progressive Discipline Table, the current violation plus the 
current discipline status require the assessment of: LEVEL . 
The violation Did Did Not result in an incident which requires 
assessment of the next higher level of discipline. Therefore, the required 





D OPTION A: I, the undersigned Employee, have discussed the alleged 
violation(s) with the responsible manager and have been afforded a 
right to union representation in making my decision to accept the disci-
pline listed above and to waive any rights to a formal investigation. 
Eropiorw SIGNATURE WTE 
• OPTION B: I, the undersigned Employee, have discussed the alleged ' 
violation(s) with the responsible manager and do not agree with the 
facts or the recommended discipline. I understand that a formal investi-
aation will be held to review all the facts of these alleaations. 
cmciorw SOiATURc OTE 
kUH^GEJTS SGNATUBE Dtfl 
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ASSESSMENT OF DISCIPLINE 





JOS TITLE j HIRE W 7 I 
RRST NAME/' Ui SOC. S£C. NO. 
DEFT; ScRVJCc LJNiT WO*K LOOTON / O ^ G 
As a result of facts developed in the investigation held on 
you were in violation of Ruie(s) 
Union Pacific Railroad publication(s): 
Check the appropriate box: 
D Union Pacific Rules 
• Timetable 
D Other: (specify) 
found in the following 
Violation Summary:. 
Under the UPGRADE Discipline Assessment Table, these violations require a minimum 
assessment of Level discipline. 
SECTION I Disciplinary action within the past 36 montns or since the policy effective date, where 
THREE I_applicable. (Rule and Description): 
HUL£# DESCRIPTION OF VIOLATION LEVEL DATE 
This record equates to a current discipline status of LEVEL 
SECTION I Under the UPGRADE Progressive Discipline Table, the current violation plus your current 
FOUR discipline status require an assessment of LEVEL discipline. 
This violation Did Did Not result in an incident requiring the assessment of 




M ^ U G c R S SJOWTURE C*Tt 
,r- r^i-^r\r^r-r\\ m r P 
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ffl CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN 










Frcxars WTH i 
RLE NO. 
j SOCIAL SECURITY NO. 
MANAGER: Describes the behavior to be modified by the Employee pertaining to 
this incident 
Employee: Describes the specific actlon(s) or steps to be taken to accomplish the 
required change In behavior, 
Employee and MANAGER: Identity any specific training or other instruction -•••: 
needed to achieve the required change In behavior, •^•^ ; 
MANAGER: Identify all review dates tor checking progress toward completion of 
the behavioral change and/or the specific deadline for completion. 
We have read these statements and agree that they satisfactorily list the responsibilities for the successful 
completion of this Corrective Action Plan. 
1 RESPONSIBLE MANAGER SIGNATURE 1 Eroioyee SIGNATURE DATE ~ "~~~ | 
1 
1A /iiMinw DAnnr PAH PHAD UPGRADE DISCIPLINE PROCEDURES 
*"N •<! X — ' «*-«•, 
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(attachment to Form 2 or 3) 
TODAY'S DATE 
FILE NO. 








Please be advised if you accept discipline, you will no longer meet the 
qualification requirements for the position of Locomotive Engineer, as 
specified by the Federal Railroad Administration in 49 CFR Part 240. 
This decision is based on violations listed on Form 2/3 as they relate to 
49 CFR 240. , the applicable portion which reads: 
As required by 49 CFR 240.307, Union Pacific Railroad is mandated to 
revoke your locomotive engineer certification. As provided in Part 240.117 
paragraph G, the pertinenf period of revocation imposed is month, 









In Consideration of findings of the hearing on (Date), 
you no longer meet the qualification requirements for the position of 
Locomotive Engineer, as specified by the Federal Railroad Administration in 
49 CFR Part 240. 
This decision is based on findings sustained at the hearing as they 
relate to 49 CFR 240. , the applicable portion which reads: 
As required by 49 CFR Part 240.307, Union Pacific Railroad is mandat-
ed to revoke your locomotive engineer certification. As provided in Part 
240.117 paragraph G, the pertinent period of revocation imposed is 
month, year(s), or ineligible for certification during EAP. 
have read this statement and agree that it satisfactorily lists- the requirements for 
;pension / Revocation of Engineer's Certification. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
GLOSSARY 
The following definitions, while not all inclusive or absolute, are intended to 
guide the determination of whether various acts by Employees meet necessary criteria 
to be considered a violation of applicable Level 5 Rules. 
ALTERCATION 








When an Employee's actions cause or result in a vehe-
ment quarrel characterized by physical activity such as 
pushing, shoving, or fighting. 
When an Employee's actions demonstrate an inability 
or an unwillingness to comply with safety rules as 
evidenced by repeated safety rule infractions. 
When an Employee's actions or statements constitute 
stealing, lying, cheating, or deceiving the Company. 
When an Employee's actions or statements are an 
intentional misrepresentation of fact for the purpose of 
deceiving others so as to secure unfair or unlawful 
gain. 
When an Employee's actions are contrary to commonly 
accepted moral principles. 
When an Employee's actions or statements indicate a 
refusal to carry out the clear instructions of a supervi-
sor (as opposed to a failure for cause) which are work, 
safety, or policy-related and which conform to accepted 
Company and industry practice, or when an Employee 
demonstrates gross disrespect towards a supervisor. 
Any failure to comply with Union Pacific's Drug and. 
Alcohol or Equal Employment Opportunity Policies will 
be construed as insubordination. 
When an Employee's continued behavior is inclined or 
disposed toward an angry verbal confrontation with 
others in the work place. 
When an Employee's action is intended to and/or re-
sults in the taking and/or removing of property or other 
items of value from the Company, it's customers, or 
other Employees without proper authority. 
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